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Preface 
 
 
 
 
This book has two principal aims. Firstly, it aims to defend metaphysics, chiefly 
against the logical positivists. Secondly, it aims to defend objective non-logical 
necessity and possibility against empiricist views which hold that the very notions 
are unintelligible and which reject the view that there is ontologically grounded 
modality. As an adjunct, I defend a conception of the tasks of ontology against the 
objectual conception adopted in some contemporary discussions. 
 Chapter 1 concerns philosophies which have been thought to seek the 
elimination of metaphysics. I argue that the common view that Hume considered 
all metaphysics meaningless and sought its elimination is the misguided result of 
the positivist appropriation of Hume. I suggest that Carnap’s revisionary view of 
meaning, in accordance with his notion of logical syntax, poses no serious threat to 
metaphysics. I set out the logical problems associated with Ayer’s notion of 
indirect verifiability and the well-beaten dispute about the status of the verification 
principle itself. I indicate my intention to study the modality involved in 
verifiability and my view that, setting aside the aforementioned logical problems, 
the classification of cognitively meaningful statements as either analytic or 
empirical is inadequate. I discuss a modal argument against metaphysics offered by 
N.R. Hanson, my criticism of which serves to illustrate a broad form of essentialist 
argument, common to much essentialist work, which might justifiably be attributed 
to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Given the case for saying that the Tractatus is in fact 
committed to realism about a (very restricted) class of modality de re, it should not 
be regarded as anti-metaphysical in the manner of the positivists. I suggest that: 
Wittgenstein’s attitude to metaphysics was more subtle and more tolerant than that 
of the positivists; contrary to the views of some commentators, his Philosophical 
Investigations neither establishes nor seeks to establish anti-essentialism. 
 In Chapter 2, informed by developments in contemporary anti-realism 
(with which I am not allied), I set out my argument so that the initial issue is not 
that of realism/anti-realism about modality, but that of primitivism/anti-
primitivism. I argue that modal discourse is primitive, i.e. neither eliminable nor 
reducible to non-modal discourse. I endorse a strict distinction between 
eliminativism and reductionism. After McGinn, I outline epistemological 
motivations behind such anti-realist positions. In order to assuage these I provide 
some modal epistemology. I adopt a broadly Kripkean account of de re modal 
knowledge while disputing the famous Kripkean tenet that there are necessary 
truths typically discoverable a posteriori. I take it, after Wiggins, that it rests upon 
a misconception about the form of essentialistic attributions. I illustrate the 
distinction between necessary truths and true statements of de re necessity using 
the necessity of identity as a key example. I try to improve on the epistemology 
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offered by Kripke and largely subscribed to by McGinn. Taking Quinean 
empiricism as a paradigm, I argue, after Pap, Wright and McFetridge, that the 
modal eliminativist’s position is untenable due to its own incoherence. I argue that, 
beside other problems, modal reductionists such as David Lewis and D.M. 
Armstrong face difficulties in respect of purging the appeal to primitive modality 
from their own theses. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether a reductionist 
account of modality can succeed. 
 In Chapter 3 I illustrate how modal projectivism is ill-placed to account 
for de re modality. I expand upon the distinction between logical and metaphysical 
modality. Having distinguished, under Hacking’s influence, between de re and de 
dicto modality, I argue for realism about a class of de re modality on the basis of 
work done by Wiggins. I charge that anti-realist conceptualism about modality and 
essence results in an untenable and epistemologically barren metaphysic. In 
addition, when the conceptualist realist dialectic developed by Wiggins is duly 
recognized, anti-realist conceptualism fails to get off the ground. That dialectic is 
ignored by Sidelle, yet it undercuts his attack on real essentialism. 
 In Chapter 4 I expand upon the de re/de dicto distinction. I discuss the 
conceptions of the modality involved in the notion of verifiability in principle 
which can be extracted from the works of the logical positivists themselves. I 
claim that the logical positivists conflated logical possibility and substantive 
possibility despite their predominant intention to characterize verifiability in terms 
of logical possibility of verification. I argue, further to the discussion of modal 
epistemology in Chapter 2, that the classification of cognitively meaningful 
statements as either analytic or empirical is inadequate. I defend the allocation of 
de dicto status to constructions employing the logical modalities. I discuss the 
issue in relation to some revisionary accounts of logical possibility offered under 
the influence of essentialist thought. I reject these, seeking to maintain the 
distinction between logical and metaphysical modalities. My views are influenced 
by the writings of McFetridge and Wiggins. I conclude with a brief comment on 
empiricism and essentialism in relation to the conflation of logical possibility and 
substantive possibility de re. 
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Chapter One 
 
The Elimination of Metaphysics 
 
 
 
 
This chapter surveys philosophies which have been thought to advocate the 
elimination of metaphysics. A critique of metaphysics should not be confused with 
an anti-metaphysical philosophy, where the latter is understood to involve the 
advocacy of the elimination of metaphysics. Failure to recognize this results in a 
skewed vision of the history of philosophy. Zealous advocates of the elimination 
of metaphysics have tended to read any critique of metaphysics (and, worse, any 
critique of a species of metaphysics) as broadly participant in a common cause. 
 This study is not concerned with philosophies such as that of Kant, who 
criticized a species of metaphysics and whose project was to reform, rather than to 
eradicate, metaphysics,1 and that of Heidegger, who criticized the history of 
metaphysics (i.e., the actual practice of metaphysicians since classical times) as a 
history of forgetting and as ‘ontical’, rather than ‘ontological’. For Heidegger, 
what had been forgotten was what he took to be the true crux of ontology, the 
question of the meaning of being. He regarded ontological inquiry as concerned 
with the meaning of being, in contrast to that which he accused metaphysicians 
through history of concentrating upon, namely the ontical, that is, concern with the 
existence of entities. Heidegger sought to reorient metaphysics to what he regarded 
as its primary task, not to bring about its death.2 
 
 
1.1 Empiricist Anti-Metaphysics 
 
The Humean Background  
 
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, 
for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning 
concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental 
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then 
to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. 
                                                 
1 Cf. Strawson (1966, 16-18); Walsh (1975, 4); A.R. White (1987, 85, 87); Körner (1991, 
99). 
2 That Heidegger sought not to eliminate, but to reorient, metaphysics is manifested in 
[1927](1962a, esp. 28-35) and [1929](1962b, passim). 
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Hume (closing remarks of An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding [1748] (1975, 165)) 
 
An explicit rejection of metaphysics, as distinct from a mere abstention 
from metaphysical utterances, is characteristic of the type of empiricism 
which is known as positivism. Ayer (1946, 135) 
 
Hume is commonly regarded as a philosopher who espoused anti-metaphysical 
views, especially given the Humean lineage of the classic anti-metaphysical 
philosophy of the twentieth century, logical positivism. As Stroud (1977, 220) 
states, some writers belonging to that movement erroneously took Hume, on the 
basis of the closing paragraphs of the Enquiry, to be an earlier proponent of their 
own anti-metaphysical thesis that the claims of metaphysics are literally 
meaningless.3 Hume questions the intelligibility of some metaphysical doctrines 
and questions, such as Spinoza’s doctrine of substance, the question of personal 
identity, and the question of the materiality or immateriality of the soul,4 but 
nowhere does he claim that all metaphysics is meaningless. In fact, the attribution 
of any such view to Hume is very far from accurate. Stroud does not make a clean 
break from the positivistic reading himself, in that he adds that ‘no doubt [Hume] 
was not disposed to what he would call “abstruse” metaphysics’. Stroud’s 
comment is unhelpful, and it subverts Hume’s taxonomy, since Hume regards 
‘abstruse’, in contrast with ‘easy’, philosophy, as the profound and truly insightful 
form of philosophical inquiry. It is within this category that he distinguishes the 
‘false and adulterate’ and the ‘true’ metaphysics: he regards the former as obscure 
and sophistical.5 Stroud then describes Hume, unfortunately, as displaying an 
‘anti-metaphysical bent’ which endeared him to twentieth-century philosophers. 
Stroud recounts how Hume was viewed as ‘the best early exponent of a view’ 
which sought to ‘put metaphysics...beyond the sphere of human cognitive 
concern’. Contrary to that interpretation, from which Stroud does not sufficiently 
distance himself, Hume sought to restrict metaphysics to that which was within the 
scope of human understanding. The positivists read their own anti-metaphysical 
views into Hume, and accordingly appropriated Hume, casting him as the forebear 
of their own anti-metaphysical project. 
 Members of the positivist movement stated their reading of Hume’s views 
on metaphysics in a quite unambiguous manner. Referring to the aforementioned 
passage in Hume’s Enquiry, Carnap [1934](1992, 55) writes, ‘[o]ur 
                                                 
3 Examples of positivistic readings of Hume follow shortly: it will be apparent that they are 
not offered exclusively by positivists. 
4 Hume [1739-40](1978, 234, 240, 243, 246, 250, 251). 
5 [1739-40], Introduction, (1978, xiii-xix); [1748], Section 1, ‘Of the Different Species of 
Philosophy’, (1975, 5-16). 
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antimetaphysical position has been formulated by Hume in the classical manner’.6 
The anti-metaphysical position Carnap has in mind is quite clearly the view that all 
metaphysical discourse is meaningless. Directly after quoting Hume he describes 
an objection to the position that all metaphysics is meaningless, using the phrase 
‘as against this’, that is, as against what Carnap takes to be Hume’s view. Carnap 
reads the thesis that all metaphysics is meaningless into the passage from Hume, 
despite the fact that Hume writes nothing of the kind. 
 Ayer (1946, 54) claims that ‘we may say not merely that [Hume] was not 
in practice a metaphysician, but that he explicitly rejected metaphysics’. He then 
produces the aforementioned passage from Hume as evidence for this claim. In a 
careful moment, Ayer does not commit Carnap’s mistake of reading Hume as 
declaring the propositions of metaphysics meaningless: 
 
Hume does not, so far as I know, actually put forward any view 
concerning the nature of philosophical propositions themselves, but 
those of his works which are commonly accounted philosophical are, 
apart from certain passages which deal with questions of psychology, 
works of analysis.7 
 
Nevertheless, Ayer does ask, rhetorically, whether the Humean passage can be 
interpreted in any way other than as ‘a rhetorical version of our own thesis that a 
sentence which does not express either a formally true proposition or an empirical 
hypothesis is devoid of all literal significance’. 
 It is a measure of the strong grip on philosophy gained by the logical 
positivist movement that the positivistic reading of Hume became widespread and 
enduring, very much in spite of Hume’s actual writings. The actual impact of the 
positivist reading is all the more formidable when one considers that Stroud, who 
sought to build upon the naturalistic reading of Hume initiated by N.K. Smith 
(1905; 1941),8 does not escape its clutches. The strong influence of the positivist 
reading is evidenced in writers other than Stroud, whose lapses into it are merely 
occasional. For example, Passmore (1952, e.g., 12, 15) frequently refers to Hume 
                                                 
6 Cf. Carnap [1934](1937a, 280). The claim of Weinberg (1936, 2) that ‘[i]n his critical 
work Hume is the first great positivist’ is merely asserted rather than shown to be the 
product of scholarship. 
7 Contrast the less careful Ayer’s claim (1959a, 10) that the closing paragraph of Hume’s 
Enquiry ‘is an excellent statement of the positivist’s position’; cf. Ayer (1969, 173), ‘the 
Logical Positivists...rejected metaphysics on the ground that metaphysical doctrines were 
not even false but literally nonsensical. This is indeed a view that goes back to Hume.’ On 
the nature of philosophy, cf. (1973, 22) where Ayer views the end of Hume’s Enquiry as 
implying that the true task of philosophy is analysis: this is in apparent contrast with Ayer 
(1980, 25). 
8 There are interpretations of Hume other than the two I mention. Smith argued against 
earlier commentators who interpreted Hume as a subjective idealist. 
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as a positivist.9 According to Urmson (1956, 102), ‘in a high-flown, but not 
untypical, passage Hume had consigned all metaphysics to the flames as 
worthless’: note the erroneously employed quantifier. Urmson then echoes the 
careful Ayer: ‘Hume...anticipated [the] position [that all metaphysics is 
unintelligible], but only in obiter dicta, and as a rhetorical flourish, not as a fully 
worked-out thesis’. Boeselager (1975, 7) comments that ‘For Hume, there could be 
no ontology or metaphysics’.10 Poser (1988, 311-312) writes that Hume rejected 
theology and school metaphysics, but then goes on to describe Hume’s philosophy 
as ‘a form of positivism’ which ‘rejected metaphysics as impossible and 
meaningless’. Post (1991, 16), after describing the positivists’ anti-metaphysical 
application of their version of Hume’s fork, does not distinguish their views on 
metaphysics from those of Hume himself, depicting Hume as describing all 
metaphysics as containing nothing but sophistry and illusion and being worthy of 
committal to the flames.11 
 Flew (1991, 169) perpetuates the myth which even the careful Ayer 
denied, namely that Hume described any statement concerned neither with 
reasoning about matters of fact nor reasoning about relations of ideas as 
unintelligible. After quoting the opening paragraphs from Section 4, Pt 1 of 
Hume’s Enquiry [1748](1975, 25-26), Flew states that Hume ‘is...claiming to have 
noticed, what is manifestly not the case, that every assertive utterance which is to 
any extent intelligible falls unequivocally into one or other of these two mutually 
exclusive and together exhaustive categories’.12 Rather, as Foster (1985, 40) 
indicates, it is not the case that Hume makes any such claim. 
                                                 
9 Nevertheless, Chapter 4, ‘The Positivist’, is more subtle than its title suggests. 
10 He adds (1975, 7-8): ‘The impossibility of any ontology or metaphysics is a consequence 
of Hume’s sensualism and nominalism. What he himself called the “true metaphysics” is 
epistemology and psychology, to be carried out along the lines of Newtonian physics.’ (One 
wonders what nominalism is if not a metaphysical point of view.) On ‘true metaphysics’ see 
the main text below. 
11 Part of Hume’s famous passage is quoted, where, significantly, the phrase ‘school 
metaphysics’ is omitted. 
12 Cf. Hanfling (1981, 9). Meikle (1995, 182) claims that: 
 
Enlightenment writers usually understood the term ‘metaphysics’ to 
mean a science which purported to prove the existence of things in the 
supernatural world, and that was primarily how their opponents in the 
declining scholastic tradition understood it too. Neither side 
distinguished between this sense of the term, and the primary sense in 
which metaphysics, together with logic, is the most fundamental area of 
philosophical inquiry, and one which informs all other areas of thought, 
since thought of any kind works to one metaphysics or another. When 
Hume and others ‘eliminated’ metaphysics, they eliminated it in both 
senses at once. 
 
In fact, Hume was neither guilty of this conflation nor desirous of the extirpation of the sort 
of metaphysics designated by the latter sense of the term. Hume was no doubt opposed to 
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 It is plain that Hume was, and regarded himself as, a practitioner of 
metaphysics. Hume sought to criticize the prevailing metaphysics of his day, rather 
than to eliminate metaphysics tout court. Straight off, we can see that the claims 
made about Hume’s attitude to metaphysics by the aforementioned logical 
empiricists (and those others who fell under the spell of the positivistic reading) 
were radically misguided, just by looking at Hume’s actual writings in a quite 
matter-of-fact manner. In the opening paragraph of the introduction to his Treatise, 
Hume attacks the lack of rigour often displayed in philosophy and in the sciences. 
He proceeds to complain about the triviality and fragmentation he finds in these 
disciplines. He describes the common prejudice against metaphysical reasoning 
and gives an account of its source. He makes it quite clear, in an unapologetic 
fashion, that his own project is of a kind which would be the object of this 
common prejudice: 
 
if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, ’tis certain it must 
lie very deep and abstruse; and to hope we shall arrive at it without 
pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, 
must certainly be esteemed vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such 
advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a 
strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious. [1739-
40](1978, xiv-xv) 
 
The crucial science for Hume, as he repeatedly makes clear, is the science of 
human nature: when conducted properly, it constitutes the true metaphysics.13 
True metaphysics, in contrast to the false and adulterate metaphysics of the 
schools, is confined to concern with that which is within the limits of the human 
understanding. In this respect Hume can be said to distinguish between 
transcendent and immanent metaphysics. 
 That Hume is in no doubt that he is a practitioner of metaphysics is clear 
from his discussions of the species of philosophy in both the Treatise and the 
Enquiry. An accurate exposition of Hume’s discussions of the species of 
philosophy is given by Zabeeh (1973, 6-9), who does not shrink from recognizing 
that Hume regards his own method of philosophy as the true metaphysics. 
However, Zabeeh then retreats into a position whereby Hume is characterized as 
classifying metaphysics along with religion, with the committal to the flames of 
                                                                                                                 
Aristotelian (and other substance-based) metaphysical views committed, for example, to 
real necessity and possibility. In Chapter 3 I will defend non-objectual modal realism 
against empiricist critics who have inherited the Humean mantle. 
13 The first sentence of the Enquiry identifies ‘moral philosophy’ with ‘the science of 
human nature’. Hume proceeds to state, as I will illustrate, that the species of moral 
philosophy are the easy and the abstruse philosophy. The abstruse philosophy is constituted 
by the false and adulterate and the true metaphysics. One of the objections against the false 
and adulterate metaphysics is that they are not properly a science. The true metaphysics is 
identical with the science of human nature properly conducted.  
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both firmly in mind. After quoting the end of the Enquiry, Zabeeh comments: 
 
it seems that metaphysics and theology for Hume, being subjects which 
fall under neither the experimental sciences nor the mathematical 
sciences, are worthless subjects. However, for Hume philosophy is not 
identical with metaphysics, and hence it does not seem that he wants to 
commit his own books to the flames. (1973, 10-11) 
 
This is despite Zabeeh’s earlier recognition (1973, 9) that Hume identifies true 
philosophy with true metaphysics: clearly, Zabeeh cannot have it both ways.14 
Hume regards himself as practising the true metaphysics and (presumably) Hume’s 
fork poses no threat to that true metaphysics, especially when we bear in mind that 
it is school metaphysics (i.e. a branch of the false and adulterate metaphysics) 
towards which Hume is eager to direct the fire. Zabeeh goes on to mention ‘“The 
airy sciences” such as metaphysics’ which Hume thinks ‘should be replaced by the 
science of human nature’ (1973, 13). Zabeeh claims (1973, 18) that Hume calls 
undecidable philosophical issues ‘False Philosophy or simply Metaphysics’, but 
Hume does not use the word ‘metaphysics’ in this way. He frequently indicates 
which species of philosophy he is talking about when he uses that word. Zabeeh 
proceeds to claim (1973, 19) that ‘the most important objection against 
metaphysics is that it is not a science. Moreover, metaphysics is often used in 
support of religion’. Zabeeh’s retreat is emphasized by his description (1973, 46) 
of Hume as waging war on metaphysics, with no attempt to state that it was some 
but not all metaphysics which Hume sought to extirpate.  
 Hume’s philosophy of modality provides further evidence that he 
regarded himself as a practitioner of metaphysics. For example, he comments that: 
 
’Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind 
clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other 
words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. [1739-
40](1978, 32)   
 
Rather than arguing for this view, he regards it as well-founded on the basis of 
work done by other metaphysicians. Hume is perhaps taking this ‘establish’d 
maxim’ upon trust, a practice upon which he frowns elsewhere [1739-40](1978, 
xiii). If Hume shared the anti-metaphysical view of the logical positivists he would 
surely not have accepted anything on the basis of its being ‘an establish’d maxim 
in metaphysics’. That he does is again illustrative of the point that it is unrigorous, 
false and adulterate, school metaphysics to which he is opposed, not all 
metaphysics. (In addition, lest it be suggested that what Hume describes as ‘true 
metaphysics’ is not metaphysics at all we should bear in mind Hume’s famous 
account of causal necessity which counts, if anything does, as a piece of anti-
                                                 
14 Unacknowledged vacillation is also exhibited by Passmore (1952). 
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realist philosophy.) In their anti-metaphysical polemics the positivists were prone 
to identify all metaphysics as ‘transcendent’, affecting to go beyond experience: 
Hume is not guilty of characterizing metaphysics in terms of such a caricature. 
 According to Hume [1748](1975, 6-7), the easy philosophy, according 
well with common sense, will always be the more popular. The serious work is 
done, however, by the profound philosopher. Hume [1748](1975, 9) describes how 
nature ordains that the profound philosopher must live, outwith his study, 
according to the dictates of nature and common sense. He describes how the 
preference for easy over profound philosophy ‘is often carried farther, even to the 
absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings, or what is commonly called 
metaphysics’. Far from seeking to eliminate metaphysics or declare it meaningless, 
Hume seeks to defend it against those who would jettison profound reasonings 
altogether. 
 Although, in contrast to easy philosophy, metaphysics is obscure, that in 
itself does not constitute a worthy objection, in Hume’s opinion, to all 
metaphysics. Hume [1748](1975, 11) claims that ‘the justest and most plausible 
objection against a considerable part of metaphysics’ is ‘that they are not properly 
a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity...or from the 
craft of popular superstitions’.15 He adds [1748](1975, 12), ‘We must...cultivate 
true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate.’ The 
false and adulterate metaphysics is obscure to the extent that no light will be 
gleaned by means of its operations. In contrast, true metaphysics is abstruse but not 
futile.16  
 Presumably, Hume regarded true metaphysics as being contained within 
the rubric of his distinction between reasoning concerning matters of fact and real 
existence and reasoning concerning relations of ideas. It is the false and adulterate 
metaphysics which falls foul of the fork. How true metaphysics relates, more 
specifically, to the distinction, is another question. Again, it is a measure of the 
grip of the positivistic reading that interpretative issues concerning Hume’s 
conception of true metaphysics have been neglected. 
 At the outset of our inquiry we have noted how anti-metaphysical 
philosophers are apt to lapse into regarding any critique of metaphysics as grist to 
their mill. It is reasonable to conclude that, in his attitude to metaphysics, Hume, 
unlike his positivist progeny, was a reformer, rather than a would-be revolutionary. 
The account of meaningfulness provided by the logical positivists was an 
innovation with Humean roots, rather than a mere reiteration of Hume’s own 
                                                 
15 The ‘considerable part of metaphysics’ referred to is the false and adulterate 
metaphysics. In viewing metaphysics and science as so related Hume’s view has affinities 
with those of philosophers as diverse as Aristotle, Hegel and Quine. All these philosophers 
can be said to have a wider notion of science than that employed by the positivists. 
(Positivism involves the advocacy of the elimination of metaphysics, not just the notion of a 
unified science.) 
16 Hume [1748](1975, 16) expresses the desire to ‘unite the boundaries of the different 
species of philosophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness’. 
Modality and Anti-Metaphysics 8 
account. 
Carnap on the Elimination of Metaphysics 
 
Our thesis...is that logical analysis reveals the alleged statements of 
metaphysics to be pseudo-statements....there are two kinds of pseudo-
statements: either they contain a word which is erroneously believed to 
have meaning, or the constituent words are meaningful, yet are put 
together in a counter-syntactical way, so that they do not yield a 
meaningful statement. Carnap [1932](1959a, 61)17 
 
Empiricism, in so far as it constitutes the epistemological thesis that all non-
analytic knowledge is arrived at empirically, is consistent with a denial of the 
literal meaninglessness of metaphysical claims.18 As Chomsky (1965, 11, 148-
153) illustrates, grammatical well-formedness is a matter of degree: a construction 
may be ill-formed and yet retain some intelligibility (e.g., ‘All dogs eats meat’). 
So, the meaninglessness of metaphysics is established neither by appeal merely to 
empiricist epistemology nor by appeal to normal standards of grammatical well-
formedness. In order to argue for the literal meaninglessness of metaphysics, the 
logical positivists had to provide supplementary theoretical apparatus. Where 
Carnap mentions counter-syntactical formations he is concerned not with the 
grammatical rules of actual language, but with logical syntax. Carnap maintains 
that the rules of grammatical syntax allow the formation of meaningless 
constructions, while those of logical syntax do not. Grammatical syntax relates to 
what Carnap calls the ‘material’ or ‘connotative’ mode of speech as logical syntax 
relates to the ‘formal’ mode of speech.19 The notion of logical, as opposed to 
grammatical, syntax, is introduced by Carnap in his discussion of what he takes to 
be the meaninglessness of certain constructions which are admitted by grammatical 
syntax. Carnap claims that ‘Caesar is a prime number’ is meaningless and that the 
                                                 
17 Cf. Carnap [1934](1937a, 7-8, 284). 
18 Cf. Hempel [1950](1959, 108), after Stace (1944, esp. section 11); Romanos (1983, 2). 
19 Cf. Romanos (1983, 13-14): 
 
The occurrence of universal words in the material mode of speech 
abounds, according to Carnap, in philosophical contexts, where it causes 
the mistaken impression that what is under investigation is the nature or 
existence of fundamental categories or features of reality, when it is in 
fact only a question of the basic types of expressions employed by a 
language. This confusion...can best be dispelled, in Carnap’s view, by 
translation out of the material mode of speech into the formal mode of 
speech. 
 
Carnap’s view is embodied in [1934](1992, 58-61); cf. [1934](1937a, 281-315, e.g., 285), 
‘pseudo-object-sentences are simply quasi-syntactical sentences of the material mode of 
speech’. As the material mode ‘readily lends itself to wrong use’ [1934](1937a, 312), so the 
rules of grammatical syntax allow the formation of literally meaningless constructions. 
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fact that it is an admissible construction from the point of view of grammatical 
syntax illustrates the need for logical syntax, according to which it is an 
inadmissible construction. The only sentences in the material mode which are 
deemed meaningful by Carnap are those which admit of expression in the formal 
mode. He writes,  
 
‘a is a prime number’ is false if and only if a is divisible by a natural 
number different from a and from 1; evidently it is illicit to put here 
‘Caesar’ for ‘a’. [1932](1959a, 68, italics added) 
 
But why accept this? Carnap’s claim that the construction ‘Caesar is a prime 
number’, although grammatically admissible, is meaningless in virtue of the fact 
that it violates logical syntax appears to be merely stipulative. According to our 
actual grammatical standards, we consider ‘Caesar is a prime number’ not 
meaningless, but false. What need have we to have the role of our actual standards 
for meaningfulness usurped by artificial, and perhaps arbitrary, standards of 
cognitive significance? Carnap’s suggestion is that the fact that grammatical 
syntax allows ‘meaningless’ constructions necessitates logical syntax. But Carnap 
seems to want to use logical syntax to explain the meaninglessness of these 
constructions.  Surely, it is at least equally open to us to stipulate that ‘a is a prime 
number’ is false, not meaningless, where a is not a number.20 
 Carnap’s comment suggests that ‘It is false that a is a prime number’ 
entails that a is a number. Carnap’s tenet thus commits him to a rule of inference 
which is no rule of inference according to our ordinary logical practice. Given that 
we have no independent reason to sanction such a rule of inference, the position 
adopted by Carnap will be deemed less acceptable than the intuitive position 
whereby ‘a is a prime number’ is false where a is not a number. Carnap’s 
insistence upon the meaninglessness of such constructions indicates that he 
believes that there are facts of the matter about meaninglessness which escape the 
attention of grammatical syntax. If our intuition and our actual practice are at odds 
with Carnap’s stipulation then the onus is upon the defender of Carnap’s position 
to show us what is wrong with our approach. As it stands we have not been shown 
that the introduction of logical syntax is necessary or desirable. 
                                                 
20 Examples such as ‘Caesar is a prime number’, known to students of linguistics as 
‘selection errors’, should not be considered to be grammatically ill-formed, nor should they 
be precluded from being regarded as logically possible statements. In so far as they involve 
mistakes the mistakes are semantic and/or metaphysical, not grammatical. Russell (1940, 
170) writes: ‘It is difficult to give any indisputable instance of a logical possibility which is 
not syntactically possible...perhaps “the sound of a trombone is blue” is an instance.’ I 
contend, consistent with the account of logical possibility to be adopted in Chapter 4, that 
examples such as Russell’s which, setting aside metaphorical usage, clearly involves a 
selection error, are neither syntactically inadmissible nor logically impossible. Selection 
errors are category mistakes. Categories cannot be established on the basis of grammar 
alone, but involve (at least) semantic and (often) metaphysical facts. 
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 Carnap uses the notion of ‘syntactical type’ (or ‘syntactical category’) in 
designating ‘Caesar is a prime number’ meaningless. Carnap lists examples of 
syntactical categories, ‘e.g. thing, property of things, relation between things, 
number, property of numbers, relation between numbers, and so forth’ 
[1932](1959a, 68). Since ‘Caesar’ is not of the category ‘number’, it cannot 
occupy the place of ‘a’ in ‘a is a prime number’ to form a meaningful statement. 
But it cannot be on merely syntactical grounds that Carnap takes ‘Caesar is a prime 
number’ to be meaningless. Category distinctions can be constructed on the basis 
of the intensions of terms, or on metaphysical grounds stemming from their 
extensions, but not from purely formal considerations. It is unclear as to what 
exactly the logical element is in logical syntax: after all, the statement that Caesar 
is a prime number is perfectly capable of participation in valid arguments. 
Carnap’s claim that it is neither true nor false has to rest upon the antecedent claim 
that ‘Caesar’ is not a number word, which is surely a fact about the intension of 
‘Caesar’. 
 Despite Carnap’s frequent emphasis on logical/syntactical considerations 
in his anti-metaphysical project, he also (e.g., [1932](1959a, 62-63)) incorporated 
the epistemological/semantic aspect which Ayer placed in the foreground, namely 
verificationism. Consistent with his increasingly favourable attitude to semantics, 
Carnap became dissatisfied with the implausible and puritanical appeal to logical 
syntax as a weapon against metaphysics. The verification principle became the 
predominant weapon in the armoury of the empiricist anti-metaphysician.21 
 
Verificationism 
 
The criterion for assessing the meaningfulness of non-analytic discourse evolved 
through various formulations.22 The logical positivists did not specify the criterion 
                                                 
21 On the history of the logical positivists’ approach to language and metaphysics, cf. 
Romanos (1983, 4). 
22 Hanfling (1981, 33-34) suggests that the verification principle and the empiricist 
criterion of meaning (‘the criterion of verifiability’) be distinguished, on the grounds that 
the former purports to answer the question ‘what is meaning?’, whereas the latter is ‘more 
modest’ in that it involves testing for meaningfulness and does not entail a general theory of 
meaning. Hanfling claims that Ayer was committed to a criterion of meaning but not to the 
verification principle (contrast Ayer’s own remarks quoted below). As against Hanfling, the 
verification principle came to be understood by some of its exponents as a criterion for 
meaningfulness, rather than an answer to the question ‘what is meaning?’. This is clear from 
remarks, made by Schlick [1938](1979, 311) and quoted by Hanfling (1981, 143), that the 
verification principle (Schlick: ‘The Meaning of a Proposition is the Method of its 
Verification’) does not furnish a theory of meaning (cf. Schlick [1938](1979, 366) and 
Rynin (1957, 47-48)). Writers such as Schlick regarded the term ‘theory’ as applicable only 
to discourse which sets out hypotheses which admit of truth and falsity. Since they did not 
regard the verification principle as a hypothesis, they were hostile to accounts which 
construed it as providing a theory of meaning. Hanfling (1981, 143) regards this as ‘yet 
another way in which the verification principle might be regarded’: in so doing he commits 
himself to a view which is inconsistent with the distinction advocated earlier in his book. In 
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of meaningfulness in terms of actual (or even present possibility of) verification, 
but in terms of ‘verifiability’, ‘confirmability’ and ‘verification in principle’.23 
Their accounts were explicitly modal, although the nature of the modality involved 
was an issue which tended not to be dwelt upon. I will discuss this issue at some 
length in Chapter 4. 
 One form of criticism of the logical positivists’ strategy for getting rid of 
metaphysics related to logical problems associated with attempts to formulate a 
criterion of verifiability which could have the required restrictive force. Since, for 
example, scientific laws and discourse pertaining to certain entities postulated in 
scientific theories do not admit of direct verification,24 the logical positivists, 
seeking not only to preserve but to venerate science, sought a more liberal 
verificationism. A balancing act had to be performed: a verificationism both liberal 
(in the sense that it included the favoured non-directly-verifiable discourses) and 
restrictive (in that it excluded metaphysics) was sought. Accordingly, the notion of 
indirect verifiability was introduced. In order to make room for scientific 
discourse, Ayer distinguished between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ verifiability, favouring 
the latter: 
 
A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term, if, 
and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience. 
But it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to 
render it probable. (1946, 37) 
 
...we fall back on the weaker sense of verification. We say that the 
question that must be asked about any putative statement of fact is not, 
Would any observations make its truth or falsehood logically certain? 
but simply, Would any observations be relevant to the determination of 
                                                                                                                 
contrast to Hanfling, Dummett (1992, 140-143) distinguishes between two versions of the 
‘verification principle’: (V1) The meaning of a statement is its method of verification, and 
(V2) A statement is meaningful if and only if it is verifiable. Although some positivists were 
disinclined to emphasize (V1), ‘the core of a theory of meaning’, Dummett indicates that 
(V1) provides a rationale for (V2) which ‘historically, the positivists accepted’. (Dummett 
proposes an alternative rationale: (V3) The method of verifying a statement is an essential 
component of its meaning.) Dummett’s description of (V1) and (V2) as two versions of the 
verification principle is warranted by the positivists’ own descriptions of their views. It must 
be granted, however, that considerable confusion is fostered by the tendency in some logical 
positivist writings to conflate talk of meaning and talk of meaningfulness. Rynin (1957, 52) 
criticizes Schlick precisely in this regard. 
23 The view that the criterion of meaningfulness is actual verification is attributed to Comte 
by E.C. Moore (1951, 473). 
24 The point is made nicely by Hempel [1950](1959, 111-112); cf. Stace (1944, 217) who 
also indicates that the requirement of direct verifiability (‘complete verifiability in 
principle’) is both too restrictive (in that it excludes scientific discourse) and too liberal (in 
that it grants meaningfulness to any disjunction in which at least one meaningful statement 
is contained). 
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its truth or falsehood? (1946, 38) 
 
In the preface to the second edition of Language, Truth and Logic, Ayer 
reformulated this as: 
 
a statement is verifiable...if some observation-statement can be deduced 
from it in conjunction with certain other premises, without being 
deducible from those other premises alone. (1946, 11) 
 
 The trouble with this, as Berlin (1939, 234) indicated and Ayer (1946, 11) 
acknowledged, was that it allowed empirical significance, in Ayer’s words, ‘to any 
statement whatever’, since for any two statements S and O, where O is an 
observation-statement and S is any statement whatever, O is entailed by the 
premises ‘If S then O’ and ‘S’, whilst being entailed by neither premise in 
isolation. Ayer attempted to provide a formulation which would avoid this 
problem: 
 
a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-
statement, or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-
statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is not 
deducible from these other premises alone; and I propose to say that a 
statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following conditions: 
first, that in conjunction with certain other premises it entails one or 
more directly verifiable statements which are not deducible from these 
other premises alone; and, secondly, that these other premises do not 
include any statement that is not either analytic, or directly verifiable, or 
capable of being independently established as indirectly verifiable. And 
I can now reformulate the principle of verification as requiring of a 
literally meaningful statement, which is not analytic, that it should be 
either directly or indirectly verifiable, in the foregoing sense. (1946, 13) 
 
 Church (1949, 53) indicated that this response also fell prey to the 
criticism that it admitted any statement whatever as meaningful. Where O1, O2 and 
O3 are logically independent observation-statements, and S is any statement 
whatever, the complex formula (?O1 & O2) ∨ (O3 & ?S) conjoined with O1 
entails O3. Since neither statement alone entails O3, the former statement is directly 
verifiable, on Ayer’s definition. Church charged that S in turn will be indirectly 
verifiable since it entails O2 when conjoined with the complex formula, O2 being 
entailed by neither statement alone. Hempel [1950](1959, 115-116) criticized Ayer 
on the ground that where S is an empirically meaningful statement, whatever can 
be deduced from S and permissible additional premises can also be deduced from S 
conjoined with N and the same additional premises, where N is any statement 
whatever (e.g., ‘The absolute is perfect’). 
 Rynin (1957, 57-58) attempted to circumvent such logical problems by 
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claiming that a so-called meaningless sentence, such as ‘The absolute is perfect’ is 
not a statement, since ‘a statement [is] a sentence possessed of truth value’, and 
only statements enter into logical relations. He then claimed, for example, that ‘if 
“The absolute is perfect” is not a meaningful statement neither is [any purported] 
disjunction’ in which it is held to participate.25 Hempel (1959, 127-128; 1965, 
120) came to accept Rynin’s point. He did so too easily, since Rynin provides no 
accounts of what it is for a discourse to be possessive of truth conditions and of 
how we are to determine whether a discourse meets the conditions which an 
answer to that question would lay down. For Rynin, the possession of truth 
conditions is presumably not sufficient for meaningfulness, since he comments 
(1957, 50) that our knowledge of those truth conditions (as distinct from 
knowledge of the truth-values of statements) is vital to ‘cognition’. A discourse 
must possess truth conditions which are ‘ascertainable’ (1957, 53) if it is to be 
deemed meaningful. It is unclear as to how his account could constitute an 
attempted defence of ‘a kind of verifiability principle of meaning’ (1957, 46) 
unless he takes it that only verifiable statements and analytic statements have the 
appropriate truth conditions, in which case his discussion provides no real account 
of how the original logical problems associated with the verification principle are 
to be circumvented. If indirect verifiability is still required in order to avoid 
debarring a great deal of scientific discourse then Rynin’s account achieves no 
progress.26 Rynin provides no evidence that indirect verifiability is not so 
required. 
 Another form of criticism of the verificationist strategy for getting rid of 
metaphysics concerned the status of the verification principle itself. It was held, for 
example, that the principle, being neither analytic nor verifiable, is self-exclusive 
and ‘metaphysical’ by its own lights.27 There was an awareness of this criticism 
from an early date.28 Two sorts of answer were commonly made to the question of 
the status of the principle by its defenders, although the first was generally mooted, 
rather than endorsed. According to the first, the principle was held to fall within 
the rubric of the positivists’ version of Hume’s fork. That is, it was held to be 
                                                 
25 The taxonomy employed by Rynin differs from that of those such as Ayer who, when 
careful, distinguished between meaningful and non-meaningful statements and held that all 
propositions were meaningful. 
26 Ayer (1973, 27) noted that none of the attempts to save the verification principle from 
Church’s objection had succeeded. L.J. Cohen (1980) offers a criterion of observational 
verifiability which accommodates the criticisms of Church and Hempel against the criterion 
of literal meaningfulness offered by Ayer (1946, 13). Cohen does not set out to delimit the 
realm of literal meaningfulness, and his account does not entail that there are any non-
observational discourses which cannot partake in logical relations. His concern is with the 
delineation of purely phenomenal language in science: he does not claim that scientific 
realism is literally meaningless, nor does he so deem ethics or metaphysics. 
27 E.g., Weinberg, although desirous of the elimination of metaphysics (1936, 193) accuses 
verificationism itself of being metaphysical (1936, 174). The issue is more recently raised 
by Körner (1979, 264) and M. Williams (1986, 11). 
28 E.g., Carnap [1934](1992a, 55).  
Modality and Anti-Metaphysics 14 
analytic of the concept of literal meaningfulness, or, it was taken to hold as a 
matter of fact; the former being the clearly preferred option. Given the positivists’ 
own conception of the task of philosophy as the logical analysis of language it was 
consistent for them to regard the principle as analytic. However, the supposed 
analyticity of the principle was far from obvious.29 As Carnap [1930](1959b, 143) 
and Hempel [1945](1949, 222) noted, obviousness is not a necessary condition 
upon analyticity. Nevertheless, analytic premises from which the verification 
principle could be derived were not forthcoming. This led to the adoption of the 
second sort of answer, which was to maintain that the principle was a prescription 
which ought to be followed in the absence of any more convincing alternative. 
Ayer attempted to side-step criticism focusing on the status of the principle: 
 
in the preface to the second edition of Language, Truth and Logic, I 
treated the verification principle as a prescriptive definition. But why 
should the prescription be obeyed? I evaded this awkward question by 
defying my critics to come up with anything better. Ayer (1992, 149) 
 
Such a response leads to an impasse in the debate between the anti-metaphysician 
and the defender of metaphysics. Metaphysicians were justifiably undisposed to 
relinquish their projects in the light of such a reply. If the criterion of 
meaningfulness offered is the best available that need not mean that it is adequate. 
The fact that it is purported to undermine metaphysics can be taken as a reductio 
ad absurdum, at least of the principle, if not of the search for such a criterion. 
What is ‘better’ will no doubt depend, in this case, upon the interests of the judges. 
From the point of view of some of Ayer’s opponents this will be the abandonment 
of his project rather than theirs. 
 A third sort of answer to the question of the status of the verification 
principle, which considerably weakens its links with positivism, is suggested by 
Dummett:  
 
Tarski…charged natural languages with inconsistency on the score that 
they contained their own semantics, which no consistent language could 
do. The argument appears incontestable: it follows that no semantic 
theory governing a language can be formulated in that language itself, 
on pain of inconsistency. Any attempt to state such a theory must 
therefore lead to contradiction. (1992, 130-131) 
  
Similarly, suggests Dummett (1992, 132-133), a general theory of meaning will 
fail to satisfy the criteria of meaningfulness which it lays down: such a theory 
cannot be expected to be self-applicable. In the light of Dummett’s discussion 
Ayer admits: 
 
                                                 
29 Cf. Dummett (1992, 130). 
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I should have dismissed the objection that the verification principle does 
not satisfy itself as an ignoratio elenchi. The verification principle 
encapsulates a general theory of meaning and a general theory of 
meaning should not be expected to satisfy itself. 
I have also to concede to Dummett that when the verification principle 
is viewed in this way its cutting edge is blunted, at least as an 
instrument for executing metaphysics. I agree that in so far as 
metaphysics constitutes a set of semantic theories, the verification 
principle passes it by. (1992, 149-150) 
 
The question of the status of the verification principle may lead to the recognition 
that it is indeed metaphysical, although this is established via a less obvious route 
(the details of which cannot occupy us here) than that followed by earlier critics of 
verificationism. I will attempt to show that the verificationism espoused by the 
logical positivists is itself metaphysical by a route which is more concerned with 
‘traditional’ metaphysics.30 In other words, my concern is primarily with being, 
the concepts we employ and the relations between being and the concepts we 
employ, rather than with the issues concerning logic and language, such as the 
applicability of the principle of bivalence, which predominate in Dummett’s 
discussions. In contrast to the more common attempts to defend metaphysics 
against the verificationist attack, I will take a modal route.31 I will lay the ground 
for my views on the substantive ontology of modality by arguing that modal 
discourse is neither eliminable nor reducible. Thereafter, I will argue for a realist 
view of de re modality. In the light of these views I will suggest that the logical 
positivists conflated logical and metaphysical modalities. This is an error which, I 
will argue, persists in contemporary philosophy, sometimes in prima facie unlikely 
quarters. In the course of my inquiry I will outline what I take to be the unfortunate 
results arising from this conflation. In addition, I will argue, contra the positivists, 
that there are cognitively meaningful statements which are neither analytic nor 
empirical but which include both empirical and non-empirical content. 
 
A Modal Argument Against Metaphysics 
 
                                                 
30 Since the positivist attack on metaphysics fails, those, such as Collingwood, Lazerowitz 
and Wisdom, who afforded metaphysics various sorts of consolation prize status 
(respectively: as encapsulating the history of ideas; as a fruitful stalking ground for the 
psychoanalyst; as a collection of interesting paradoxes) did so gratuitously. The views of 
these three figures are discussed at length by A.R. White (1987, 143-173). 
31 I do not claim originality in following a modal route per se. The attempt has been made 
by E.C. Moore (1951) and Hans Poser (1988). I do not claim originality in that I do it, but in 
how I do it. In Chapter 4, I examine the nature of the modality involved in verificationism. 
This is an issue which is neglected in the existing literature (including the works just 
mentioned). Although logical positivism is dead, there is value in noting previously 
neglected reasons for its deficiency. Also, verificationism is far from dead and there might 
be results arising from my inquiry which would pertain to contemporary views. 
Modality and Anti-Metaphysics 16 
In the light of my programmatic concerns, it is interesting to note an explicitly 
modal anti-metaphysical argument. N.R. Hanson (1960, 86-87) argues that 
metaphysics is impossible on the grounds that ‘“Hume’s dictum”: that from a 
necessary proposition nothing contingent follows—and vice versa’ is correct and 
that metaphysical arguments, since they ‘usually purport to be both informative, 
i.e., non-tautological, and also apodeictically true, i.e., non-falsifiable...must 
purport’ to be ‘trans-type inferences’, i.e., inferences ‘from necessary propositions 
to contingent propositions—or vice versa’.32 Hanson’s argument incorporates the 
vital presumptions that all necessity is expressible by means of necessary 
propositions and that the only acceptable notion of objective necessity is that of 
logical necessity.33 
 I dispute Hanson’s characterization of metaphysics, and the related 
presumptions, commonly adhered to by empiricists, that all necessity is de dicto 
and that the only objective necessity is logical necessity.34 Hanson’s argument 
asserts that, at a fundamental level, all metaphysical arguments purport to be trans-
type. Contrary to Hanson’s assertion, there are many metaphysical arguments 
which, when properly construed, cannot purport to be trans-type. In introducing 
his argument, Hanson equated arguments from what must be the case to what is the 
case (and vice versa) with arguments from the necessary to the contingent (and 
vice versa). For the metaphysician who makes use of the de re modal notions, 
however, there is a ‘must’ other than the ‘must’ which attaches to necessary 
statements (which must be true).35 For example, from the logically contingent 
premise that it is necessary for water to be H2O36 it follows that it is truly 
predicable of water that it is H2O. There is a clear sense in which this is an 
argument from what must be the case to what is the case, although it is not an 
argument from the necessarily to the contingently true. 
 A common type of metaphysical argument proceeds from a statement of 
what is the case and/or what is really possible, to a statement of what must be the 
case in order for the former to be actual or really possible. Arguments of this sort 
attempt to illustrate the natures of real existents. They do not concern themselves 
with ‘the necessary’, in Hanson’s sense, at all. For Hanson, ‘the necessary’ relates 
to ‘necessary propositions’. For philosophers who advance arguments of the kind 
just described, a sort of necessity relating to the essences of real existents is 
                                                 
32 This reasoning from ‘usually’ to ‘must’ is invalid. Furthermore, I will contend that it is 
not the case that most metaphysics consists of inferences which purport to be trans-type. 
33 Hanson (1960, 90) recognizes a kind of epistemic necessity, relating, for example, to 
‘conceptual paralysis’ which, as he intends it, is clearly a subjective notion. 
34 Other criticisms of Hanson’s article are offered by Lehrer (1962) and Cole (1963). 
35 In order to avoid the implication that logical modalities are precluded from having de re 
status, I should point out that the philosopher alluded to here is one who makes use of de re 
modalities which are neither reducible to nor explicable in terms of the de dicto modalities. 
Whatever else they may be, the logical modalities are de dicto. I will substantiate these 
claims in the course of this book, especially in Chapters 3 and 4. 
36 Contrast the premise that it is necessarily true that water is H2O. 
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admitted. The recognition of this non-logical necessity is perfectly consistent with 
the contingent existence of the world and the entities therein. In so far as a notion 
of necessity distinct from that recognized by Hanson is legitimate, his argument 
against metaphysics is undermined, since metaphysical arguments can employ that 
sense of necessity without purporting to be trans-type at all. Such arguments move 
from the logically contingent to the logically contingent. Although they are 
concerned with metaphysical necessity, they do not seek to establish necessary 
propositions. In later chapters I will argue that metaphysical necessity constitutes 
an intelligible notion of objective necessity distinct from logical necessity. 
Subsequently, I will defend realism about metaphysical necessity where it relates, 
for example, to the objects subsumed under natural kind concepts. The tendency, 
manifested by Hanson, to recognize only paradigmatically de dicto modalities has 
had a significance so great that the projects of some philosophers who have sought 
to rehabilitate paradigmatic modality de re, and realism about that modality (i.e., 
essentialism), have been tainted by the failure to be consistently observant of the 
proper form of essentialist claims. This will be illustrated in the proceeding 
chapters. 
 
 
1.2 Wittgenstein, Metaphysics and Essentialism 
 
Wittgenstein has been construed as an anti-essentialist and an anti-metaphysician. I 
will suggest that, contrary to such interpretations, the Tractatus can be viewed as 
putting forth an essentialist argument of the kind just indicated,37 although the 
essentialism of the Tractatus should be recognized as of a very restricted kind 
compared to the essentialist views which became prevalent in the decades 
                                                 
37 A characteristic which it shares with many other philosophical works, including, 
amusingly, Hegel’s Science of Logic. Illuminating comment on the latter is provided by 
Houlgate (1995, 38): 
 
Necessity, for Hegel, is not an immediately evident feature of the world, 
but is what there turns out in essence to be. We do not begin with 
necessity, therefore, but rather come to the thought of necessity through 
considering what there actually is. Hegel’s analysis of necessity thus 
begins not with necessity itself, but with actuality. 
 
What there actually is (and what actually goes on) reveals what is genuinely possible, i.e., 
what is in accordance with the nature of reality. ‘Actuality’ here just means reality, and it is 
not meant to have any non-modal connotation: the conception at work is of an actuality 
which is naturally modal. Just as, for Hegel, actuality reveals necessity, so for Wittgenstein 
the actual possibility of language reveals the nature of reality. (Neither inquiry leads to any 
necessary propositions: terminological intricacies notwithstanding, the necessity pertinent to 
both cases is not formal, but ontological. In respect of the Tractatus, the possibility of 
representation, which grounds its actuality, has no tautology as correlative. Hegelian real 
necessity is formally contingent.) The essentialist metaphysician holds that the accidental 
provides indirect access to the essential: the point is elaborated at 2.2 below. 
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subsequent to the demise of logical positivism. The Tractatus purports to show 
how reality must be given the possibility of language, rather than to state what 
reality must be.38 If the essentialism to which I will point is indeed present then it 
is a mistake to view the Tractatus as an anti-metaphysical work.39 The attribution 
of neither metaphysical nor essentialist views to the Tractatus is novel. Carnap 
appears to have had some awareness that Wittgenstein was no anti-metaphysician 
in the manner of the logical positivists, since he opines that although Wittgenstein 
regarded philosophy as the logic of science, he drew ‘no sharp line of demarcation 
between the formulations of the logic of science and those of metaphysics’ 
[1934](1937a, 284). In addition, Carnap comments [1934](1937a, 304) that 
Wittgenstein was ‘misled into enquiries’ of an essentialist nature.40 Carnap’s latter 
comment suggests that either he did not read Wittgenstein’s remarks about 
necessity (cited below) along standard empiricist lines (to the effect that there is no 
necessity other than standard logical necessity) or that he thought that 
Wittgenstein’s views on modality and essence were inconsistent. 
 Having offered an account of why I attribute an essentialist view to the 
Tractatus, I will proceed to outline some general considerations pertaining to 
Wittgenstein’s attitude to metaphysics which show it to be much more subtle than 
that of the anti-metaphysician. Finally, I will dispute the claim that there is any 
argument against real essentialism in the Philosophical Investigations. Since I do 
not believe that Wittgenstein was concerned to provide any such argument, what I 
                                                 
38 The essentialism I attribute to the Tractatus relates to the idea that, given the possibility 
of representation, reality must be a plurality of simple objects. (Wittgenstein’s world, i.e., 
the totality of facts, is dependent upon the objects which determine logical space.) The 
‘must’ involved here is an essentialist ‘must’. The attribution in question does not rest upon 
any claims about the natures of simple objects themselves. 
39 Russell, in his logical atomist phase, can in no way be regarded as advocating the 
elimination of metaphysics since he stated that his was a metaphysical project [1918](1956, 
178, 215-216). Cf. Urmson (1956, e.g., 4-6, 47, 69), who characterizes logical atomism as 
purporting to supply a superior metaphysics, rather than to eliminate metaphysics. In 
contrast, Burnheim (1952, 3) claims that logical atomism is part of ‘a group of philosophical 
doctrines which claim to eliminate all forms of metaphysical reasoning’. On the basis of 
Russell’s influence on the Vienna Circle, and, apparently, of his use of the phrase ‘a piece 
of gratuitous metaphysics’, Joergensen (1951, 11-17) goes so far as to discuss ‘The Logical 
Positivism of Bertrand Russell’. Russell (1940, 7) writes, ‘I am, as regards method, more in 
sympathy with the logical positivists than with any other existing school’ [my emphasis]. 
Russell [1950](1956, 367) claims: ‘“Logical positivism” is a name for a method, not for a 
certain kind of result.’ It is hard to distinguish between a method and a doctrine if the very 
method includes doctrinal content (e.g., that one must avoid doing metaphysics because 
metaphysics is meaningless) and, in any case, Russell’s sympathy is with the tenet that 
‘there is no special way of knowing that is peculiar to philosophy’: later comments 
[1950](1956, 372) indicate his disagreement with some of the doctrines of logical 
positivists. Russell (1937b, 20) holds that ‘if, through language, we can know facts, that 
implies a relation...which may serve to justify, to some degree, the traditional attempt to use 
logic as a clue to metaphysics’. 
40 More recent interpretations which have it that Wittgenstein was concerned with 
essentialist enquiry include Hochberg (1971), Klemke (1971a) and Bradley (1992). 
The Elimination of Metaphysics 19 
write in this regard serves as a critique not of Wittgenstein but of commentators 
who read anti-essentialism into the Investigations. 
 
Essentialism in the Tractatus 
 
Ayer held, throughout his career, that there is no necessity in nature and that the 
only legitimate sense of necessity is logical necessity.41 In the Tractatus (6.37, cf. 
6.3, 6.31), Wittgenstein claimed that the only necessity is logical necessity. At face 
value, this is a claim with which Ayer would sympathize. If we assume the premise 
that essentialist necessity is not logical necessity or the premise that logical 
necessity is not a kind of essentialist necessity42—premises which Ayer would no 
doubt endorse—Wittgenstein’s comment appears to be an avowal of anti-
essentialism. Wittgenstein often uses terms in non-standard ways in the Tractatus, 
but if Wittgenstein’s claim is interpreted in accordance with how the terms it 
employs are most commonly understood then there is good reason to call it into 
dispute, as I hope Chapters 2 and 3 will show. 
 However, there is a case for saying that Wittgenstein’s claim that the only 
necessity is logical necessity has little in common with Ayer’s refusal to 
countenance any necessity other than logical necessity, since Wittgenstein is 
concerned with the logic of representation, rather than making exclusive reference 
to the ‘logically necessary’ as the logical positivists would have understood the 
phrase.43 Wittgenstein uses the word ‘logic’ to describe the study of the nature of 
reality and its mirroring in language, not just to delineate the practice of rendering 
tautologies explicit.44 The question which Wittgenstein’s logical atomism 
addresses is this: how must reality be in order for representation to be possible? 
(That kind of essentialistic question, which is obviously not exhaustive of 
essentialism, is rejected in the Philosophical Investigations. Such questions are 
viewed as products of the obsession with naming which Wittgenstein criticizes 
                                                 
41 See 4.2 below, including the quotation of his remarks to Honderich (1991, 224). 
42 Fine (1994) suggests that it is.   
43 Wittgenstein’s concern with the logic of representation is suggested, for example, by 
6.13: ‘Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world.’ Cf. Mounce (1981, 
13): ‘logic...makes representation possible’. 
44 By ‘tautologies’ I mean that which would have been considered tautologous by logical 
positivists: i.e., necessarily true propositions of logic (as understood by them) and 
mathematics. Wittgenstein’s ‘tautologies’ were presumably different, at least in so far as he 
denied them genuinely propositional status. For Wittgenstein logical propositions fail to say 
anything, although they show the essence of the world. Only factual discourse is strictly 
possessive of truth value, according to Wittgenstein’s official view (and despite his avowal 
of the truth of the contents of the Tractatus). In the Notebooks 1914-16 (1979, 126), he 
comments that ‘a logical proposition is one the special cases of which are either 
tautologous—and then the proposition is true—or self-contradictory (as I shall call it) and 
then it is false’. In the Tractatus (4.461, 4.4611) he characterized tautologies and 
contradictions as lacking sense, but not nonsensical. Wittgenstein did not use the word 
‘logic’ in a univocal manner. 
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right from the start of that work.) Wittgenstein’s view was that there is 
isomorphism between language and reality: language and reality were held to share 
form. Language does not make reality possible; rather, the converse relationship 
holds. That which is represented is prior to the mode of representation. The form 
of reality, the nature of being, is mirrored in language. Logical space is the totality 
of possible facts. It is logical space, rather than the facts which happen to pertain in 
the actual world, which is relevant to the question of the nature of reality, since 
logical space is exhaustive of all representations, although not itself a 
representation. It is the possibility of sense (i.e., linguistic representation) which is 
of concern to Wittgenstein, not the narrower realm of the representation of actual 
states of affairs. In other words, the concern is with the possibility of meaning 
rather than the assertion of truths. Form makes representation possible; the world 
and language have form in common. The form of the world, although reflected in 
language, is not itself linguistic in character, since that which is represented is 
prior to the mode of representation. I will later maintain a distinction between 
modality de re and de dicto, such that de re modality does not reduce to de dicto 
modality. This does not preclude de dicto modality from being a subspecies of de 
re modality, but nor does it entail that such a relationship holds: I seek to uphold 
neutrality on the question. Consistent with the classification of modality de re 
which I will support are the tenets (to which I subscribe) that modality de dicto is, 
narrowly construed, purely formal in character and, broadly construed, logico-
linguistic in character, and that the class of modality de re is neither purely formal 
nor logico-linguistic in character. So, whether or not modality de dicto is a 
subspecies of modality de re (and, therefore, whether or not a subspecies of 
modality de re is logico-linguistic in character), if a modality is not logico-
linguistic then it is not de dicto. As a result, the modality pertinent to the form of 
the world is de re. So, the Tractatus is committed to de re modality; furthermore, it 
is committed to de re modality realistically construed. Neither anti-essentialism nor 
anti-metaphysics is consistent with this commitment.  
 Wittgenstein addresses the nature of reality, whereas Ayer’s logical 
necessity relates to modality de dicto, incorporating the assumptions that modality 
de dicto is never de re and that de re modality is misbegotten. As I will attempt to 
illustrate in later chapters, the notion of essence, relating as it does to de re 
modality, cannot be explicated in terms of the standard notion of logical 
necessity.45 There is further evidence, then, that Wittgenstein’s claim about 
necessity differs greatly from that of Ayer. The sorts of issues associated with 
recent essentialist thought relating, for example, to natural kinds, the necessity of 
origin, and causal powers, certainly do not seem to be of positive concern to 
                                                 
45 Bradley (1992) depicts Wittgenstein as a de re modal atomist for whom logical necessity 
reduces to necessity de re (1992, 24). The notion of logical necessity operant here is by no 
means standard. Bradley’s interpretation is confused in so far as it depicts essentialistic 
attributions in terms of necessary truths (1992, e.g., 183: ‘any modal ascription, if true, is 
necessarily so’), despite his own recognition (1992, 175-176) of the lack of equivalence 
between modality de re and de dicto.  
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Wittgenstein. It is plausible that he held anti-realist views where these are 
concerned—witness, for example, his remark in the Tractatus (6.3) that ‘outside 
logic everything is accidental’—and none are directly concerned with the logic of 
representation.46 However, the point remains that Wittgenstein’s early thought 
employed a notion of necessity other than (standard) logical necessity. 
Furthermore, in his attitude to that non-logical necessity it seems that he was no 
ontological anti-realist, despite his semantic anti-realism about the contents of the 
Tractatus. 
 
Wittgenstein and Metaphysics 
 
From a historical point of view, there is no doubt that the dismissal of metaphysics 
as nonsensical that was proffered by the logical positivists was influenced by a 
reading of the Tractatus.47 Their interpretation of Wittgenstein rested upon an 
ambiguity in relation to Wittgenstein’s use of expressions such as ‘meaningless’ 
and ‘nonsensical’ and an inappreciation of the importance of his saying/showing 
distinction. Those who read Wittgenstein from a logical positivist perspective were 
prone to regard utterances classified as ‘meaningless’ or ‘nonsense’ as meaningless 
in their own sense, whereby metaphysics was held to be unintelligible, or, at best, 
merely expressive of ‘an attitude towards life’.48 To say that an utterance lacks 
sense or meaning need not be to say, however, that it is ‘nonsense’ in the 
pejorative sense.49 In the Tractatus (4.461-4.462) Wittgenstein maintains that 
tautologies lack sense (contrast ‘are nonsensical’), in that they do not say anything. 
This does not mean, however, that they do not show anything. Tautologies lack 
                                                 
46 Any argument for attributing to Wittgenstein an essentialism any more lavish than that 
which I attribute here would have to look elsewhere, since considerations pertaining to the 
logic of representation do not provide sufficient justification for such a view. Bradley 
(1992) does attribute a more bountiful essentialism to Wittgenstein, but an examination of 
his account would involve exegetical issues too numerous and too detailed to be dealt with 
here. 
47 Ayer (1985, 18) states that the logical positivists, in designating metaphysics as nonsense 
in their pejorative sense, were taking their cue from Wittgenstein but that ‘Whether 
Wittgenstein’s own use of the term was always pejorative is not clear’. He proceeds to state 
(1985, 33) that the logical empiricists who took Wittgenstein to be advocating the dismissal 
of metaphysics and who took themselves to be following him did so on the basis of a 
misinterpretation: the ‘very great influence’ of the Tractatus was ‘partly due to a 
misunderstanding’. Nevertheless, Ayer omits to mention the saying/showing distinction and 
displays a failure to afford it due cognizance, e.g., in his comment that, ‘[i]n the case of the 
Tractatus we have to choose between [Wittgenstein’s] dismissal of its contents as senseless 
and his claim that they are true’ (1985, 30). 
48 The implausible view that metaphysics is merely expressive of an attitude towards life is 
proposed by Carnap [1932](1959a, 78-80). 
49 Warnock (1958, 84-93) counsels against an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s use (in both 
the Tractatus and the Investigations) of terms like ‘nonsense’ and ‘meaningless’ that likens 
his attitude to that of the logical positivists. 
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sense, and metaphysical claims are nonsensical, for Wittgenstein, in that they are 
not genuine propositions. He does not think tautologies to be gibberish, counter-
syntactical, unintelligible, or what have you: he calls them meaningless because 
they do not say anything. It is clear, then, that Wittgenstein means something other 
than the positivists did by the use of the word ‘meaningless’. Genuine propositions 
admit of truth and falsity. Unlike genuine propositions, the ‘propositions’ of logic 
and metaphysics do not picture anything: they do not say, they show.50 
Metaphysics is like theology, aesthetics and ethics in so far as metaphysical 
discourse has a non-representative function. Metaphysics cannot be eliminated, on 
Wittgenstein’s account, precisely because he holds that there are limits to thought 
about which nothing can (literally) be said: his own project is to demonstrate those 
limits. Saying involves picturing, but the relation of picturing, on his account, 
cannot itself be pictured: it has metaphysical status. In contrast, for the positivists, 
there is no (legitimate) metaphysics. Wittgenstein holds that traditional 
metaphysics attempts, and fails, to breach the boundaries of language. It is 
illegitimate only in so far as it misconceives its own nature. 
 Wittgenstein’s position also contrasts with the positivists in that he 
attaches importance to metaphysics. Ayer came to realize this divergence: 
 
We took it for granted that [Wittgenstein] judged metaphysics to be 
worthless, whereas in so far as he equated it with what he called ‘the 
mystical’, and included in it judgements of value and the appreciation of 
the meaning of life, his attitude was much more akin to that of Kant... 
Ayer (1985, 31) 
 
Wittgenstein was later to claim, in Zettel (§458), that it is of the essence of 
metaphysics to confuse conceptual and factual inquiry.51 This comment may be 
suggestive of the view that even a metaphysics which seeks to recognize its own 
non-descriptive status cannot avoid slipping into an apparently descriptive modus 
                                                 
50 Mounce (1981, e.g., 43, 95, 102), Bradley (1992) and Young (1986) are among the 
commentators who emphasize the importance of the saying/showing distinction. Young 
thinks that this distinction is important to distinguishing between immanent and 
transcendent metaphysics in reading the Tractatus. He claims (1986, 291) that Wittgenstein 
viewed immanent metaphysics as relating to what cannot be said but can only be shown, 
whilst, like Kant, ‘reject[ing] transcendent metaphysics as a branch of philosophy making 
scientific pretensions’. On Young’s interpretation immanent metaphysics is allowed to stand 
as showing the structure of reality: it is not up for elimination. Young (1986, 292) refers to 
4.111, where Wittgenstein makes specific mention of the status and function of philosophy. 
On Young’s account, transcendent metaphysics is ‘allowed to aim at dealing with the 
problems of life which matter most’ (e.g. God, immortality and free will): it is up for 
replacement by religion. This contrasts with the interpretation offered by Ayer (1985, 31), 
who, making no reference to any immanent/transcendent distinction, suggests that 
Wittgenstein may have identified metaphysics precisely with these important concerns. 
51 Cf. Philosophical Investigations, §392, where he gives an example of an approach to 
philosophy which ‘oscillates between natural science and grammar’. 
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operandi: such an interpretation is certainly consistent with Wittgenstein’s 
apparent ambivalence concerning the ‘propositions’ of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein 
held that contrary to what metaphysicians tend to suppose, theirs is not a factual 
inquiry: neither is that of the Tractatus. Metaphysics and logic are concerned, on 
this account, with form (i.e., the essence of the world), which is shown, not 
described. For Wittgenstein, metaphysics is expressive, rather than representative, 
but not, as Carnap claimed ‘of an attitude towards life’. Admittedly, Wittgenstein’s 
opinion of metaphysics is relatively difficult to decipher. Nevertheless, it is not 
fanciful to suggest that Wittgenstein’s position may have affinities with that of 
Kant, in that he is concerned with the limits of thought: he believes there is 
something (i.e., the form of reality) beyond thought and language about which 
nothing can be said.52 
 There is significant critical opinion according to which Wittgenstein is 
not seeking to eliminate metaphysics in the Philosophical Investigations but to 
understand the nature of metaphysical and philosophical problems.53 The critique 
of metaphysics and philosophy offered in the Investigations is similar to that 
offered in the Tractatus. Metaphysicians are held to err in that they view their 
problems, and their purported answers to these problems, as factual, rather than 
conceptual, because the surface form of the language in which they are couched is 
akin to that displayed by genuinely factual (i.e., empirical) discourse.54 Fann 
(1969, 94) writes that Wittgenstein ‘criticises metaphysics because it has been 
presented in an empirical form, not because it deals with unimportant matters’. 
Wittgenstein seeks to render clear the conceptual, rather than factual, nature of 
metaphysics: ‘My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense 
to something that is patent nonsense’ (Investigations, §464). Although this 
comment appears to have an extremely disparaging air, it is consistent with 
Wittgenstein’s long-standing view that non-descriptive discourse can be valuable 
and that it can show without saying. Kahl (1986, 297) writes, ‘for Wittgenstein 
only conceptual investigations are legitimate heirs to the subject that was originally 
called “philosophy”’: this is consistent with the Tractarian view of philosophy as 
non-factual. Wittgenstein would agree with the logical positivists that metaphysics 
is meaningless in the sense that it is unverifiable.55 However, for Wittgenstein this 
is just another way of saying that its method of investigation is conceptual, not 
empirical. 
 Wittgenstein’s aims included elucidating the structure of reality 
(Tractatus, 6.54) and showing metaphysics to be metaphysics (Investigations, 
                                                 
52 Readings on which Wittgenstein has been seen, like Kant, not to seek the elimination of 
metaphysics but to distinguish between its legitimate and illegitimate species include Kahl 
(1986), Young (1986), and (especially) A.R. White (1987, 116-126). 
53 E.g., Fann (1969, 86-96) and Pitkin, (1972, e.g., 19, 289-290). The most relevant parts of 
the Investigations are §§109-133. 
54 Cf. Fann (1969, 90-91) and A.R. White (1987, 124). 
55 Cf. Kahl (1986, 298). 
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§464). He advised that whenever someone wanted to say something metaphysical, 
he should be shown that he has ‘failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions’ (Tractatus, 6.53). This remark can be construed as indicating that 
metaphysics proper shows but does not attempt to say. The recommendation which 
follows this remark, that nothing should be said except that which can be said (‘i.e. 
propositions of natural science’), does not entail that there is no place for 
metaphysical discourse. Wittgenstein’s recommendation is consistent with the 
maintenance of a metaphysics which does not attempt to say anything 
metaphysical, but nonetheless uses metaphysical discourse to reveal the form of 
reality: this is very fortunate, given the plausibility of this as an interpretation of 
the status of the contents of the Tractatus themselves.56 Wittgenstein can be seen 
as distinguishing between a metaphysics which conceives itself to be saying 
something and a metaphysics, like his own, which shows, and recognizes that it is 
the business of metaphysics to show rather than say. 
 
Essentialism and the Philosophical Investigations 
 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is regarded by some as anti-essentialist. I have 
already indicated that I accept that the essentialistic methodology of the Tractatus 
is rejected in the Investigations. What is not to be found in the latter work, 
however, is any argument against real essentialism. 
 Two aspects of the work which feature in anti-essentialist readings are the 
considerations concerning family resemblances and a slogan about the relationship 
between essence and grammar.57 Concerning the former, Wittgenstein writes: 
 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’....What is 
common to them all?—Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, 
or they would not be called “games”’—but look and see whether there 
is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a 
whole series of them at that. (Investigations, §66) 
 
What follows from Wittgenstein’s claim is not that essentialism must be rejected, 
but that searching for an essence common to all things classified under the same 
word may be an erroneous project. It does not follow that an anti-realist account of 
all modality de re must be adopted, particularly since it is entirely compatible with 
essentialist metaphysics and semantics to recognize that not all names and 
classificatory terms relate to real essences.58 In fact, the example used by 
                                                 
56 Cf. Mounce (1981, 102). 
57 Anti-essentialist readings include Hallett (1991) and Petrie (1971). 
58 Cf. Sorabji (1980, 194) who comments that, as an objection to Aristotelian essentialism, 
Wittgensteinian considerations about family resemblance are ‘misplaced’; the Aristotelian 
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Wittgenstein is particularly harmless to the essentialist who takes the paradigmatic 
cases of real essence to relate to natural kinds rather than artifacts. At most, 
Wittgenstein’s comments indicate that there need not always be essences common 
to items classified under a common term. From this it does not follow that there 
can never be any essences corresponding to such terms; nor does it follow that 
there are no such instances. Nothing Wittgenstein says about essence is 
inconsistent with real essentialism. The paradigmatic essences—those pertaining to 
natural kinds—are not threatened by his comments, since the essentialist can well 
recognize that not all purported natural kind terms even succeed in referring. The 
discovery that a purportedly natural kind term fails to refer, or that it picks out a 
merely nominal essence, constitutes an advance in our knowledge of the natural 
realm, far from being an illustration of the ill-foundedness of essentialism.59 
 Wittgenstein claims (Investigations, §371) that ‘Essence is expressed by 
grammar’. From this it does not follow that all, or even any, necessity is purely 
linguistic in character.60 Wittgenstein’s claim should not be mistaken for the non-
equivalent claim that essence is essentially and exhaustively linguistic. That the 
source of necessity is in language certainly does not follow from the claim that 
essence is expressed by grammar any more than that it follows that the source of 
the artist’s inspiration is the painting because it is expressed by the painting. 
(There is a sense in which the tenet that essence is expressed by grammar accords 
well with the defence of essentialism I will support in Chapter 3, where I will 
argue that essentialist attributions pertaining to natural objects exhibit a 
characteristic grammatical form. Of course, this does not entail that such 
attributions are always expressive of a real essence.) 
 It is generally accepted that the later Wittgenstein propounded an anti-
realist account of (standard) logical necessity. Granting that he did, it does not 
follow in any obvious manner that he had an anti-realist view of necessity de re. 
This is illustrated by the fact that there is no obvious incoherence involved in 
maintaining, for example, that the only real necessity there is involves natural 
compulsion, biological need, etc., while viewing logical necessity as lacking 
ontological ground. To deny coherence to such a stance at the outset would, on the 
assumption that meaning is crucial to the logical modalities, beg the question 
against any physicalist realist about nature who combined anti-realism about 
meaning with realism about natural necessity. I see no obvious way in which to 
object to such a position in point of ontology. However, I believe that a realist 
view of logical necessity is necessary to the epistemology of some de re modal 
claims: most obviously, those concerning de re possibility. A fuller account is 
given at 2.2: the specific form of realism about logical necessity I adopt is of 
conceptualist, rather than platonist, hue. 
                                                                                                                 
does not have it that, for any classificatory term whatever, all things classified under the 
term share a common essence. 
59 Cf. Wiggins (1980, 82).  
60 Contrary to Petrie (1971, 144) it does not follow from the quoted comment and the 
‘“meaning is use” doctrine’ that the source of necessity must be in language. 
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 Even if Wittgenstein did have an anti-realist view of necessity de re, there 
is no argument to support such a view in the Investigations. The passages which 
are sometimes regarded as anti-essentialist do not actually establish anti-
essentialism. It is doubtful that they even suggest anti-essentialism. Wittgenstein 
does not explicitly set out to offer a rebuttal of essentialism and there is no 
indication in Wittgenstein’s text that he regarded his comments on essence as 
expressive of anti-essentialism. Of course, Wittgenstein may well have been ill-
disposed to essentialism at this stage in his philosophical career. However, citation 
of the purportedly anti-essentialist passages mentioned above neither furnishes a 
critique of essentialism nor provides sufficient evidence that Wittgenstein held 
anti-essentialistic views. The passages in question are anti-essentialist only if 
essentialism is to be identified with the implausible position that it is always the 
case that all things classified under a common term share some characteristic not 
shared by things subsumed under different terms.61,62 
                                                 
61 Hallett (1991, 2) describes the tenet that all members of a class have ‘something in 
common...(a shared family resemblance for example)’ as an ‘innocuous’ form of 
essentialism. He seeks to oppose what he takes to be traditional essentialism, according to 
which essences ‘are core properties or clusters of properties present, necessarily, in all and 
only those things which share [a] common name’. Despite Hallett’s reluctance (1991, 3) to 
provide ‘a precise definition’ of essentialism, this illustrates a tendency to confuse 
essentialism with the implausible tenet indicated in the main text above. 
62 The implausible tenet indicated in the main text above is more attributable to traditional 
empiricist semantics, as characterized (but not endorsed) by Sidelle (1989, 10, 170-172). 
The common characteristic in question is the satisfaction of a definite description or an 
analytic definition. (Sidelle seeks to retain the conventionalist core of empiricist semantics, 
while rejecting the traditional tenet.) 
Chapter Two 
 
Modal Primitivism 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Primitivism, Eliminativism and Reductionism 
 
Minimally, modal primitivism is the view that modal idioms are up neither for 
elimination nor for reduction to non-modal bases.1 Anti-realist modal primitivism 
is an option: for example, one can be an irrealist about modality. Irrealism is a 
species of anti-realism about a discourse which, in contrast with reductionism and 
eliminativism, does not approach the discourse via the traditional means, i.e., the 
standard truth-conditional rubric. An irrealist about a discourse holds that there are 
no genuine truth-conditions pertaining to that discourse and that the discourse has 
some role other than purporting to be traditionally assertive. Thus, in contrast with 
the eliminativist, the irrealist does not hold that attributions employing the disputed 
discourse are erroneous. 
 In contrast with a minimal semantic primitivism, committed to the tenet that 
modal discourse is neither eliminable nor reducible, is an ontologically committed 
sort of modal primitivism. This incorporates the semantic primitivist’s minimal 
position, and holds the further thesis that modality is ontologically, rather than 
merely conceptually, grounded. The ontological primitivist about modality holds 
that modality is in the nature of reality: actuality is construed as modal.2 The 
extent of the difference between this position and that adopted by David Lewis 
will be elucidated later. 
 Primitivist positions will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3. David 
Lewis (1973, 85) depicts primitivism as ‘an abstinence from theorizing’.3 At the 
outset, some considerations can be offered as to why such a depiction of 
primitivism is erroneous. 
                                                 
1 Blackburn (1984, Chapter 5) calls the former ‘rejection’ and sometimes calls the latter 
‘analysis’. 
2 Recent defences of such a view include Wiggins (1980) and Fine (1994). The former will 
be crucial to my support for realism about a class of modality de re in Chapter 3. 
Shalkowski (1996, 376) describes modal primitivism as ‘the view that the world has a 
genuine modal character and that it does not possess this character in virtue of any 
nonmodal character it possesses’. Thus, he does not distinguish between conceptual 
primitivism and ontological primitivism. 
3 Cf. Butchvarov (1970, 113) who comments that if questions about necessary truth cannot 
be answered without appeal to the notion of necessity itself ‘we would have a theory which 
may be of relevance for other philosophical topics...but of no relevance at all for the topic of 
the nature of necessary truth’. 
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 Firstly, the adoption of primitivism can, as herein, be argued for on the 
basis of an examination of the demerits of non-primitivist positions. Thus, 
primitivism is established through theorizing. 
 Secondly, even once minimal primitivism has been adopted the 
realism/anti-realism debate is still open, so the adoption of primitivism does not 
signal an end to theorizing. 
 Thirdly, the elucidation and clarification of modal notions is not identical 
with their reduction, and can be performed in a framework which includes no 
reductionist aspiration.4 Lewis seeks to debar non-reductive accounts of modality 
on the basis that only a reductive analysis of modality is genuinely explanatory. 
Despite Lewis’s view, it is both legitimate and explanatorily fruitful to explain the 
modal via the modal, as I hope to illustrate. For example, the nature of the notion 
of essence can be elucidated by reference to the species of modality it involves. 
This is genuinely explanatory, since our rendering a genuine elucidation will direct 
us away from errors concerning the notion. An intra-modal explanation (i.e., an 
explanation of one modality-involving notion via another) does influence our view 
of the notion being explained: for example, it may affect the sort of epistemology 
which we will regard as apposite to the notion. So, in order to give fruitful 
accounts of modal notions it is not necessary to explain modality away. In any 
case, the prospects for modal reductionism are, I will argue, less than promising. 
 
The Distinction Between Eliminativism and Reductionism 
 
Eliminativism, the position which advocates that a type of discourse is jettisoned, 
is distinct from reductionism. Furthermore, eliminativism and reductionism are not 
only distinct, they are separate in the sense that neither is a subspecies of the other. 
The issue at hand is that there can be no such position as reductionist 
eliminativism: it is a mistake to view reductionism as supportive of eliminativism.5 
                                                 
4 Cf.: Pap (1958, 422), ‘there is no vicious circle [involved] in the attempt to clarify modal 
concepts by means of themselves’; Newman’s comment (1992, 113) that a primitive notion 
‘can be characterized by saying things about it...and by saying what it is not’; Frege’s 
distinction [1892a](1980, 42-43), cited by Newman (1992, 1), between definition and 
explanation; Wiggins (1980, 4), ‘much can be achieved in philosophy by means of 
elucidations which use a concept without attempting to reduce it’; Grossmann (1983, 5), ‘[in 
the] most fundamental matters of metaphysics, definitions are impossible’. 
5 On the view attributed by Stalnaker (1976, 70) to Adams (1974, 224) and suggested by 
Roper (1982) reduction (in these cases a reduction of possible worlds discourse) can 
advance elimination. On this view, a reductionist account of possible worlds discourse 
eliminates possible worlds in the sense that it is illegitimate to postulate worlds along 
Lewisian lines as ‘non-actual possibles’: this is distinct from eliminativism about possible 
worlds discourse. Eliminativism about a discourse is different from the exercise of 
parsimony along the lines just mentioned.  
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 Reductionists hold that the (purportedly) problematic A-discourse can be 
re-expressed in basic, less problematic or unproblematic B-discourse.6 
Eliminativism will here be classified as a position stemming from error theory: it 
follows, as I will illustrate, that it cannot be supported by reductionism. If 
eliminativism were to be alternatively defined so as to include any position which 
advocates that a discourse be jettisoned, then reductionists calling for the disposal 
of the ‘problematic’ discourse in favour of the ‘unproblematic’ discourse would 
also count as eliminativists. All such an alternative definition would do would be 
to pick out one tenet common to eliminativism and reductionism, namely the 
dispensability claim, to which I will later return. 
 A crucial reason why reductionism and eliminativism are quite separate 
stems from the role which truth plays in the two theories. Reductionism and 
eliminativism, as Blackburn (1986) emphasizes, share a common approach to the 
disputed discourse: the truth-conditional approach. 
 Reductionist positions are truth-preserving: claims made in the A-
discourse are true or false in virtue of the fact that they stem from the base 
discourse and there is a ‘mapping’ relation between A-statements and B-
statements. In contrast, eliminativism is an offshoot of error theory.7 The error 
theorist about a discourse holds that the discourse says nothing true (whether about 
the world, our minds or our linguistic conventions) and is, in a sense about to be 
described, mistaken. An error theorist about a discourse holds that the discourse 
purports to establish truth but that its truth conditions are unfulfilled. Since claims 
in the discourse incorporate the claim to (truth-conditionally conceived) objectivity 
but go unfulfilled, the discourse fails in its purported project: the incorporated 
assertoric claim is unsubstantiated so the claims made in the discourse are false. 
The eliminativist subscribes to the error theorist’s thesis and stipulates that the 
discourse should be jettisoned.8 If the reductionist’s claims about the relation 
between the A-discourse and the B-discourse are adhered to then there can be no 
question of reductionism leading to eliminativism. The two approaches are 
contrary to one another: reductionism cannot be a basis for eliminativism, nor can 
there be any relation of supplementation or complementarity between the two 
positions. The eliminativist is committed to jettisoning the disputed discourse 
because of its systematic falsehood; the reductionist need not be committed to 
dispensing with the disputed discourse at all. There is reason to suspect that any 
such aspiration is incompatible with the reductionist’s project, given that the 
                                                 
6 Cf. Blackburn (1984, 152-153): the problem can be one ‘of meaning, or of epistemology, 
or of metaphysics’.  
7 The paradigm error theory oft-cited, particularly by Blackburn, is the approach to moral 
discourse proposed by J.L. Mackie (1977, 35, 48-49).  
8 Note the possibility of positions which adhere to error theory without seeking elimination. 
Someone might be an error theorist about a discourse and yet hold that it is not up for 
elimination due, for example, to its theoretical utility, or to de facto considerations about 
human psychology to the effect that we must view the world in terms of the discourse. An 
example of the former approach is the possible worlds fictionalism due to Rosen (1990). 
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endorsement of non-arbitrary equivalence relations between a discourse and its 
reductive base is necessary to reductionism. 
 
The Dispensability Claim 
 
Blackburn (1984, 151) describes reductionism in the following terms: 
 
A different attitude to a theory [i.e. other than eliminativism], which yet 
shades into outright rejection of it, is that its theses can be accepted, but 
their content can be expressed in other ways, using a different kind of 
vocabulary. 
 
How can this be made sense of in the light of the strong separation of reductionism 
and eliminativism which Blackburn suggests (e.g., 1984, 147) and which I 
endorse? This is a question upon which Blackburn does not dwell. For my 
purposes, dealing more explicitly with the sense in which reductionism may be 
said, consistently with the aforementioned distinction, to ‘shade into’ 
eliminativism is worthwhile, since my argument has it that the proponent of (in the 
first instance, minimal) primitivism has two birds to deal with that it may not be 
possible to kill with the one stone. 
 McGinn (1981) makes three central claims concerning the definition of 
modal anti-realism. Firstly, he claims that ‘anti-realism about modality is the 
doctrine known as actualism’ (1981, 168). Secondly, he suggests that ‘anti-realism 
is a thesis of reductive or eliminative actualism’ (1981, 170). Thirdly, he states that 
to bring about ‘the actualist programme would...be to show that nothing of 
significance is lost if we purge our thought of all modal notions’ (1981, 171). 
 Now McGinn’s first claim is incorrect, for the following reason. 
Possibilism is the doctrine, adhered to by David Lewis, that possible but non-
actual objects exist. Actualism is merely the denial of this doctrine. That is to say, 
the actualist has it that there are no possibilia.9 However, actualism does not entail 
modal anti-realism, since one can, as herein, adopt a position of non-objectual 
modal realism. Such an account has it that the modalities are real and that they are 
not to be accounted for via reduction to non-actual possibilia. What McGinn takes 
‘actualism’ to mean is in fact the thesis that there are no possibilia conjoined with 
the further thesis that reality is non-modal in nature. I will distinguish the position 
which conjoins these two theses by the term ‘rigid actualism’. (The importance of 
the distinction between actualism and rigid actualism will be returned to below.) 
McGinn’s second claim is also incorrect. As we have already seen, reductive and 
eliminative approaches are not exhaustive of modal anti-realism.10 
 Although I take issue with McGinn’s first two claims, his third claim may 
nevertheless serve to assist our understanding of what it might mean to suggest 
                                                 
9 Cf. Prior and Fine (1977, 116). 
10 Cf. Divers (1990, Chapter 6; 1992, esp. 113). 
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that reductionism and eliminativism shade into one another. (This is so long as we 
substitute the word ‘actualist’ with the non-equivalent phrase ‘reductive or 
eliminative’.) Furthermore, consideration of it may help us to see how this shading 
is not such that either of the approaches in question can properly be described as 
providing rational support for the other. Eliminativism and reductionism share the 
truth-conditional approach and the tenet that the disputed discourse is dispensable. 
That a discourse is dispensable, however, is not sufficient to establish that it is up 
for elimination, and to state its dispensability need not be to advocate its 
elimination. (By way of analogy, consider this: there can be two ways of referring 
to one thing. The fact that there are two might be construed such that neither of 
them is regarded as indispensable as against the other. At least one is essential to 
referring to the thing, but there is no one such that it and only it is essential.) 
Furthermore, the sense of the dispensability claim is quite different in the case of 
eliminativism than in that of reductionism. To reiterate: eliminativism is rooted in 
error theory, whereas reductionism is entirely different in that it is truth-
preserving. It holds that the A-discourse (i.e. the one supposedly up for reduction) 
is true in virtue of the B-discourse (i.e. the reductive base).11 So, eliminativism 
states that the discourse is dispensable because it is, in the specified manner, false, 
while reductionism states that the discourse is dispensable because any claim made 
in it can be made in the terms of the base discourse. The reductionist has to show 
that priority genuinely attaches to the purportedly reductive discourse in any 
relation of equivalence between the A- and B-discourses. If, as the reductionist has 
it, the same claim can be made in either A- or B-terms then consistency demands 
that either neither form of expression is admissible or that both are. The 
reductionist favours the B-discourse, but it legitimates the A-discourse, it does not 
encourage its eradication.  
 For the modal eliminativist, nothing of significance is lost if modal 
discourse is forsaken because that discourse, despite purporting to do so, does not 
convey any facts. For the modal reductionist modal discourse conveys facts, but 
the facts it conveys are not essentially modal: there is no distinctive cognitive 
content to modality over and above what can be expressed in either rigidly 
actualistic or non-modal discourse. The reductionist holds that were modal 
discourse to be jettisoned, none of the fact-stating purchase associated with it 
would be lost because that is entirely contained within the non-modal base 
discourse. 
 Eliminativism and reductionism, two species of anti-realism, can be 
described as shading into one another in that the set of the tenets of eliminativism 
and the set of the tenets of reductionism intersect. This is so because they share the 
dispensability claim. The foundational claims pertaining to the establishment of the 
dispensability claim are discrete, with the single exception of the common tenet 
                                                 
11 ‘True in virtue of’ is to be interpreted in a strong sense (i.e., a sense that is stronger than 
mere supervenience) where reductionism is concerned. Mapping relations are held by the 
reductionist to pertain between A- and B-discourses, with the latter discourse having 
conceptual priority over the former. 
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that allows that the disputed discourse is held to aim at truth.12 The sense in which 
reductionism and eliminativism can properly be held to shade into one another is 
meagre: the view that reduction cannot provide the grounds for elimination is 
vindicated.  
 
 
2.2 Modal Epistemology 
 
The Problem of Knowledge 
 
In this section I will examine the problem of modal knowledge, outlining how 
eliminativism and reductionism are aligned with distinct forms of epistemological 
concern. I will agree with McGinn (1981) that there is a strong connection 
between modality and the a priori.13 I will suggest that, when modality is 
approached from within the truth-conditional rubric, the broad options which face 
the theorist are as follows: (a) the a priori, and thus modality, is rejected on the 
grounds that it is epistemologically profligate, since either (i) the only acceptable 
model of knowing involves the knowers’ being causally related to the known (and 
purportedly a priori knowledge involves no such relation); or, (ii) the a priori 
requires that some of the contents of our web of belief are held to be entirely 
immune from revision in the light of recalcitrant experience, but even the most 
hallowed principles of logic are revisable in the light of pragmatic utility, and other 
core, but more peripheral, beliefs are subject to refutation by experience; (b) the a 
priori is accepted, but only modality de dicto is held to be epistemologically 
acceptable; (c) the a priori is accepted and modality de dicto and modality de re 
are regarded, thereby, as epistemologically acceptable. Option (a) constitutes an 
eliminativist and radical empiricist approach. Option (a)(ii) constitutes Quinean 
eliminativism. Option (b) corresponds to the position of those empiricists (who, for 
convenience I shall call ‘Humean empiricists’) who accept one of the ‘dogmas’ 
criticized by Quine, namely a distinction between a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge. (Such empiricists commonly adopt reductionist theses concerning 
modality de dicto and purport to eschew modality de re.) Option (c) will be 
endorsed by those essentialists who accept that the a priori is implicated in all 
modal knowledge. (I know of no essentialist denial that the a priori is implicated 
in all modal knowledge.) In this section I will provide a brief exposition of 
Quinean eliminativism. Later in this chapter I will endorse argument to the effect 
that the rejection of the a priori, and thus modality, along the lines of (a) is 
                                                 
12 Where the notion of truth is here understood in terms of the traditional truth-conditional 
rubric, in contrast, for example, with the expressivist alternative proposed by Blackburn 
(e.g., 1984, 197-202) and the (anti-expressivist) minimalist alternative proposed by Wright 
(1992).  
13 I endorse Thesis (II) of Peacocke (1997, 556): ‘In every case in which a content 
containing a metaphysical modality is known, any modal premisses in the ultimate 
justification which underwrites the status of the belief as knowledge are a priori.’ 
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untenable. I will suggest, after McGinn, that since the essentialist and the Humean 
empiricist both accept the a priori, and since the a priori is implicated in all modal 
knowledge, there is a clear sense in which modality de re should be regarded as no 
more epistemologically problematic by the Humean empiricist than those sorts of a 
priori knowledge which the Humean empiricist already accepts. I will proceed to 
provide an epistemology for metaphysical modality de re which, although different 
from Kripke’s account in some important respects, is of a broadly Kripkean form. 
 Epistemological concerns are a key source of motivation for non-
primitivist positions about modality. A strain of these are held, in the case of error 
theory, to advance the claim that modal discourse is systematically false. 
(Epistemological concerns are not exhaustive of the motives for modal 
reductionism: David Lewis’s reductionism is motivated by the supposed formal 
and theoretical benefits which it affords.) 
 Epistemological concerns are mentioned in rather vague terms by 
Blackburn (1984, 146, 151) as provoking eliminativist and reductionist responses: 
claims may ‘seem suspicious’ or ‘invite scepticism’; ‘we might find some 
particular set of terms awkward or puzzling in various ways’. According to 
Blackburn: 
 
The motivation for reductive analyses is based on a contrast. The 
commitments expressed in some original vocabulary (the A-vocabulary, 
or A-commitments) must be felt to introduce some apparent puzzle, 
either of meaning, or of epistemology, or of metaphysics, not introduced 
by statements made in the analysing, B-vocabulary. (1984, 152-153) 
 
It is the epistemological sort of ‘puzzle’ which appears to dominate in motivating 
eliminativist approaches to modal discourse, and it is a central motive for other 
anti-realist approaches.14 
 Preliminary to his discussion of possible worlds semantics, McGinn 
imposes an epistemological condition upon ‘ontological imputations’, to the effect 
that: 
 
the introduced objects must play a suitable part in the learning and 
verification of the sentences concerned....what makes our sentences true 
should properly relate to our knowledge of their truth. (1981, 147) 
 
McGinn construes ‘ontology’ in narrowly entitative (i.e., ‘ontical’—and thereafter 
rigidly actualistic) terms, which allows him to characterize his own project of 
                                                 
14 As I will illustrate, Quine’s modal eliminativism stems from epistemological concern. 
An anti-eliminativist theorist who regards real necessity as epistemologically baffling is 
Sidelle, who claims (1989, 134-135) that such necessity is epistemologically and 
metaphysically ‘occult’. I hope to go some way towards addressing these charges in this 
chapter and in the next. 
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establishing non-objectual modal realism as non-ontological (1981, 169-170).15 
McGinn takes ontological questions to be exhaustively about what entities and 
sorts of entities exist. As against such a conception, ontology is the study of 
being.16 That study is not exhausted by addressing the kinds of question which 
would count as ontological on McGinn’s definition, since the former includes 
questions about the nature of reality and the natures of existents, such as the 
questions as to whether the modalities are real aspects of being and whether 
individuals have essences. Nevertheless, McGinn’s epistemological condition is 
applicable to any non-irrealist and anti-eliminativist account of modality in that 
‘what makes our sentences true should properly relate to our knowledge of their 
truth’ (1981, 147). 
 McGinn distinguishes between two strains of epistemological concern 
which foster anti-realism: 
 
In one kind the form of the anti-realist complaint is that the realist truth 
conditions invite scepticism: this is because knowledge of those 
conditions appears mediated by a problematic inference...In the other 
kind the complaint is in a way more fundamental: the trouble here is 
that the anti-realist cannot comprehend how the introduced [problematic 
cognitive] faculty is supposed to operate at all. (1981, 167) 
 
The form of sceptical concern in the case of the first strain is associated with the 
limitations of the faculty. There is held to be a problem about how the faculty can 
be sufficient to justify certain knowledge claims (adhered to by the realist) which 
seem to be beyond its grasp. As McGinn puts it, these knowledge claims require to 
be ‘mediated by a problematic inference’. In the latter case it is the faculty itself 
which is held to be problematic, not the extent of its reach. The sceptical suspicion 
is serious enough, in the minds of the afflicted, to undermine the possibility of 
there being such a faculty. 
 The strains of scepticism which McGinn identifies seem to correspond, 
respectively, to the epistemological motives for reductionism and eliminativism 
about modality. The epistemologically-motivated reductionist is trying to resolve a 
perplexity which arises in the A-discourse as it stands. The A-discourse commands 
reductive analysis because it is held to give rise to a requirement for problematic 
inference. The aim is to reduce it to a base discourse whereby this requirement can 
be dissolved. The reductionist aims to give an epistemologically non-perplexing 
account of the truth conditions for modal claims. The modal eliminativist’s 
                                                 
15 The benefits of an alternative terminology to that of McGinn, in which the ontical and 
the ontological are distinguished, will be mentioned later. 
16 This is no mere terminological dispute, since McGinn’s discussion (e.g., in identifying 
ontological realism with objectual realism) underestimates the tasks of ontology. I will later 
suggest that, where modality is concerned, ontological realism proper (which holds that the 
modalities are irreducibly grounded in reality) is in fact non-objectual. My conception of the 
tasks of ontology compares with that advanced by Grossmann (1983, 3-5; 1992, 1). 
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concern is deeper. The question for the eliminativist is not as to how (apparently 
problematic) modal knowledge can be rendered perspicuous: rather, the sceptical 
question which the eliminativist raises is as to how there can be modal knowledge 
at all. The eliminativist’s answer is that there cannot. Furthermore, this is not 
because there is some modal truth which we are held to be unable ever to know. 
Rather, the eliminativist holds that since we have no faculty for modal knowledge 
acquisition the intelligibility of the idea that there are modal truths is undermined. 
This is illustrated by the case of Quine’s view that there are no necessary truths.17  
 Quine’s radical empiricism motivates his modal eliminativism.18 He is 
committed to the view that all knowledge is empirical and that all beliefs are 
constrained by empirical evidence. In accordance with his radical empiricism, he 
rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction. He opines that if necessity is to be at all 
intelligible it must rest upon the notion of analyticity.19 He holds to the conviction 
that the a priori and the analytic/synthetic distinction (and thus modality) are not 
epistemologically respectable. The analytic/synthetic distinction is called into 
question by Quine precisely because this ‘dogma of empiricism’ cannot be 
genuinely upheld by a pure empiricism: the commitment to the a priori manifested 
in the writings of Hume and the logical positivists is a vestige of rationalism. 
Given Quine’s rejection of the a priori, he holds that we possess no cognitive 
                                                 
17 Divers (1992, 113) lists Quine as a member of a modal irrealist tradition. In contrast, 
Wright (1986, 191) depicts Quine as an error-theorist. Quine is hostile to the logical 
modalities and essentialist modal attributions. Quine (1966, 48-56) states that the only 
notion of necessity with scientific utility is that of natural necessity, which relates to 
dispositional attributions and about which he is an anti-realist. Dispositional attributions, in 
turn, are held to be a requirement of a relatively primitive science: they become obsolete 
with scientific progress. It is difficult to be convinced by these comments. The 
indispensability of dispositional attributions to both science and philosophy is illustrated by 
their centrality to Quine’s conception of ‘stimulus meaning’ (1960, 33-34). In so far as 
empiricism is committed to the idea that the world and the realm of necessity are distinct, 
and given that dispositional attributions are not equivalent to conditionals (contra Quine 
(1960, 33-34, 222-225) and typical empiricist accounts), the absence of a credible empiricist 
account of such attributions undermines the plausibility of empiricism. Discursive criticism 
of empiricist accounts of dispositional attributions is provided by Weissman (1965, esp. 
Chapter 2). 
18 Cf. Hookway (1988, 123): ‘[Quine’s] empiricist approach to science ensures that he sees 
the notion of analyticity as the only hope for clarifying necessity—albeit a forlorn one.’ 
(This point also relates to the note below.) Wiggins (1980, 104) suggests that it is ‘only 
empiricism as empiricism misconceives itself...that could find anything...to cavil at’ 
regarding Wiggins’s ‘principles and maxims governing the derivation of a modest 
essentialism’. (Unfortunately, Wiggins does not explain the nature of such a misconception 
of empiricism.) 
19 Quine (1980, 143): ‘The general idea of strict modalities is based on the putative notion 
of analyticity’; cf. Quine (1960, 195-96; 1980, 23-37; 1966, 169). (Quine (1960, 55, 65-69) 
employs the notion ‘stimulus-analytic’; a notion which in turn employs the notion of 
dispositions.) The interdependence of the putative notions of analyticity and necessity is 
undermined if, as Kripke maintains, there are non-analytic necessities. This is the case 
regardless of whether such necessities are properly construed as necessary truths.  
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faculty pertaining to (allegedly) necessary truth or to the justification of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction: all our cognitive faculties are answerable to the 
tribunal of experience and there is, therefore, no necessary truth and no legitimate 
analytic/synthetic distinction. 
 Quine holds that necessity is not scientifically respectable since it 
commits us to empirically unrevisable truth and it is incompatible with the 
language of canonical science.20 According to Quine, that language is extensional, 
whereas modal contexts are non-extensional: ‘referential opacity afflicts...the so-
called modal contexts “Necessarily...” and “Possibly...”, at least when those are 
given the sense of strict necessity and possibility as in [C.I.] Lewis’s modal logic’ 
(1980, 143).21 Quine has it that there is a trade-off between instrumental validity 
and problematic status in point of epistemology: e.g., in the case of our postulation 
of physical objects (1980, 44). In the case of necessity, however, there is no such 
instrumental validity to be had precisely because necessity involves commitment to 
the a priori and the a priori is in conflict with global pragmatic utility. Quine is 
correct to link modality with the a priori: the a priori is pertinent to all modal 
knowledge. (However, it is a mistake to identify all necessity with analyticity.) 
Since the a priori is implicated in all modality, the philosopher who wishes to 
preserve modality against the Quinean attack must tackle that attack at its source 
by defending the thesis that there is a class of a priori knowledge, or that there 
must be some such class if our scientific practice, broadly construed, is to function. 
Successful argument to this effect constitutes a necessary but non-sufficient 
condition for the defence of modality against the Quinean attack: it must also be 
shown that modal notions will feature significantly in that class of a priori 
knowledge. The meeting of these conditions is sufficient to defeat the Quinean 
attack: arguments which serve to fulfil these conditions will be endorsed later.  
 One way in which the epistemological difficulties associated with 
modality can be circumvented is by the adoption of an irrealist approach to modal 
discourse, such as that advocated by Blackburn. The epistemological difficulties 
which arise within the rubric of the truth-conditional approach (in which realism, 
reductionism and eliminativism participate) do not arise on an irrealist account. On 
Blackburn’s quasi-realist projectivist account, ‘the propositional behaviour of the 
commitments—the reason why they become objects of doubt or knowledge, 
probability, truth or falsity’ is explained on the basis of ‘a theory of the mental 
state expressed by the commitments in the area in question’ (1986, 122). In the 
next chapter I will argue that there is a significant class of modality, namely 
                                                 
20 As has been noted, Quine is prepared to admit the adverb ‘necessarily’ when it relates to 
natural necessity, but he construes this (1966, 51) as conveying no more than regularity.  
21 Quine’s attribution of referential opacity to modal contexts is criticized by Wolfram 
(1975) and Millican (1993), both of whose arguments rest upon the premise that definite 
descriptions can have purely referential occurrence. I take that premise to be implausible, 
and indeed untenable, in view of my support for a broadly Fregean distinction between 
sense and reference (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, not all modal contexts are intensional: I 
will illustrate that referential opacity afflicts only modality de dicto. 
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modality de re, for which this approach cannot account. Also, as I will try to show 
later in this chapter, that class of modality is not as epistemologically problematic 
as its critics have maintained. 
 One realist strategy in the face of epistemologically motivated anti-
realism is to argue that, however serious an epistemological problem a realist 
metaphysic of modality might present, the recognition of such a problem neither 
necessitates nor renders desirable a rejection of the metaphysical position subject 
to epistemological concern. Epistemological qualms, although they may be serious, 
are not sufficient to undercut our metaphysics. The realist may attempt to outweigh 
the kind of scepticism which would reflect back upon our metaphysics by 
emphasizing the benefits of realism and the theoretical drawbacks of the 
opposition which might be even more serious than the troublesome epistemology 
of modality. If there is serious incoherence or outrageousness in the opposing 
theories, then this will count in realism’s favour, even if realism gives rise to 
problematic epistemology. This appears—although not unambiguously—to be the 
strategy adopted by McGinn in defence of his own realism. McGinn does not 
attempt entirely to resolve the problem, but to give it a thorough exposition, 
showing what is at stake by means of analogy. Thereafter, he seems to admit to a 
certain perplexity in the face of the problem. He wants to illustrate that modality is, 
in some important respects, akin to mathematics. His aim is to illustrate what 
marks out modality as epistemologically problematic in a way which is distinct, for 
example, from the epistemological status of theoretical entities postulated in 
science. It also emerges on McGinn’s view that for the Humean empiricist, 
modality de re should be no more—and no less—epistemologically problematic 
than mathematics. The challenge to the realist about modality de re and to the 
Humean empiricist alike, is to provide a plausible epistemology for those species 
of knowledge in which the a priori is held to have an important role. 
 The strong connection between modal knowledge, including de re modal 
knowledge, and the a priori is set out by McGinn (1981, 180). In order to give rise 
to ‘transempirical truths’, a ‘theoretical construction’ must meet the conditions that 
it is realistically construed and that its introduction into or removal from an 
empirical theory neither increases nor lessens the empirical content of the theory. 
(This latter condition, ‘conservativeness’, is an adaptation of a notion employed in 
Hartry Field’s work on mathematical theories.) For McGinn, a theoretical 
construction has transempirical status if it is based on neither direct nor indirect 
observation (including argument to the best explanation, as in the case, for 
example, of theoretical entities). The point for McGinn is that modal constructions 
are akin to mathematics, and contrast with theoretical entities, in that modality is 
transempirical in the sense outlined. 
 McGinn (1981, 181) writes that in the case of a theory T, free of modal 
expressions, and a set of causally modal constructions V,  
 
T ? V is a conservative extension of T: in particular, T ? V has no 
empirical consequences not shared by T. So modality, like mathematics, 
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is empirically conservative. The reason is obvious: empirical 
consequences are reported by sentences which can be observed to be 
true, but what is non-actual cannot be observed to be true...So, by the 
conservativeness of modality, removing the modal component from an 
empirical theory does not decrease empirical content. In fact, this is just 
the point which has seemed to empiricists to lend such support to a 
constant conjunction conception of laws: viz., that the extra assertoric 
content alleged by the necessitarian about laws must transcend what we 
can empirically verify. 
 
McGinn (1981, 183) states that we could not arrive at a theory with modal content 
purely by means of empirical observation and that ‘there is a clear and important 
sense in which all specifically modal knowledge is a priori’. This is set against the 
background of the claim, provoked by consideration of Kripke’s discussion of a 
posteriori necessities, that 
  
we come to know that a certain empirical statement is necessary by 
inference from a pair of premisses: the first is the non-modal empirical 
truth which we know by ordinary a posteriori procedures; the second is 
a conditional, affirming that if the concept in question applies to a 
sequence of objects then it does so necessarily, where this conditional is 
known a priori by reflection on the concept in question. Modus ponens 
delivers the modal conclusion. (1981, 157-158) 
 
For example, upon the basis of the empirical discovery (say via the scientific 
analysis of blood samples) that Jill is the daughter of John and the conditional that 
if x is the (biological) daughter of y then x is necessarily the daughter of y, we 
arrive at the de re modal conclusion that Jill is necessarily the daughter of John. 
 McGinn offers a conceptualist account of the modal premise in such 
arguments. That is the sense in which all ‘specifically modal’ knowledge can be 
characterized as a priori, even when the truth of a modal statement is arrived at a 
posteriori. 
 McGinn’s modal realism is ‘Tractarian’, i.e., he believes that modal 
statements must feature in ‘a complete and ultimate description of reality’ (1981, 
170). In addition, his metaphysical standpoint is essentialist. This essentialism is 
evident in his endorsement of the principle that ‘something is a genuine individual 
only if...its properties partition (non-trivially) into the essential and the accidental’. 
Given that McGinn’s position is anti-reductionist and essentialist and that he offers 
a conceptualist account of modal knowledge, it is clear that his discussion 
constitutes a conceptualist realist account of modality.22 
 The real problem for the empiricist, which was at the forefront of Quine’s 
criticism of traditional empiricism, and of which McGinn makes mention, was how 
                                                 
22 Cf. the discursively defended conceptualist realism of Wiggins (1980, Chapter 5). 
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the empiricist can accept the a priori at all. McGinn (1981, 181) argues that 
modality, like mathematics and unlike theoretical entities, cannot be 
epistemologically established via argument to the best explanation, and that 
 
If this is correct, the liberalized empiricist can insist upon the non-
empirical nature of modality while not simultaneously and unwantedly 
excluding statements whose epistemological credentials he finds (or 
should find) acceptable [relating, e.g. to theoretical entities]. But now if 
modality is thus non-empirical and if modal realism is (as I have 
claimed) true, then this insistence immediately refutes empiricism, be it 
ever so attenuated... (1981, 182) 
 
The relevant ‘liberalization’ of empiricism involves the inclusion of a broad notion 
of indirect observability, including argument to the best explanation, but 
(presumably) a denial of the existence of a priori knowledge. The sort of 
empiricism envisaged here by McGinn is inconsistent with Humean empiricism. 
On McGinn’s account it emerges that the problem of modal knowledge is no more 
and no less acute for Humean views (which seek to uphold the legitimacy of a 
class of a priori knowledge pertinent to de dicto modalities) than it is for realism 
about modality de re.23 The problem of modal knowledge confronts equally the 
‘empiricist’ who wishes to retain logical modalities and the exponent of irreducible 
and real modality de re (i.e. the essentialist). If McGinn’s account is correct, de re 
modality does not fall foul of Hume’s fork and versions thereof, so long as 
interbreeding between the species of reasoning/knowledge is not debarred. (It 
would then seem that the Humean empiricist really has no legitimate grounds for 
epistemological qualms specific to modality de re.) The epistemology offered has 
it that de re modal knowledge comes about via inference from modal major 
premise and empirical minor premise. On McGinn’s account, the epistemological 
problem associated with modality boils down to the problem of how there can be a 
priori knowledge. If the a priori/a posteriori distinction can properly be upheld by 
the empiricist then, on McGinn’s account, there is no epistemological problem 
specific to modality, since the ‘problem’ of modal knowledge just is the ‘problem’ 
of a priori knowledge. If we accept the type of conceptualist realist account of 
modal knowledge de re advanced by McGinn, and if the empiricist is in a position 
to explain claims to knowledge where the nature of the subject matter cannot be 
accommodated by a (liberalized) causal model of knowing, then there should be no 
problem of modal knowledge. If the empiricist is in no such position then the 
choice which confronts the truth-conditional theorist of modality is between 
thoroughgoing Quinean empiricism and the acceptance of modality, and thereby 
the a priori, as legitimate, albeit epistemologically problematic. The theorist must 
                                                 
23 Whether McGinn is successful in his stated aim of explicating such a realist view need 
not concern us. Divers (1990, Chapter 7; 1992) rightly contests McGinn’s assumption that 
upholding modal-actual supervenience (without reduction) is, as Divers (1992, 99) puts it, 
‘constitutive of’ modal realism. 
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either seek to eliminate modality or admit that it may be epistemologically 
problematic, but that modalizing has to be preferred over eliminativism. The 
proceeding section will endorse the view that the problem associated with modal 
eliminativism, namely its incoherence, is much more serious than any problem 
which might attach to the a priori, and accordingly to logical modality and 
metaphysical modality de re. 
 McGinn points to an unresolved issue relating to the reconciliation of our 
metaphysics with our epistemology. On the one hand we have the difficulty of 
establishing that there is genuine knowledge a priori; on the other we have the 
problem that even if there is, how is it to be explained, given that we cannot 
explain it causally? 
 
The epistemological problem with modality is...that we cannot represent 
modal facts as causally explaining our knowledge of them. And the 
trouble with this is that we seem to have no other going theory of 
knowledge. We thus reach the uncomfortable position of agreeing that 
there is a priori knowledge but not understanding how such knowledge 
comes about. And this, it seems to me, is the form that the problematic 
epistemology of modal realism takes....My own view is that we are here 
confronted by a genuine and intractable conflict between what our 
metaphysics demands and what our epistemology can allow. (1981, 
185) 
 
McGinn’s account appears to suggest that there may be a need to reverse one of 
the central characteristics of modern philosophical method, stemming from its 
Cartesian heritage, namely the maintenance of epistemology as prior to 
metaphysics. If the demands of any coherent empiricist approach will require 
adherence to modal eliminativism then anyone who finds modal eliminativism 
implausible may have to turn the philosophical clock back by awarding priority to 
metaphysics over epistemology.24 (I am not suggesting that an epistemology for 
the a priori and modality cannot be found, but merely that the impossibility of 
eliminativist positions being correct entails that epistemological qualms should not 
take precedence over sound ontology.) The desire to revert to pre-Cartesian 
methodology is no doubt attractive to any philosopher who shares the predilection 
that the world is ontologically prior to our knowledge of it, and the accompanying 
belief that the metaphysics to which epistemologically-oriented methodology often 
leads—which awards not just epistemological but ontological priority to 
                                                 
24 Although the maintenance of epistemology as prior to metaphysics is a central feature of 
empiricism, it was inherited from Descartes’s methodology. Thus, like the two dogmas 
criticized by Quine, it has its origins in rationalist thought. It is characteristic of non-
empiricist philosophies to deem something other than epistemology (typically metaphysics 
or logic) to be ‘first philosophy’. Regardless of whether there need be a first philosophy, 
philosophers through the ages have tended to operate as if some area of philosophical study 
had priority over others. 
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epistemological atoms, qualities and the like over substances—is ill-advised. Of 
course, this predilection has to be supported by argument if metaphysical realism is 
not simply to be assumed. A more direct approach to the relation between modal 
metaphysics and modal epistemology, involving the justification of the 
conceptualism suggested by McGinn, is available. 
 
Outline of an Approach to Modal Epistemology 
 
The following argument encapsulates a line of thought to be further supported later 
in this chapter. 
 (1). In practice we employ axioms concerning modal notions.25 These 
include examples employing de re forms, e.g., (a) for any thing A and any activity, 
x-ing, if A is x-ing/x-ed then it is/was possible for A to x.26 These axioms, and the 
deductive principles governing argument forms in which they may feature, such as 
modus ponens, are ‘normative with respect to reasoning’.27 
 (2). Unless we eschew the very notions of possibility and necessity we 
must accept some such axioms, since they govern the meanings of the notions. The 
provision of a (not necessarily formal) logic for modal notions is a necessary 
condition for their possession of cognitive content. (The fact that this condition is 
met suggests that even if, as the projectivist has it, modality is a matter of our 
adopting modal attitudes, such attitudes, unlike, e.g., aesthetic attitudes, are subject 
to rules of a sort which can be formulated fairly straightforwardly.28) 
 (3). Eschewing modal notions is not an option, since the practice of 
deductive reasoning both relies upon and employs them.29 Even arguments in 
which the modalities do not overtly feature rest upon the modalities, because the 
whole practice of reasoning from suppositions rests upon the notion of logical 
necessity. 
 (4). The denial that the possibility of p entails p or that the possibility for 
A to x entails that A xs is symptomatic of an understanding of the notion of 
                                                 
25 E.g., if it is the case that p then it is possible that p; if it is necessary that p then it is not 
possible that not p. 
26 Much of what I write in this section rests upon the assumption of an account of the form 
of de re constructions which I will defend in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
27 I borrow the phrase from Haack (1978, 238). Cf. the combination of the thesis of 
normativity adopted in (1) and the cognitivism adopted in (4) with the ‘weak psychologism’ 
about logic suggested by Haack (1978, 238-242). 
28 The fact that the condition is met is seen, for more than one reason, as a threat to the 
projectivist’s project, as will emerge in Chapter 3. 
29 That practice, in turn, is indispensable to science (broadly or narrowly construed). This 
emerges from accepting Wright’s argument for the indispensability of the a priori to the 
functioning of empirical theories, McFetridge’s argument for the indispensability of logical 
necessity, and the further premise, (5) below, that logic is an a priori science. The 
arguments of Wright and McFetridge are expounded later in this chapter. Contrary to 
Quinean empiricism, there must be some deductive principles immune to empirical revision. 
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possibility. Someone who regards the objective possibility of something as 
entailing that it actually pertains clearly has a defective understanding of the notion 
of possibility.30 Modal axioms are proper objects of knowledge and ignorance. (At 
the very least, the layman and the logician talk as if they had cognitive content. 
The onus is on the non-cognitivist to provide us with an acceptable explanation of 
such talk and of the ordered nature of our use of the notions at issue.) 
 (5). Since deductive reasoning cannot (primarily) be justified via, and 
does not require justification via, empirical means, modal axioms and deductive 
principles have purely a priori status.31 (Where I attribute ‘purely a priori’ status 
to something I do not mean to rule out the possibility—indicated by Kripke—that 
it can ever be known a posteriori. Rather, I suggest that, if it can properly be 
regarded as an object of knowledge, the fundamental form of justification for it is 
extra-empirical.32 In addition, my concern is with the cognitive faculties of human 
beings.33) 
                                                 
30 The objective modalities are those which are unrestricted by ignorance and belief. 
31 Cf. McGinn (1976, 199-200) and Peacocke (1993, 185) on the a priori status of logic. 
32 Cf. McMichael (1986, 37): ‘A priori knowledge is distinguished from a posteriori 
knowledge not because it can arise in the total absence of experience...but rather because 
experience does not constitute an evidential basis for it’. Also, cf. Pap (1958, 126): ‘What 
marks a proposition as a priori is...that the only kind of cognitive activity which we admit as 
appropriate to its validation is conceptual analysis and deduction—the “mere operation of 
thought”.’ Even if there are purely a priori items the truth of which can be known a 
posteriori (e.g., via an expert’s report) this does not conflict with the claims of McMichael, 
Pap and myself. According to Wright (1980, 110): ‘Arithmetical equations certainly are 
strongly borne out by experience. If an explanation is to be available of why we give them 
the extra “dignity” of a rule...it is surely that more than experimental corroboration of them 
is possible.’ My claim is that appeal to experience is irrelevant to the fundamental 
justification of modal axioms and deductive principles. Wright’s Wittgenstein agrees (1980, 
329-330) that deductive inference ‘could not typically’ be ‘inductively supported’, but 
assigns purely normative status to logical ‘“statements”’. 
33 Cf. Kitcher (1980, 90-91; 1984, 26, incl. n. 16) who comments that, in characterising the 
a priori, we are interested only in the cognitive faculties which human beings actually 
possess, not in those which they possess in other possible worlds. Thus, my ‘a priori’ 
compares with Hirsch’s ‘a priori in the narrow sense’ (1986, 245): ‘A truth is knowable a 
priori in the narrow sense if it is metaphysically possible that we (human beings) should 
know this truth a priori, i.e., that we should know it purely on the basis of our 
understanding and reasoning.’ This is so long as metaphysical possibility is interpreted as de 
re, notwithstanding Hirsch’s own contrasting of the metaphysically necessary with the 
contingent (1982, 228) and his description of metaphysical necessity as concerning 
statements which hold ‘in any counterfactual situation’ (1982, 229). Given that any 
humanly useful a priori/a posteriori distinction will involve relativity to human cognitive 
faculties and that these faculties involve irreducible modality de re it seems that the 
empiricist will be ill-placed to retain the distinction while rejecting the modality. This opens 
up a path to the incoherence of the Humean empiricist’s denial of modality in nature. In 
addition, it illustrates Quine’s fundamental insight that the theoretical apparatus of the 
orthodox empiricism of his day cannot be sanctioned by a pure empiricist epistemology. 
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 It may be concluded, then, that there is a class of purely a priori modal 
knowledge.34 
 Neither (3) nor the argument compels us to accept de re modal notions. 
(Unless, that is, the de dicto is a special class of the de re: in such a circumstance 
the indispensability of non-de dicto modal notions remains unestablished). We are 
compelled to accept de dicto modal notions since they are essential to the practice 
of reasoning from suppositions. Although de re modal notions feature in our actual 
reasoning practice they are unessential to the practice of reasoning from 
suppositions, unless the de dicto is a species of the de re. Nevertheless, with 
respect to the de re modal notions, the argument is intended to furnish an 
epistemology, not to establish their indispensability. 
 If the above argument holds—and I will support it further in the next 
section—then it lessens the impact of (particularly Quinean) empiricist sensibilities 
where the modalities are concerned. Unlike McGinn’s comments on modal 
epistemology, the dialectic of the argument is that much of the tension that there 
might be is, fundamentally, between logic and epistemology, not metaphysics and 
epistemology. The argument suggests that the requirements of our deductive 
practice have priority over an epistemology dominated by hard-edged empiricism. 
(Since we need the modalities and knowledge of modal notions is a priori, a 
philosophy which outlaws the a priori must be deemed unsatisfactory.) 
Nevertheless, the argument has a metaphysical pay-off in that it helps to establish 
the epistemological respectability of modal attributions de re, thereby diminishing 
the force of some standard objections to de re modality. 
 Empiricists have tended to be less than careful about distinguishing 
between the logico-grammatical respectability of modal attribution de re and the 
acceptability of the metaphysics of essentialism. Although the main Quinean 
objection to the former is in terms of its purported lack of intelligibility, its source 
might still be said to be epistemological, even to the extent of such talk of a lack of 
intelligibility being viewed as rather disingenuous. The empiricist is committed to 
the view that the natural realm and the realm of necessity are entirely detached. For 
the empiricist, as for Wiggins’s anti-realist conceptualist (1980, Chapter 5), there 
are no modalities in nature. Whatever else this is, it is a metaphysical thesis. It is 
adhered to by the empiricist because the empiricist cannot see how its denial can 
be reconciled with the empiricist’s epistemology. It seems to me that it is this 
                                                 
34 The argument just given has affinities with McFetridge’s argument for the 
indispensability of logical modalities: the former will be bolstered by consideration of the 
latter in the next section. Schlick denied that a priori propositions are factual and described 
them [1932a](1979, 170) as ‘expressions which have nothing to say, they bring no 
knowledge’. In so doing, however, he did not express non-cognitivism, since he regarded 
the classifications a priori and analytic as applicable to true propositions: see e.g., 
[1932a](1979, 162-163). Rather, in describing the a priori as non-factual, he means to 
suggest that no a priori proposition says anything about the world as studied by natural 
science and that a priori propositions, which he mistakenly takes always to be obviously 
true, are uninformative: i.e., that they do not bring knowledge does not entail that they are 
not known.  
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epistemologically-motivated metaphysical thesis which is at the heart of empiricist 
denials of the intelligibility of modal attribution de re. I think that the plausibility 
of my claim is strengthened by the empiricist’s customary failure to make the 
distinction mentioned at the start of this paragraph.35 
 Examples such as (a)—for any thing A and any activity, x-ing, if A is x-
ing/x-ed then it is/was possible for A to x—hold of necessity. Although they 
concern de re modalities they are necessarily true. Knowledge of modal axioms is 
purely a priori. Substantive de re modal knowledge, in contrast, is not purely a 
priori. (As I employ the term ‘substantive’ I intend it to convey concreteness. 
Substantive modalities de re are those which relate to the essences of concrete 
entities.) Substantive de re modal knowledge comes about by inference from 
axioms concerning de re modal notions, such as (a), and empirical premises.36 As 
McGinn suggests, the factual content of theories employing de re modalities 
outstrips that of (putatively) unmodalized theories, whilst the theories themselves 
are empirically equivalent. This presents no metaphysical or epistemological 
problem unless there are unsettled questions about the possibility of a priori 
knowledge which are sufficiently serious to undermine our practice: this is very 
unlikely to occur, for the following reason. The proponents of any epistemological 
worries which may be raised in this regard will themselves require to employ the 
very principles central to our practice upon which they cast sceptical aspersions. 
The practice of philosophizing rests upon the ability to reason, so philosophers 
cannot intelligibly ask questions about our practice of reasoning from outwith that 
practice itself.37 
 There are differences in the modal statuses of possibilities and necessities 
themselves, which ought to be reflected in modal epistemology. These differences 
are important to metaphysics, but tend to be overlooked both in discussions of the 
epistemology of modality and in discussions of modal metaphysics which rely 
upon the axioms of systems of modal logic in inappropriate contexts. The 
differences have a significant bearing on the epistemological issues. Substantive de 
re possibility, unlike merely logical possibility, is an aspect of actuality. Thus, 
although metaphysical necessities and possibilities cannot be established merely on 
the basis of observation, our knowledge of substantive modality de re is 
evidentially constrained. Where merely logical modalities are concerned evidential 
constraints play no direct, fundamental or important epistemological role. That 
                                                 
35 In a departure from tradition, the self-proclaimed ‘neo-empiricist’ Sidelle (1989, 73-74 
and passim) makes the distinction and his whole account requires it, since he seeks to show 
that the empiricist can feast at the table of modal attribution de re without rejecting the 
thesis that there are no modalities in nature. 
36 In commenting on Hegel’s notion of real possibility, Burbidge (1992, 44) writes: ‘Real 
possibilities are actual conditions. Each one is an actuality as well as a possibility.’ This 
conveys the idea that there are actual facts involving real possibilities. The modal 
epistemology I endorse captures this idea. 
37 Cf. the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations adopted by Dancy 
(1985, 76-82 and esp. 210-211). 
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which does not admit of a priori justification and is known a posteriori is logically 
contingent. This points to the necessity for carefulness in the application of the 
axioms of formal systems such as the axiom of S5 that if it is possible that p then it 
is necessary that it is possible that p.38 Now, the empirical premise that A xs, and 
the non-empirical premise that actuality implies possibility,39 produces the results 
that: (b) it is possible for A to x, and (c) it is possible that A xs. In accordance with 
the S5 axiom, it follows from (c) that: (d) necessarily, it is possible that A xs. The 
modalities relevant to the axiom and to (c) and (d) are broadly logical possibility 
and necessity, not substantive de re possibility and necessity. Although knowledge 
that something is actual entails that some formulation relating to it is logically 
possible, actuality does not evidentially constrain the logical modalities, since the 
logical modalities are not objects of substantive modal knowledge, but merely of 
notional modal knowledge. (I intend ‘notional modal knowledge’ to denote 
knowledge of modal concepts. Knowledge of modal concepts per se does not 
involve concrete entities, unlike substantive modal knowledge de re. If the de dicto 
is a subspecies of the de re, then there is a class of modal knowledge de re which 
is not substantive in the foregoing sense.) Knowledge of those modalities is purely 
a priori, and what merely happens to be true of actuality, i.e., that which is 
contingently true, does not have any direct, fundamental or important evidential 
relationship with logical possibility and necessity. Knowledge that (b) is related to 
the nature of actuality. In contrast, the circumstances of my example 
notwithstanding, since the possibility or necessity of a dictum requires no 
empirical warrant, and is fundamentally justified via a priori means, (c) and (d) 
have purely a priori status. Knowledge of (b) does not entail that (e) it is necessary 
that it is possible for A to x: this is where care has to be taken so as not to misapply 
the axiom. Knowledge of (b) does entail that there is nothing in the nature of A 
which precludes it from x-ing. Knowledge of (b) thus provides indirect knowledge 
of the essence of A. Where substantive possibility is concerned it is a contingent 
matter as to what possibilities there are: where merely logical possibility is 
concerned it is not a contingent matter as to what possibilities there are.40 In view 
                                                 
38 An example of a discussion which is not careful in this regard is that of Bradley (1992, 
Chapters 4 and 5). He claims, for example, that ‘we have many good and powerful reasons 
for holding that any modal ascription, if true, is necessarily so’ (1992, 183). This is despite 
his insistence (1992, 176) upon the non-equivalence of de re and de dicto modal 
attributions. 
39 There are de re/de dicto subtleties here: (i) If p is actual (i.e. true) then it is logically 
possible that p; (ii) If A xs then it is possible for A to x; (iii) If A xs then it is logically 
possible that A xs. (i)-(iii) stem from the general (unsubtle) principle that actuality implies 
possibility, although the result obtained in (ii) is quite different to that obtained in (i) and 
(iii). 
40 Contrast David Lewis (1986, 111) who claims that ‘what possibilities there are’ is a non-
contingent matter. Contrary to his claim, metaphysical possibilities de re pertaining to 
concrete entities are not possibilities of a kind which can properly be qualified, in the 
manner of S5, by a sentential necessity operator. (Lewis does not state that his claim 
concerns only logical modalities.) 
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of the contingent status of substantive possibilities, the attempt to argue that no 
modal knowledge is subject to causal constraint fails. Nevertheless, even de re 
modal knowledge fails to secure the status of being a species of knowledge which 
can be accounted for on a purely causal model of knowing. This is indicative of the 
poverty of such an epistemology, rather than the epistemological profligacy of 
modality.41 There are many varieties of knowledge which cannot be accounted for 
on a strictly causal model due to the non-spatial/non-temporal nature of their 
subject matter.42 A case central to this study is that of abilities, which, as Kenny 
(1989, 27-28, 72-73) indicates, are not spatially located, unlike the entities in 
which they inhere. (To adapt Kenny’s example, one cannot point to the key’s 
ability to open the lock, although one can point to the vehicle of that ability.) 
Neither, of course, are abilities abstract objects: a broadly Aristotelian account of 
modality de re has the virtue that it does not, as Kenny again indicates (1989, 72), 
hypostatize possibility and necessity.43 The behaviour of an entity manifests its 
abilities, although our recognition of those abilities is mediated by a priori axioms 
and rules of inference rather than directly perceived. The vehicle of an ability, 
unlike the ability itself, can often be recognized, although not necessarily qua 
vehicle of the ability, in the absence of any such mediation. The identification of a 
particular physical aspect of a thing as the vehicle of a given ability is a matter for 
empirical science.44 
 Kripke has influentially rejected the thesis, supported by logical 
positivists such as Ayer, that the necessary, the knowable a priori and the analytic 
are co-extensive. Kripke protested that the necessary/contingent distinction, in 
contrast to the a priori/a posteriori distinction, is one of metaphysics, not of 
epistemology. I think this unfortunate, since the necessary/contingent contrast is 
more properly described as logical: metaphysical necessity is not logical necessity, 
and what is metaphysically necessary is—or at least is often—contingent.45 
                                                 
41 Cf. Divers (1990, 160-164). 
42 Aside from familiar examples such as mathematical knowledge, Divers (1990, 161-163) 
indicates that a purely causal epistemology cannot even account for perceptual knowledge 
of secondary qualities. 
43 It is noted by van Fraassen (1980, 3) that ‘empiricists have always eschewed the 
reification of possibility (or its dual, necessity). Possibility and necessity they relegate to 
relations among ideas, or among words, as devices to facilitate the description of what is 
actual’. Such anti-realist positions, however, have no monopoly on the rejection of the 
reification of modality. Indeed, the realist primitivism I adopt is steadfastly opposed to such 
reification. 
44 Cf. Kenny (1989, 74). 
45 McGinn (1976, 195) follows Kripke in referring to ‘concepts of metaphysical modality, 
viz., necessity and contingency’. I will argue for the distinction between logical and 
metaphysical modality in the next chapter: it is already suggested by the previous 
paragraph. I believe that Kripke in fact accepts this distinction but that he is less than careful 
when it comes to observing the distinction. This issue is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Knowledge of essence is not—or at least is not always—knowledge of logical 
modality. McGinn claims, after Kripke, that:  
 
It is very plausible that, at least for the strict modalities, knowledge of 
the modality of a given sentence is arrived at a priori. This is pretty 
evident for sentences whose truth (as distinct from their necessity) is 
known a priori, but it also seems to hold for necessary a posteriori 
sentences, e.g., statements of natural kind, composition, identity and 
origin....we come to know that a certain empirical statement is necessary 
by inference from a pair of premisses: the first is the non-modal 
empirical truth which we know by ordinary a posteriori procedures; the 
second is a conditional, affirming that if the concept in question applies 
to a sequence of objects then it does so necessarily, where this 
conditional is known a priori by reflection on the concept in question. 
Modus ponens delivers the modal conclusion. (1981, 157-158) 
 
Thus, McGinn claims that substantive modal knowledge, i.e. knowledge pertaining 
to the natures of concrete entities, concerns the modality possessed by sentences 
and that there are paradigmatically a posteriori necessary truths.46 But this cannot 
provide a viable epistemology for substantive modal knowledge, because it distorts 
the nature of the modality involved. A substantive modal truth is not identical with 
any necessary truth. Substantive modal knowledge is not, contra Kripke and 
McGinn, knowledge of the modality of any linguistic or metalinguistic item.47 It is 
clear that the modalities do not function solely in the manner required by 
McGinn’s account (i.e., as sentential operators): the modal term in (b) (it is 
possible for A to x) does not qualify (b), or any other (meta)linguistic item, at all.48 
So, contrary to McGinn’s suggestion, knowledge of substantive modalities de re is 
not, and cannot be, ‘knowledge of the modality of a…sentence’. McGinn (1976, 
204) has it that:  
 
To claim that we have a posteriori knowledge of essence might be to 
claim either that there are necessary truths whose truth we know a 
                                                 
46 Cf. the account of Kripke given by Gibbard (1975, 187). 
47 Cf. Wiggins’s criticism (1974) of Kripke’s metalinguistic account of essence. The 
distinction between a necessarily true statement and a true statement of de re necessity 
emphasized by Wiggins pervades my account of modality. The Kripkean error is 
perpetuated by McMichael (1986) the whole dialectic of whose discussion rests upon 
construing essentialist necessity as attaching to propositions. Witness his misrepresentation 
(1986, 37) of essentialism thus: ‘Essentialists claim the necessity of singular propositions 
that cannot be transformed, by analysis, into logical truths.’ Cf. Casullo’s comment (1977, 
154) that if there are essential properties then not all necessary propositions can be known a 
priori. I dispute the view that essentialism undermines the thesis that all (humanly) 
knowable necessary propositions are knowable a priori. 
48 Cf. Chapters 3 and 4 on the de re/de dicto distinction. 
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posteriori (there being no other way), or that there are necessary truths 
whose necessity we know a posteriori. 
 
 In accordance with my account of substantive modal knowledge de re, 
McGinn’s claim is false. Knowledge of metaphysical modalities de re pertinent to 
concrete entities accords with neither of the options mentioned by McGinn. 
McGinn (1976, 204) claims that: 
 
The ambiguity can be removed by attending to matters of scope: the true 
statement ‘we can know a posteriori of a necessary truth that it is true’ 
is different from and does not imply the (I think) false statement ‘we 
can know a posteriori of a necessary truth that it is a necessary truth’.  
 
In fact, McGinn has not shown there to be any genuine species of necessary truth 
of paradigmatically a posteriori status. 
 According to the official logical positivist view, the world and the realm 
of necessity are detached. Necessity is identified with analyticity and only the 
analytic is held to be knowable a priori. Kripke (1980, 38) points out, quite 
rightly, that ‘“necessary” and “a priori”...as applied to statements, are not obvious 
synonyms’ and he argues, against the logical positivist position, that the terms are 
not even co-extensive. The conclusion that the terms are not co-extensive, even 
when restricted to statements, is correct. However, the examples of a posteriori 
necessities which are provided by Kripke do not constitute genuine examples of 
necessary statements at all. I admit that there are genuine a posteriori necessities, 
but I deny that they give rise to necessary a posteriori statements. 
 Kripke’s account of the epistemology of (purportedly) essentialist claims 
is illustrated by the following example. We know empirically that a table before us 
is made of wood. We know, by reflection, that this table cannot be made of ice. 
Kripke’s account is accurately depicted as follows.49 Where p states that this table 
is wooden, and q that it is not made of ice, we know empirically that p; we know 
extra-empirically that if p then necessarily q; we know by modus ponens that 
necessarily q.50 Let us grant that knowledge of a necessity is illustrated by the 
Kripkean example. The knowledge of that necessity is held to be a posteriori since 
it is derived, via an a priori conditional, from an empirical, and thereby a 
posteriori, premise. The argument allows and, as it stands, requires that substantive 
empirical fact bears upon the epistemology and metaphysics of necessary truth. My 
premises (1) and (5) above allow for de dicto necessities of purely a priori status 
concerning de re modal notions. This provides a means of securing an alternative 
to the Kripkean argument. Although truths concerning de re modal notions hold of 
necessity, inferences in which such a truth and an empirical truth feature need not 
                                                 
49 After Dancy (1985, 219-220), who employs the logical necessity operator in his 
exposition of Kripke’s view. 
50 Cf. McGinn (1981, 157-158), quoted above. 
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result in necessary truths. Examples such as the premise that if water has a certain 
chemical formula it has that formula necessarily may thereby be disambiguated 
such that if water is H2O then it is necessary for water to be H2O, but it is not 
necessarily true that water is H2O (i.e. the statement that water is H2O is not 
possessive of truth in all logically possible worlds).51 On the account just offered 
the contingency of that which is established by methods which essentially include 
the empirical is not sacrificed.52 The Kripkean rejection of the thesis that the 
necessity that p (and p’s being knowable) entails that p is knowable a priori is ill-
founded.53  
 When we know, on the basis of empirical premise, a priori premise and 
inference, that it is possible for a thing to participate in an event of a given kind we 
have indirect knowledge of its nature: we know that there is nothing in the nature 
of the thing which rules out such possibility. How do we tell when, or whether, it 
is necessary for a thing to initiate a particular type of event, or to react in a certain 
way upon the exercise of some external influence? The distinction between those 
sorts of change through which an entity endures and those which constitute its 
destruction will bear upon such questions.54 Metaphysical necessities de re relate 
to (at least) the non-deontic requirements of entities. It is plausible to suggest that 
we have defeasible knowledge of such requirements. We know, I suggest, that 
human beings (as distinct from persons) cannot survive decapitation. This is 
perhaps revisable, but in this and similar cases, non-modal knowledge (that human 
beings never survive decapitation) constitutes defeasible grounds for the modal 
claim (that they cannot).55 (Compare the case of our knowledge that animals need 
food.) We might regard the conditional that if a thing is a fully developed human 
being then it is necessary for that thing to have a head as having the form of 
necessity-involving counterparts of possibility-involving examples such as the 
principle, (a) above, that for any thing A and any activity, x-ing, if A is x-ing/x-ed 
then it is/was possible for A to x. However, there is a crucial difference between 
                                                 
51 Cf. Chapter 4, on the de dicto status of logical possibility. In fact, I do not hold that the 
major premise mentioned constitutes a necessary a priori truth: see below.  
52 Contrast: McGinn’s view, quoted above; Kripke (1980, 159, cf. 40) where he conflates 
the essential/accidental distinction and the necessary/contingent distinction. Like Kripke 
and McGinn, Hirsch (1982, 228-229) construes metaphysical necessity as qualifying 
statements. In addition, he contrasts metaphysical necessity with ‘a priori contingency’. 
53 McGinn (1976, 203-204) claims that the thesis is false since ‘cases of de re necessity —
necessity of identity, of constitution, of kind, of origin, etc.— seem counterexamples to it; 
none of these necessities could be known a priori’. My claim is that standard cases of de re 
necessity do not constitute counterexamples to the thesis at all, since they are not necessary 
truths. McGinn (1976, 205) claims that ‘a priori evidence is constant across worlds, because 
available without observation of the specific properties of each world’. Likewise, but 
contrary to his account, knowledge of necessary truths is a priori and available without 
observation of the specific properties of any world.   
54 See 3.2 on the metaphysics of essence and change. 
55 Cf. Shalkowski (1996, 387): ‘The world sometimes confirms...our modal hypotheses.’ 
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the two cases. The possibility conditional (a) is necessarily true: the necessity 
conditional, if true, is so contingently. 
 In my view, examples commonly provided as a priori modal major 
premises for use in arguments to substantive modal knowledge de re are neither a 
priori nor necessary truths. For example, I deny that the claims that the material 
composition of a material object at the time of origin is essential to the object56 
and that ‘whatever the origins of any given human individual, they are essential to 
that individual’57 are necessary a priori. Neither of these claims seems to me to be 
true in virtue of the notions it involves. So, I hold that if these claims hold they are 
themselves dependent upon empirical truths and more fundamental truths of a 
purely conceptual nature.58  
 It is fairly easy to come up with non-controversial a priori truths 
involving the notion of de re possibility. In contrast, many commonly provided de 
re necessity-involving major premises held to feature in arguments to substantive 
modal knowledge de re do not seem to me to be a priori necessities and it is not so 
easy to furnish non-controversial examples which merit that status. The notion of 
identity furnishes a truth which does, I believe, merit such status, although I do not 
claim that the relevant truth is non-controversial. 
 It is often held that there are no contingent identities. This position is 
defended by Ruth Barcan Marcus [1961](1993, 9), who holds that if x and y are 
identical then it is logically necessary that x and y are identical. (The formal 
version of this claim is a theorem of her extended modal system QS4.) Marcus 
(1993, 9) claims that the conjunction of the assertion of the holding of an identity 
relation and the assertion of the logical possibility of its negation constitutes a 
contradiction. She includes identities involving concrete entities when she claims 
(1993, 12) that ‘to say truly of an identity (in the strongest sense of the word) that 
it is true, it must be tautologically true or analytically true’.59 The view that there 
                                                 
56 Kripke (1980, 114 nt. 56). After Salmon (1979), Kripke (1980, 1) expresses doubt about 
his original claims about this claim. 
57 Peacocke (1997, 530), after Kripke (1980). 
58 For example, (j) below. For the record, I regard the principle of the essentiality of 
material origin as implausible because I do not think that the ‘hunk of matter’ from which a 
material object is originally composed is of its nature (i.e., explanatory with respect to its 
abilities). I grant that, as a matter of a priori necessity, it is of the essence of material 
objects to be materially constituted. I do not agree with the thesis that, for any material 
object, the matter of which it is actually composed at time of origin is of its essence. Cf. 
Anscombe (1953, esp. 93), which entails the rejection of the principle of the essentiality of 
material origin. 
59 Marcus (1993, 10) comments that, where ‘I’ stands for the identity relation, 
‘aIb...doesn’t say that a and b are two things that happen, through some accident, to be one’. 
Her claim is correct. However, the non-accidental nature of a relation does not, contra 
Marcus, secure the logical necessity of the claim in which it is expressed. We see here the 
importance of the under-appreciated distinction between accident and contingency. 
Although an identity relation involving a concrete object is no accident with respect to the 
object, the formulation in which it is expressed is no logical necessity. 
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are no contingent identities has unfortunate consequences which are indicative of 
its untenability. One such consequence is that it results in identity relations 
involving concrete entities, accurately described by Marcus (1993, 202) as 
‘metaphysical’, being (purportedly) accounted for in terms which are de dicto 
rather than de re. In addition, it would seem that the view is entirely unequipped to 
cope with the platitude that concrete entities are contingent existents. Necessary 
truths do not depend for their truth upon that which just happens to exist in the 
actual world and, contra Kripke, cases of true essentialist attributions concerning 
concreta do not constitute counterexamples to the thesis that all necessary truths 
are purely a priori. 
 Unlike Marcus, Kripke does not identify concrete identities with 
tautologies and analytic truths since he regards the latter, unlike the former, as 
necessary a priori (1980, 39). Nevertheless, despite his admonition that we 
‘interpret necessity here weakly’ [1971](1977, 68), his account has it that true 
identity statements in which objects are designated by proper names are necessary 
truths, albeit discoverable a posteriori.60 Kripke (1977, 67) depicts the necessity 
in (as opposed to the necessary truth of) the thesis that ‘every object...is necessarily 
self-identical’ thus: (x)?(x = x). 
 This characterization of the necessity of the identity relation falls prey to 
some of the same criticisms as the account of particular concrete identities 
provided by Marcus. Identity is a relation of an object to itself.61 So, where 
concreta are concerned, the necessity pertinent to that relation cannot be accurately 
explicated via the use of the sentential necessity operator.62 There are necessary 
truths about the notions of identity and metaphysical necessity de re, but many 
identity relations hold contingently. It may well be a necessary truth, true in virtue 
of the very concept object that it is necessary for every object to be identical with 
itself, but this neither asserts nor entails the existence of any object in particular, 
much less the necessary existence of any object in particular. Nor does it 
misrepresent the embedded necessity as de dicto or logical. Thus, the statement 
that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus is such that, if true, it sanctions a true 
statement of necessity de re, not, contra Kripke (1977, 89), a necessary truth. The 
                                                 
60 Kripke (1980, 98) holds that ‘descriptions can be used to make contingent identity 
statements’. 
61 Cf. Grossmann (1983, 170-172). 
62 This criticism applies equally to Kripke’s representation (1977, 69, 67) of the thesis that 
‘for every object x and object y, if x and y are the same object, then it is necessary that x and 
y are the same object’ as (x)(y)((x = y) ??(x = y)). Kripke claims that this thesis is about 
objects, not statements. Rather, the thesis that where an identity holds it holds of 
metaphysical necessity is a truth about the very notion of identity. The embedded notion of 
necessity is indeed of the kind which concerns objects: it has to be rendered de re. That 
objective is achieved neither by the informal employment of a that-clause—a classic 
symptom of oratio obliqua—nor by the use of a sentential necessity operator. For a truly de 
re version of the thesis see the main text below. Like Kripke, Davies and Humberstone 
(1980, 10; cf. Davies, 1981, 241) take it that all ‘true identity statements using proper 
names’ are necessary truths. 
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Barcan Marcus account cannot cope with the aforementioned platitude. According 
to Kripke (1977, 68), a statement is weakly necessary ‘if whenever the objects 
mentioned therein exist, the statement [is] true’. The Kripkean might claim to cope 
with the platitude in view of the fact that weak necessity is hypothetical, not 
categorical. This, however, effects the abandonment of the thesis that there are 
non-contingent identities concerning concrete objects. In addition, it provides an 
incorrect semantics for modal attributions de re since it fails to convey their 
existential commitments.63 
 Another account of the modality involved in identity relations actively 
avoids the unfortunate consequences just associated with its rival.64 Wiggins gives 
a de re adaptation of the Barcan proof of the necessity of identity (using a lambda 
abstraction operator and NEC as a de re necessity operator, in contrast to the 
logical necessity box employed in the original).65 Crucially, Wiggins’s account 
incorporates the distinction between ‘a necessarily true statement’ and ‘a true 
statement of de re necessity’ (1980, 110, cf. 214).66 There is some ambiguity in 
Wiggins’s account as to whether it is the de re necessity of particular identities 
which is not put forward as necessarily true, or whether it is the general statement 
that for all x and all y, if x is identical to y then it is necessary for x to be identical 
to y. In point of necessity Wiggins does not seem to disambiguate the two claims. 
Nevertheless, the latter makes no assertions concerning the existence of particular 
objects, is shown to be true by means of proof (i.e., is a priori), and is a true 
statement about the notions of identity and necessity de re. Accordingly, it does 
constitute a necessary truth, although the necessity it embeds is not of that 
character. 
 Wiggins’s argument secures the truth of the following principle 
concerning identity and metaphysical necessity: 
 
if x is identical to y, then it is metaphysically necessary for x to 
be identical to y. 
 
                                                 
63 E.J. Lowe has suggested to me that we may construe the claim that it is metaphysically 
necessary for Hesperus to be identical to Phosphorus as meaning that Hesperus and 
Phosphorus are identical in every world in which they exist. However, the truth conditions 
for statements of metaphysical necessity de re about concrete objects require the actual, or 
at least the sometime actual, existence of their subjects. This is not accommodated by the 
strategy suggested by Lowe. On the idea of actual existence, see Martin (1988, Chapter 3). 
64 Cf. Wiggins (1976, 301-303; 1980, 214). 
65 Wiggins (1976; 1980, 109-111, 214-215). Wiggins rails against ‘the contingency 
theorist’. This terminology is rather misleading, since the opponent of that theorist holds 
that identity statements are expressive of necessity but need not hold that they are logically 
necessary. Stalnaker (1986, 137, 139 nt. 37) erroneously attributes the view that if x = y it is 
necessary that x = y to Wiggins. The thesis defended by Wiggins is an alternative to that 
attributed to him by Stalnaker. 
66 Cf. Mondadori (1995, 233) on the distinction. 
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Particular identity relations involving concrete objects cannot be explicated in 
terms of necessary truths. The denial, adhered to by Marcus and Kripke, of the 
contingent status of particular identities rests upon a failure to delineate truths in 
which the notion of identity is used from truths about that very notion. (The very 
expression ‘the necessity of identity’ is apt to foster this confusion due to its 
inherent ambiguity.) Wiggins’s account allows for logically contingent 
metaphysical necessities and respects the purely a priori character of necessary 
truths. It thereby undercuts Kripkean tenets concerning necessary a posteriori 
truth, while allowing the strengthening of the general approach to modal 
epistemology adopted by Kripke by expunging from it a serious error. The 
resulting amendment to the Kripkean account is such that the idea that we can 
arrive at a posteriori modal truth, via modus ponens, from modal premises and 
empirical, non-modal premises is retained. Kripke’s unfortunate view (1980, 159) 
that ‘cases of the necessary a posteriori...cannot be contingently true’ and ‘have 
the same special character attributed to mathematical statements’ is avoided. 
 It is a necessary a priori truth that (i) for all x and all y, if x is identical to 
y then it is metaphysically necessary for x to be identical to y.67 This is consistent, 
however, with the tenet that identity relations concerning concrete objects hold as 
a matter of logical contingency, albeit metaphysical necessity de re. (i) is a truth 
about the notion of identity. Particular identity relations involving concreta are 
seen to constitute metaphysical necessities de re (contrast necessary truths) via 
inference from (i) and the empirical premise of the existence or, in 
Hesperus/Phosphorus-type cases, the identity, of the objects in question. So, (i) is 
an example of a de re necessity-involving counterpart of de re possibility-
involving premises such as (a). Compare also the following principle: (f) if it is 
metaphysically necessary for As to x and this is an A, then this xs. This is a 
consequence of the general modal principle that necessity implies actuality. There 
is no difference in point of modal status or epistemology between (i), (f) and (a). I 
contend that these principles are a priori necessary truths and that, if they are true, 
understanding the notions with which they are concerned secures knowledge of 
their truth. 
 The fact that observation of a thing’s actual behaviour yields, via (a) and 
modus ponens, indirect knowledge of its nature, since what is possible for a thing 
can only be that which its nature does not preclude, suggests the following 
principle: 
 
                                                 
67 I am under no illusion that this is a non-controversial claim. I reject the view, e.g. of 
Gibbard (1975), that there are particular identities which are in no sense necessary. 
Gibbard’s view rests upon the claim that if a statue and a lump of clay share all their non-
modal properties they are non-necessarily identical. Since I hold, unlike Gibbard (1975, 
201-206), that metaphysical necessity de re is typically extensional in nature, I deny 
Gibbard’s claim: if x and y differ in terms of what is possible for them, then they are 
necessarily non-identical. 
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(j) Necessarily, that which is necessary for a thing’s having all its 
fundamental capacities (including its capacity to acquire 
whatever abilities it can acquire, regardless of whether it actually 
has them, but excluding its existence) is of the essence of the 
thing. 
 
I propose (j) as an addition to the inventory of de re modal-notional truths fit to be 
regarded as instances of fundamental modal major premises in modus ponens 
arguments to substantive modal knowledge de re: i.e., I propose that it is necessary 
a priori.  ‘The vehicle of an ability’ is characterized by Kenny (1989, 72) as ‘the 
physical ingredient or structure in virtue of which the possessor of an ability 
possesses the ability and is able to exercise it’. (j) is intended to capture the idea 
that the fundamental vehicle of a thing’s abilities is of the essence of the thing. 
(My being a human being is necessary for my possession of the totality of 
capacities and abilities I possess.) This is at one with the Aristotelian conception of 
essence as explanatory.68 
 The threat of anti-realist conceptualism—the idea that modality is all in 
the mind—arises with the ascription of a priori status to specifically modal 
content. Sidelle (1989) advances a broadly Kripkean epistemology for the 
necessary a posteriori which he sees as lending support to a conventionalist anti-
realism about essence and modality de re. His epistemology is of the standard 
modus ponens form. He has it that all necessities ultimately owe their necessity to 
some analytic necessity. Sidelle (1989, 93) claims that the methods we employ ‘for 
ascertaining knowledge of necessity are not methods for learning about the world’. 
However, as Yablo (1992) indicates, the epistemology advanced by Sidelle does 
not entail an anti-realist metaphysic of essence and modality de re. Furthermore, 
Sidelle’s claim rests upon confusing our comprehension of the notion of de re 
necessity with our recognition of particular necessities. A demonstration that our 
knowledge of the concept of necessity is not a method ‘for learning about the 
world’ does not show that our practice of applying that concept is no such method. 
Sidelle’s epistemology would certainly count against the anti-conceptualist realist 
about modality, but it does not, contrary to Sidelle’s supposition, undercut realism 
tout court. (This is all the more evident from the implausibility of the thesis that 
the truth of a priori necessities such as (a), (f) and (i) above is secured merely by 
convention.69)  This point illustrates a general weakness in Sidelle’s account, to 
which I will return in Chapter 3, namely its identification of realism with anti-
conceptualist realism and conceptualism with conventionalism. 
                                                 
68 Exegesis is provided by Kung (1977, esp. 368-372). 
69 To appropriate Forbes (1997, 530), ‘it is unsatisfactory to suppose that these truths are 
manufactured by stipulations....To the extent that one finds the principles plausible, they 
seem forced on us by the nature of our concepts.’ Cf. the metasemantic account of the a 
priori proposed by Peacocke (1993), according to which a priori principles constitute 
possession conditions for our concepts, rather than mere ‘truths in virtue of linguistic 
meaning’ after the fashion of the Carnapian account of analyticity. 
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 I hope to have alleviated somewhat the epistemological worries 
associated with modality, especially those associated with modality de re. To 
reiterate: principles of the forms exhibited by examples such as (a) and (f) are true 
a priori. They are de dicto necessities concerning de re modal notions. The status 
of (f) as an a priori necessary truth tells us nothing about the epistemology of ‘it is 
metaphysically necessary for As to x’. Whether or not it is necessary for As to x 
will depend upon the essence of things of kind A. When As are concreta, neither 
our knowledge of necessary truths nor a priori reflection will supply us with an 
answer to the question as to the essence of As: the empirical is essentially 
implicated in our arrival at the right answer to that question. Our knowledge of 
what is always the case concerning As supplies us with defeasible grounds for 
having certain beliefs concerning the nature of As. There may be characteristic 
marks or behaviours we associate with things of kind A and which figure in our 
individuative practice concerning As. If a thing displays these then we have 
defeasible grounds for regarding it as an A. In the next chapter I will suggest, on 
the basis of Wiggins (1980), that reality is modal in nature since it is such that it 
can be subsumed under the substance concepts we employ: it is reciprocally 
related with our conceptual apparatus. We discover which of our purported 
substance concepts are satisfied by reality: this entails that we have knowledge of 
real necessity. Furthermore, I will argue that anti-realist positions concerning 
necessity, essence and individuation are committed to an untenable and 
epistemologically bankrupt metaphysic. 
 
 
2.3 A Defence of Modal Primitivism 
 
Modal Eliminativism 
 
The impossibility of eliminativism can be established by illustrating that modal 
discourse not only characterizes our thought and practice, but that it is 
indispensable. Also, quite apart from any particularly sophisticated philosophical 
objections to modal eliminativism, aspersions can be cast upon the position by 
pointing to its own prima facie internal inconsistency: the eliminative programme 
is apparently imbued with reliance upon possibility.70,71 The appeal to possibility 
                                                 
70 Quine, like other empiricists hostile to modality, is more prone to make use of the notion 
of possibility than that of necessity. Although Quine has it that modal attribution de re is 
unintelligible, his charge against modality de dicto must be that there are no necessary 
truths rather than that the very notions of possibility and necessity are unintelligible: cf. 
Hale (1997, 487). Quine’s claims about revisability seem to be double-edged. He seems 
committed to the de dicto claim that every statement is revisable, as well as the de re claim 
that it is possible for us to have experience, relevant to any given statement, to engender the 
negation of that statement. 
71 If Quine regards his own philosophy as primitive science, then it is consistent for him to 
employ talk of natural necessity and possibility therein. Such modality is permitted by 
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permeates that which motivates the eliminative programme, since its foundational 
premise relates to the ever-present possibility of recalcitrant experience. It is 
because all statements are held to be revisable in the light of recalcitrant 
experience that Quine attacks the a priori, analyticity and necessity: the Quinean 
attack is itself rooted in modality. The omnipresent possibility of recalcitrant 
experience entails that it is impossible that any statement is immune from the 
effects of such experience. It thus entails that the possibility of recalcitrant 
experience holds as a matter of necessity. The eliminative programme is itself 
reliant upon the modalities it seeks to jettison. 
 The Quinean faces something of a catch-22. On the one hand there is the 
issue just discussed, relating to the Quinean revisionist’s reliance upon the ever-
present possibility of recalcitrant experience. On the other, there is an issue about 
how, if at all, the Quinean programme can retain any prescriptive element if all 
statements are revisable. Modal eliminativism undercuts itself if the prescription 
that modal discourse be jettisoned cannot have any clout without appeal to the 
class of judgments it seeks to banish. 
 The charge that a Quinean attitude to the logical modalities collapses goes 
back at least as far as Pap’s discussion. According to Pap (1958, 372), the Quinean 
pragmatist’s account of ‘logical truths’ as those which we are least likely to 
forsake in the face of recalcitrant experience, but which are answerable to such 
experience nonetheless, fails to explain why it is that those truths enjoy such 
privileged status in the first place. Pap comments that the abandonment of logical 
and mathematical principles would itself be answerable to the demands of logical 
necessity, since even Quine (1980, 42) has it that revisions must be consistent. 
 Wright provides a critique which, although independent of Pap’s 
discussion, puts flesh on the bones of the charge that global empiricism is 
incoherent.72 Wright (1986, 192-194; cf. 1980, 322-323, 327-330, 415-420) 
argues that the assessment of an experience as recalcitrant will require the a priori, 
thus rendering Quinean pragmatism incoherent. Wright argues that in order to be 
adjudged recalcitrant, ‘a barrage of experience, E’ (1986, 192) will be at odds with 
a theory η and its underlying logic L, to the effect that the experience would 
conflict with a conditional I ? P which is derivable from η via L. That is to say, E 
will be such that ‘it inclines us to assent both to I and to the negation of P’ (1986, 
192). If there can be no resort to the a priori then there would appear to be nothing 
                                                                                                                 
Quine, e.g, (1966, 48-56; 1969, 130-138) solely because it is required by dispositional 
attributions, which are a hallmark of primitive science. When science moves from the 
dispositional to the categorical the need for such attributions is held to wither away. In the 
case of the revisability of all statements, it is not clear that dispositional attribution is at all 
pertinent. Quine is at liberty to help himself to a notion of primitive-scientific possibility but 
it seems that revisability cannot be accounted for in terms of that notion, since Quine’s 
stance is that total science is continually, and will ever be, subject to the tribunal of 
(possibly recalcitrant) experience. It thus appears that Quine’s philosophy is itself 
inconsistent with canonical science, in which the modalities have no role. 
72 For an intricate discussion of the arguments of Wright and McFetridge, with a view to 
combining and bolstering them, see Hale (1999). 
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to prevent us from denying that the experience is recalcitrant: unless the judgment 
that it is recalcitrant is really correct on a priori grounds there is no way in which 
any experience can be so adjudged. This is because the judgment that E is 
recalcitrant is dependent upon the statement W, that I ? P is derivable from η via 
L. W itself is established via proof that I ? P follows from η via L. (Wright (1986, 
193) notes that this proof is independent of any endorsement of the principles of 
L.) Wright comments that ‘the very description of E as recalcitrant for η-with-L 
presupposes acceptance of a statement which is established by proof, which is 
analytic if any statements are, and which is independent of L’ (1986, 193). The 
problem for Quine is that if, as he maintains, all judgments are revisable, then this 
will apply to W. The global empiricist is in no position to rule out the option of 
denying that E is recalcitrant, via a denial of W. Whether or not this move could be 
positively sanctioned will rest upon further pragmatic considerations. The problem 
is that judgments about recalcitrance will always rest upon statements similar to W 
which are themselves to be adjudged in the light of their own pragmatic 
acceptability (in which judgments about recalcitrance will themselves figure). The 
Quinean can only designate an experience as recalcitrant on the basis of a W-like 
statement which is itself revisable and in respect of which we are left with no 
justificatory guidelines: in fact we are left with no means of assessment for 
recalcitrance. The revisionism to which the Quinean is committed is seen to result 
in a regress. If judgments of recalcitrance are to have any support and any bearing 
they must be treated as non-revisable; otherwise the regress will ensue.  
 McFetridge (1990, 149) notes that Wright appears to move from his 
initial conclusion that at least some statements such as W should be taken to admit 
of proof—where proof is construed ‘as a theoretically uncontaminated source of 
rational belief’, Wright (1986, 194)—to the suggestion that some statements are 
logically necessary. In effect, McFetridge accuses Wright of conflating the modal 
and the epistemic, charging that while Wright is successful in arguing that there is 
a requirement for exempting some statements from the class of revisable 
statements it does not follow that necessity pertains to these statements: 
 
nothing in the anti-Quinean argument showed any need for the 
statements [e.g. W] established by these ‘proofs’ to be regarded 
as necessarily true: merely true, and conclusively established in a 
way neither requiring nor vulnerable to holistic appraisal. But 
this feature seemed not to add up to a notion of necessity. (1990, 
149) 
 
Like Kripke (1980, 34-39), McFetridge emphasizes that the epistemological 
classification of statements is distinct from their classification according to modal 
status. McFetridge (1990, 149-150) comments that Wright’s move from the 
epistemic to the modal in the concluding steps of his anti-Quinean argument stems 
from Wright’s own tendency to favour a non-cognitivist account of logical 
necessity (associated with Wittgenstein) according to which the use of the notion 
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of logical necessity in relation to a statement is an indication of our reluctance to 
treat that statement as refutable. In McFetridge’s view (1990, 150), the trouble 
with this conception of our operations in respect of logical necessity is that it 
allows no room for statements which we may regard as if true then necessarily true 
nor does it leave much room, if any, for distinguishing between dogmatic 
acceptance and classification as logically necessary.73 McFetridge’s discussion 
suggests that there is a gap in Wright’s account. If a non-cognitivist account of 
necessity is accepted, then Wright’s argument succeeds in establishing that there 
are logically necessary statements. However, since such an account is at least 
dubious the anti-Quinean argument is successful in establishing only the weaker 
conclusion that some statements must be exempted from holistic appraisal. 
 The anti-Quinean argument expounded by McFetridge (1990, 153-154) 
argues directly for the indispensability of logical necessity, thereby undermining 
the cogency of the Quinean project, rather than proceeding by means of an initial 
argument for the incoherence of the Quinean position. McFetridge prepares the 
ground for his argument by emphasizing the detachment of the notion of validity 
from that of the truth of the constituents of an argument, stating that the notion of 
validity we employ is such that a mode of inference is valid (i.e., logically 
necessarily truth-preserving) or invalid irrespective of the specific content of the 
premises of any argument in which it is manifested. Thereby, principles of 
inference can be implemented which have an extent such that they are applicable 
to any and all of the suppositions we might make. This notion of validity as 
logically necessary truth-preservation is indispensable to reasoning from 
suppositions, so logical necessity is needed. This conclusion is established as 
follows. 
 To reject logical necessity would be to suppose that for every acceptable 
mode of inference M there is at least one proposition r such that r would fall 
outwith the range of appropriate applicability of M, thereby precluding M and the 
supposition that r from employment in one and the same argument. If it is known 
under which suppositions r it will be that M is illegitimate then the position 
depicted in the previous sentence is self-refuting, since it will then be the case that 
the mode of inference M conjoined with not-r will be applicable under all 
suppositions. McFetridge (1990, 153-154) suggests that there is no supposition 
such that it falls outwith the range of applicability of the modified mode of 
inference that ‘M can be applied under the supposition that not-r’. If, on the other 
hand, it is not known which proposition the supposition of which would exclude 
the applicability of M to any argument in which such a supposition were to feature, 
but there is believed to be some such proposition, then M would be inapplicable. In 
order to employ M it is necessary to know whether, for any supposition that p 
                                                 
73 On the assumption that the first criticism is predicated upon Kripkean considerations 
concerning necessary a posteriori truths it is one with which I cannot agree, given my 
criticism of that aspect of Kripkean modal epistemology. However, it may well be that it is 
the case of examples such as Goldbach’s conjecture which motivate the criticism, in which 
case I have no quibble. 
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which might feature in an M-relevant argument, the truth of that proposition would 
undermine the truth-preserving capability of M. In the situation outlined this would 
not be known, thereby rendering the mode of inference inapplicable. There would 
be no means of determining the tenability of M with a supposition that p since the 
rules of inference embodied in M could not be employed subsequent to the 
supposition that p, since those very rules themselves would be under scrutiny. 
 So, if r is known then the rejection of logical necessity is self-refuting; if r 
is unknown then no reasoning from suppositions can occur, since modes of 
inference are inapplicable in such a circumstance. The notion of logical necessity 
is indispensable to reasoning from suppositions. Since the practice of reasoning 
from suppositions is not up for elimination, we must not jettison logical necessity. 
 McFetridge’s argument illustrates that there must be at least one logical 
necessity if the general practice of reasoning from suppositions is to be preserved. 
My argument in the previous section set out specific modal principles which merit 
classification as logically necessary since they are constitutive of the very notions 
we employ. Such principles are essential to our actual reasoning practice. They 
include truths concerning de re modal notions. Given the indispensability of 
logical necessity the a priori is shown to be indispensable, since logic is an a 
priori science. 
 Criticisms of the modalities fail to justify, never mind necessitate, their 
elimination. Such criticisms may indicate the requirement for a clarification of our 
modal notions or for an approach to these notions other than that in which the 
criticisms in question have their source. A case in point concerns Quine’s attack 
upon the analytic/synthetic distinction, as summarized by Grice and Strawson 
(1956, 147): 
 
There is a certain circle or family of expressions, of which ‘analytic’ is 
one [‘necessary’ is another], such that if any one member of the circle 
could be taken to be satisfactorily understood or explained, then other 
members of the circle could be verbally, and hence satisfactorily, 
explained in terms of it....Unfortunately each member of the family is in 
as great need of explanation as any other.  
 
Quine appears to take it for granted that in the ‘explanation’ of the terms figuring 
in the intensional circle, no explanation from outwith that circle can be provided.74 
Thus, he maintains that the terms in question are hopelessly unclear and have no 
place in canonical science. Even if we concede to Quine that his view of the 
relationship between the (mooted) notions of analyticity and necessity is correct, it 
is not imperative to interpret the intensional circle in a Quinean manner, as 
compelling us to accept, or being suggestive of, modal eliminativism. In fact, it 
may be taken to suggest the appropriateness of modal primitivism. If necessity 
need not be as strongly associated with analyticity as Quine suggests, i.e., if 
                                                 
74 Cf. Grice and Strawson (1956, 147-148) and Haack (1978, 173-175) on Quine. 
Modality and Anti-Metaphysics 60 
Quine’s intensional circle does not accurately represent the framework for the 
supposed explanation of modal notions, it might nonetheless be the case that no 
extra-modal explanation could be provided for modality (such an explanation 
would seem to be what would be required, in Quine’s eyes, for the provision of 
any respectability to the notions in question, although he does not see it as having 
positive prospects). Such a circumstance would again be strongly suggestive of the 
appropriateness of modal primitivism. 
 
Modal Reductionism 
 
Modal reductionism is the view that the modal reduces to the non-modal. This is a 
better way of putting the matter than to suggest that modal reductionism is the 
view that the modal reduces to the actual, since that would be to make the 
unwarranted assumption that the actual is non-modal. In addition, Lewisian modal 
reductionists hold that the modal reduces to non-modal, non-actual reality.75 
 Actualism is the thesis that the totality of real existents does not include 
unactualized possibilia: nothing follows from the adoption of this stance as to 
which approach to modality should be favoured, other than that objectual modal 
realism, i.e. the thesis that there are non-actual truth-makers for modal discourse, 
should not. Being an actualist in this sense is consistent with both (non-objectual) 
realist and anti-realist accounts of modality. The position that I call ‘rigid 
actualism’ supplements actualism with the thesis that the actual is non-modal. The 
contrast between actualism and possibilism concerns ontical matters: it concerns 
questions as to what entities exist.76 Rigid actualism contrasts with both non-
objectual modal realism and possibilism. The contrasts here are both ontical and 
ontological: they concern not only that which is posited as real, but its nature. The 
non-objectual realism I adopt herein subscribes to the ontological thesis that 
necessities and possibilities inhere in actuality. Only this position challenges the 
specifically ontological tenet of rigid actualism.77 (It is unfortunate that the view 
                                                 
75 McFetridge (1990, 141) states that the modal realist holds that there are irreducibly 
modal facts, yet he counts the Lewisian approach as a form of realism. McFetridge takes the 
possible worlds to be ‘modal objects’ on the basis that ‘the modal expressions are 
interpreted as various kinds of quantifiers over them’. The point of the Lewisian project, 
however, is precisely to reduce the modal to the non-modal. 
76 Cf. McFetridge (1990, 141). 
77 The term ‘modal actualism’ is used by Shalkowski (1994, 687-688) to designate his own 
view that there are irreducibly modal facts ontologically grounded in actuality. (Cf. the 
usage of Loux (1979a, 55).) The phrase ‘modal actualism’ was coined by Kit Fine in Prior 
and Fine (1977, 116), to designate the conjunction of the theses that modal idioms are 
primitive (modalism) and that only actual objects exist (actualism): the adoption of that 
position does not commit one to the ontological thesis to which Shalkowski subscribes. 
Shalkowski apparently equates non-objectual realism with primitivism, when in fact, the 
former is a subspecies of the latter. This mistake is a consequence of Shalkowski’s 
foundational assumption (1994, 669) that one of the prime tasks of the modal metaphysician 
is to provide an account of the truth conditions for modal facts. It is bad policy simply to 
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that modal realism involves the acceptance of possibilia has gained so much 
currency due to the views of David Lewis, who is bold enough to state flatly 
(1986, vii) that modal realism is ‘the thesis that the world we are a part of is but 
one of a plurality of worlds’.) It is unhelpful, but commonplace, to suppose, as 
does McGinn, that the polarities in the approach to modality are actualism and 
realism, since actualism opposes not realism, but possibilism. 
 The taxonomy favoured here is an improvement upon that employed by 
McGinn, since the former clearly marks out the distinction between the issue of 
actualism/possibilism and that of realism/anti-realism about modality. This 
important distinction between matters ontical and matters ontological has been 
insufficiently recognized in much recent work on modality.78 To reiterate: rigid 
actualism is an ontological thesis with which modal realism is inconsistent. Modal 
realism is consistent with actualism, the ontical thesis that only actual entities exist. 
 Once modal eliminativism has been rejected the fundamental choice 
which confronts the modal metaphysician is between modal primitivism and modal 
reductionism: this will be dealt with prior to the question as to whether realist 
primitivism is to be favoured over anti-realist primitivism.  
 Lewis explicitly criticizes modal primitivism. In his view, our modal 
idioms are quantifiers over worlds. Worlds other than the actual world, and the 
objects occupying them, are non-actual but real. Objectual modal realism is 
ontologically anti-realist about modality. Ontologically (rather than semantically) 
speaking, it is realist not about the modal, but about the possibilia which are held 
to supply the non-modal truth conditions for modal discourse. Lewis asks, 
 
If our modal idioms are not quantifiers over possible worlds, then what 
else are they? (1) We might take them as unanalyzed primitives; this is 
not an alternative theory at all, but an abstinence from theorizing. (2) 
We might take them as metalinguistic predicates analyzable in terms of 
consistency...If a consistent sentence is one that could be true, or one 
that is not necessarily false, then the theory is circular...If a consistent 
sentence is one whose denial is not a theorem of some specified 
deductive system, then the theory is incorrect rather than circular: no 
falsehood of arithmetic is possibly true, but for any deductive 
system...either there are falsehoods among its theorems or there is some 
falsehood of arithmetic whose denial is not among its theorems. If a 
consistent sentence is one that comes out true under some assignment of 
extensions to the non-logical vocabulary, then the theory is incorrect: 
some assignments of extensions are impossible, for instance one that 
assigns overlapping extensions to the English terms ‘pig’ and ‘sheep’. If 
                                                                                                                 
assume that the modal metaphysician must adopt a truth-conditional approach. Shalkowski 
is apparently guilty of a mistake he attributes to others (1996, 386), namely of foreclosing 
the theoretical options before their discussion even begins. 
78 Lewis and McGinn are among the guilty parties. Plantinga (1987, 189, 196-197) is 
cognizant of the distinction. 
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a consistent sentence is one that comes out true under some possible 
assignment of extensions, then the theory is again circular. (3) We 
might take them as quantifiers over so-called ‘possible worlds’ that are 
really some sort of respectable linguistic entities; say, maximal 
consistent sets of sentences of some language....But again the theory 
would be either circular or incorrect, according as we explain 
consistency in modal terms or in deductive (or purely model-theoretic) 
terms. (1973, 85) 
 
 The first approach, modal primitivism, is rejected by Lewis: he simply 
stipulates that modal metaphysical theorizing must provide an extra-modal account 
of modality if it is to count as theorizing. I have already criticized this prejudice (at 
2.1). The second and third are rejected because each is either false or fails to be 
genuinely reductive, constituting primitivism by the back door.79,80  
 In the above quotation, Lewis characterizes modal primitivism as 
primitivism about our modal idioms. Elsewhere, he suggests that modal 
primitivism is the view that the modal operators are unanalyzable (1986, 13-14, 
17). He then appears to suggest that since these operators are not exhaustive of our 
modal idioms, the primitivist has more to deal with than the primitivist anticipates. 
Lewis seems to be trying to present this as a difficulty for modal primitivism. 
Since the modal operators are not exhaustive of our modal idioms, and the 
primitivist is by no means compelled to hold the contrary view, there is no reason 
to succumb to Lewis’s rhetoric here, and we can maintain that his earlier 
characterization of primitivism is more accurate. Modal primitivism just is the 
rejection of reductionism and eliminativism about modal discourse: the view is not 
confined to the modal operators. Lewis’s rejection of modal primitivism is both 
arbitrary and predicated upon misrepresentations of modal primitivism. The earlier 
characterization of modal primitivism as abstinence from theorizing is 
misrepresentative and rests upon the implausible assumption that only reductive 
analysis constitutes genuine theory or explanation. His later account misrepresents 
primitivism by assuming that the primitivist ‘has more on his hands than he thinks 
he has’ (1986, 14), i.e. by assuming that the primitivist is not cognizant of the fact 
that there are modal idioms other than the modal operators.81 
 Lewis’s own project is to provide a reductive analysis of our modal 
idioms, not just the modal operators, in terms of quantifiers over possible worlds 
                                                 
79 Lewis (1986, Chapter 3) objects to ‘linguistic’, ‘pictorial’ and ‘magical’ forms of 
‘ersatzism’ about worlds on the grounds that they require primitive modality. (3) is the 
ersatzist approach. 
80 In relation to the second and third we might add that neither could hold since neither is 
exhaustive of our modal idioms: neither approach can account for irreducibly de re modal 
idioms. 
81 In relation to operator primitivism, Lewis’s views are in sharp contrast with those of 
Peacocke (1978, 475), according to whom ‘one major attraction of an operator treatment [of 
necessity] is that it does not treat “?” as any kind of quantifier’ [my emphasis]. 
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and their inhabitants.82 He is a semantic realist about modality, but his position is 
ontologically anti-realist in that he holds that the modal is nothing over and above 
the non-modal. So, Lewis’s modal realism is not, in point of ontology, modal 
realism proper at all, contrary to his own regular insistence that his is the only 
‘genuine’ modal realism. Lewis is a realist about possibilia, not about modality: 
possibilia serve as the reductive bases whereby the modal is held to reduce to the 
non-modal. His hostility to primitivism stems from the view that accounting for the 
modal in modal terms is explanatorily void and an abstinence from theorizing. 
According to Lewis, ‘the ersatzers must resort to primitive facts where genuine 
modal realists can offer analyses’ (1986, 140-141). Lewis rejects attempts, other 
than his own, to reduce the modal to the non-modal on the ground that they make 
appeal to notions which they seek to explain, thereby resulting in primitivism. 
Since we recognize that reductive analyses are not exhaustive of genuine modal 
theories we reject Lewis’s principle that for any account of modality to qualify as a 
genuine theory it must not make appeal to modal notions. However, if Lewis’s 
principle is watered-down to form an alternative principle such that for an account 
of modality to qualify as a genuine reduction it must be extra-modal, we are in a 
position to endorse this latter principle. 
 Contrary to his own claim, Lewis fails to show that the ersatzist must 
resort to primitive facts: to show that ersatzism does in fact resort to primitive 
modality need not be to show that it is primitive modal facts to which appeal is 
being made. Ersatzism might rest upon primitivism about our modal notions 
without necessarily postulating modal facts. Lewis’s criticism of linguistic 
ersatzism will serve to illustrate the ways in which ersatzist programmes make 
appeal to primitive modality. Lewis (1986, 150-151) describes two routes to 
primitivism inherent in linguistic ersatzism. The first route to primitivism arises via 
the requirement for consistency. Lewis (1986, 150) writes that if modality is to be 
reduced to quantification across ersatz worlds characterized as sets of sentences 
then any such set must be consistent: ‘An inconsistent set might be an ersatz 
impossible world, but it is not an ersatz possible world.’ Employment of the notion 
of consistency will make appeal to primitive modality, since, ‘a set of sentences is 
consistent [if and only if] those sentences, as interpreted, could all be true 
together’. The second route to primitivism arises ‘via implicit representation’ and it 
is outlined thus: 
 
It may be that so-and-so, according to a certain ersatz world, not 
because there is a sentence included in that world which just means that 
so-and-so, no more and no less; but because there are sentences which 
jointly imply that so-and-so. There might be a single sentence which 
implies that so-and-so but doesn’t just mean that so-and-so because it 
                                                 
82 Contra Blackburn (1984, 213), who attributes the view that modal idioms are irreducible 
to Lewis. Commentators who subscribe to the view that Lewis is a modal reductionist 
include Weiss (1980), Plantinga (1987), Rosen (1990), Shalkowski (1994) and Divers 
(1997). 
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implies more besides; or there might be a finite or infinite set of 
sentences which jointly imply that so-and-so. This implication is prima 
facie modal: a set of sentences implies that so and so [if and only if] 
those sentences, as interpreted, could not all be true together unless it 
were also true that so-and-so; in other words, if it is necessary that if 
those sentences are all true together, then so-and-so. (1986, 151)83 
 
This will be imminent if and only if the worldmaking language lacks the 
expressive power to represent explicitly what it represents implicitly. Lewis makes 
the formal point that a language may be impoverished syntactically or semantically 
such that the language itself lacks the means to render explicit something which it 
implies. An ersatz world may be constituted by sentences of a worldmaking 
language in which entailments arising from the relevant set of sentences cannot be 
explicitly represented due to an expressive inadequacy in the language. Lewis 
maintains that ersatz worlds are maximally consistent relative to the worldmaking 
language, not absolutely. There will be a trade-off between the demands of 
consistency, which are more easily met by an impoverished language, and the 
desirability of expressive power, which characterizes a rich language (1986, 152). 
It might be objected that the second route to primitivism will not arise for the 
ersatzist whose worlds are sets of maximally consistent propositions, rather than 
sentences of any worldmaking language. For Lewis, however, this would be no 
objection, since he regards propositions as sets of Lewisian worlds (1986, 53-
55).84 
 If it can be shown that the Lewisian approach fails to capture the modal 
facts, or that the purportedly reductive terminology is itself overtly modal, or that it 
requires primitive modality either in explicating the meanings of the terms it 
employs or in explicating the metaphysical theses to which it is committed, then its 
plausibility will be undermined.85 We might intuit that our modal notions, and 
accordingly our modal idioms, are in some sense prior to possible worlds, or at 
least that a possible worlds account is not genuinely reductive of modality.86 In the 
recent literature attempts have been made to substantiate this intuition. Lycan 
(1988, 46) charges that the facts of modality cannot be accounted for without the 
ruling out of impossibilia, and that the Lewisian has no resources to do this 
without making appeal to primitive modality: ‘world’ is a modal primitive, since 
                                                 
83 Lewis (1986, 154-156) identifies two places where primitive modality ‘will not go away’ 
in linguistic ersatzist accounts: in the axiom corresponding to the maintenance of the 
consistency requirement, and, in the connecting axioms which relate local and global 
descriptions within a world. 
84 Lewis’s view is criticized by Plantinga (1987). 
85 This dialectic is laid out by Divers (1997, esp. 147, 153). Even if the outcome is less than 
conclusive, the account of modality I defend herein may have the advantage in that it is not 
ontically profligate and is comparatively respectable from an epistemological perspective. 
86 The latter stance is adopted by Kripke (1980, 19 nt. 18); cf. Putnam (1983, 67-68). 
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for Lewis it has to mean ‘possible world’.87 The charge, then, is that in any 
purportedly extra-modal worldly analysis of a given (de dicto) possibility claim, 
‘possible’ will be implicated, in a relatively unsubtle manner, in the supposed base 
discourse. Some critics have claimed that Lewis’s argument for possibilia applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to impossibilia, which might be taken to suggest that the 
Lewisian’s explicit ontical commitments are, ironically, arbitrarily parsimonious.88 
The Lewisian reply is that only possibilia are needed to account for the modal 
facts.89 This, in itself, constitutes a reply only to those who accuse Lewis of 
ungrounded parsimony: Lycan’s charge that ‘world’ is itself a modal primitive is 
unaffected. 
 In the absence of any such provision in Lycan’s discussion, Divers (1997, 
147) proposes the following as a necessary condition on non-circularity: 
 
(NC1) A proposed reduction is non-circular only if the [purportedly 
reductive] right-sides of equivalences involve the use of neither: (i) 
vocabulary from the proscribed class; nor (ii) vocabulary the sense of 
which could be conveyed adequately only by using vocabulary from the 
proscribed class. 
 
Where modal reductionism is at issue overtly modal vocabulary is of the 
proscribed class. Lycan’s charge might appear to be that ‘world’ falls foul of (ii). 
However, Lycan’s charge is (invalidly) deduced from the claim that, ‘the very 
flesh-and-bloodiness [of Lewisian worlds] prevents [Lewis] from admitting 
impossibilia’ (1988, 46). Divers (1997, 146ff) points to a conflation—inherent in 
Lycan’s charge—between matters intensional and matters extensional. (NC1) lays 
down a condition on the vocabulary, and the sense of the vocabulary, which is to 
feature in the purportedly extra-modal base discourse. Since there is no such 
conception as circularity in extension (1997, 146), the Lewisian commitment that 
impossibilia do not feature in the extension of ‘world’ is not sufficient to convict 
the Lewisian of circularity by the lights of (NC1). Lycan’s charge, then, does not 
straightforwardly convict Lewis of importing primitive modality into his analysis 
along the lines of (ii). Divers (1997, 149ff) emphasizes that the sense of a term, the 
justification for beliefs concerning its extension, and the articulation of 
                                                 
87 The same charge is made by Lycan and Shapiro (1986, 358). Putnam (1983, 67) claims 
that it is ‘evident that one cannot explain the notion of possibility itself in terms of possible 
worlds’. Cf. the claim of Mondadori and Morton (1976, 19) that a reduction of the modal ‘is 
unobtainable on anyone’s account’.  
88 The argument at issue occurs at Lewis (1973, 84): it relates to the claim that there are 
‘ways things might have been’, with which Lewis agrees and which he says he takes 
literally by committing himself to realism about possible worlds. The impossibilist version: 
there are ways things could not have been, so there are impossible worlds. This is due to 
Naylor (1986); cf. Yagisawa (1988, esp. 183). On the charge of arbitrary ontical economy 
see the ensuing discussion of Shalkowski’s critique of Lewis. 
89 Miller (1989, 476), after Sharlow (1988); cf. Lewis (1986, 7 n. 3).  
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commitments concerning its extension are distinct: respectively, they concern 
intensional, epistemological, and metaphysical matters. In so far as Lycan’s 
objection is predicated upon the Lewisian’s concretist commitments, it fails, by the 
light of (NC1), to convict the Lewisian of circularity, since the commitments at 
issue, and the justifications thereof, concern matters extensional, rather than the 
intension of ‘world’. Accordingly, the Lewisian reduction of modal discourse to 
quantification over worlds is not shown to fail to be analytic of that discourse. 
 In response to Lycan’s charge, Miller (1989, 477) suggests a non-modal 
definition of ‘world’ such that: 
 
(1) Individuals are worldmates if they are spatiotemporally related. (2) 
A world is a mereological sum of worldmates. 
 
Thus, it is suggested, base discourse involving quantification over worlds is 
intelligible independently of acquaintance with modal concepts: reductionism has 
not been shown to fail.90 This treats Lycan’s charge per se, illustrating that it is 
not just Lycan’s argument for it that is insufficient to establish circularity. 
 Divers (1997, 150-153) outlines two further escape routes from Lycan’s 
charge that, given the Lewisian commitment to the concreteness of worlds, ‘world’ 
must mean ‘possible world’ since their concreteness precludes worlds from having 
‘logically incompatible constituents’ and if ‘the Concretist needs or wants to rule 
out impossibilia by fiat, the Concretist is stuck with a modal primitive’ (1991a, 
224). It might be held that there is an absolute, but non-analytic, necessity such 
that whatever is concrete is possible. Such a tenet is insufficient to establish that 
‘world’ means ‘possible world’, so again, the reductionist is innocent of circularity 
by the light of (NC1).91 Alternatively, the reductionist may admit that ‘world’ 
means ‘possible world’. This is again insufficient to demonstrate (NC1) circularity, 
since, where the reductive vocabulary is uncontaminated by proscribed 
vocabulary, the reductionist account is circular only if conceptual priority 
genuinely attaches to the overtly modal discourse. Such priority cannot be laid 
down as a prior condition upon debate. Reductionists have it that the analysandum 
contains no cognitive content over and above that contained in the analysans: we 
can hardly fittingly proscribe the reductionist’s position merely in virtue of its 
                                                 
90 Cf. van Inwagen (1986, 187) and Divers (1997, 149), both with more detail. (Unlike 
Divers, van Inwagen (1986, 194-199) accepts that Lewis provides a genuine reduction of 
the modal to the non-modal but argues that the analysis which Lewis provides, although 
genuinely reductive, is incorrect. Unlike Divers, van Inwagen takes it that the provision of 
equivalence relations between modal and worldly terminologies and a non-modal 
explication of the sense of ‘world’ is sufficient for a genuine reduction of the modal to the 
non-modal.) 
91 Though, as Divers indicates (1997, 151), this line of defence comes at a heavy price in 
that the semantical and logical benefits purported to accrue from the analyticity of 
equivalences between modal and worldly discourses would then be lost. This is very serious 
indeed given Lewis’s claim (1986, 133-135) that these benefits motivate, and are supposed 
to compensate for, the prima facie implausibility of his metaphysics. 
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reductionist aspiration. In order to avoid begging the question, the anti-reductionist 
has to show that the reductionist has no legitimate claim to conceptual priority for 
the purported base discourse. 
 Following his defence of the reductionist against Lycan, Divers adds that 
the reductionist is still vulnerable to attack, since (NC1) is not a sufficient 
condition for non-circularity. Accordingly, Divers proposes an expanded 
conception of circularity: 
 
(NC2) A reductionist proposal is non-circular only if the reductionist 
can adequately express, without using proscribed vocabulary, whatever 
other claims he is committed to expressing in defence of his proposal. 
(1997, 153) 
 
This expanded conception covers not only the senses of the purportedly reductive 
terms, but also the expression of beliefs concerning their extensions.92 
 This conception might be applied as follows. Despite Lewis’s own 
commitment to the concreteness of worlds—his disavowal of any perspicuous 
concrete/abstract distinction notwithstanding—a philosopher who accepts the non-
arbitrary equivalence of modally qualified dicta and quantification over worlds 
need not have it that ‘world’ means ‘concrete world’. The tenet that the terms are 
co-extensive is consistent with the tenet that they do not have the same sense. 
Lewis’s commitment concerns the extension of ‘worlds’. It remains to be seen 
whether that commitment can be expressed in a manner not proscribed by (NC2). 
Lewis (1986, 165) states that the linguistic ersatzist has to appeal to primitive 
modality, since only consistent sets of sentences will count as worlds. Lewis 
claims that his account faces no such problem since ‘there is no such thing as an 
inconsistent world’. Lewis is apparently claiming that concreta (unlike linguistic 
items) are not the kinds of items which can exhibit inconsistency. It is difficult to 
see how this claim can be interpreted except as a de re modal claim about worlds: 
Lewisian worlds are such that it is metaphysically impossible for them to admit of 
inconsistency. So, Lewis’s commitment to the non-abstract, non-linguistic, natures 
of worlds appears to convict him of circularity by the light of (NC2). 
 Miller’s (1) (1989, 477, quoted above) has it that spatiotemporal 
relatedness is a (merely) sufficient condition for worldmatehood. This contrasts 
with the specification of worldmatehood provided by Lewis (1986, 71), according 
to whom spatiotemporal relatedness is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
worldmatehood: ‘things are worldmates [if and only if] they are spatiotemporally 
related’.93 Lewis has it that a world is ‘a maximal mereological sum of 
                                                 
92 There is a caveat: ‘the case has yet to be made that...(NC2) is both justified and effective 
[in convicting the reductionist of circularity]’ (1997, 154). In the light of the hiatus relating 
to justification, attempts to apply (NC2) to would-be reductionist views should be viewed as 
provisional. 
93 Worlds in which only temporal relatedness pertains are here understood to be included as 
maximal sums of spatiotemporally related worldmates (1986, 73). 
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spatiotemporally interrelated things [i.e. worldmates]’ (1986, 73). Lewis’s 
comments, unlike those of Miller, are not explicitly set out as providing the 
meaning of ‘world’. Were they so intended, it would appear that neither the notion 
of worldmatehood nor that of a world could be modally innocent. On the other 
hand, insofar as Lewis’s comments concern the characterization of worlds, they 
might fall foul of (NC2). Lewis (1986, 72) views the worldmate relation as non-
primitive, but it appears that his commitments regarding its nature cannot be 
explicated non-modally. In addition, the modality involved cannot reduce to 
quantification over worlds, since such an attempted reduction would generate a 
vicious regress. 
 Divers (1997) seeks to combine (NC2) with considerations highlighted by 
Shalkowski’s discussion of Lewisian reductionism, in order to bolster the anti-
reductionist case presented therein. Shalkowski (1994) employs the relatively 
imprecise principle that if one is going to advance modal reductionism then one 
precludes oneself from imposing a modal constraint on theorizing: modal 
reductionism fails because it cannot both honour this principle and remain non-
arbitrary. Shalkowski argues that: (i) all objects in the (supposedly) reductive base 
must ‘meet the prior modal condition that they are possible’ (1994, 677); and, (ii) 
in order to provide grounds for modality, the set of non-actual objects appealed to 
must be exhaustive, i.e., inclusive of all possibilia. It will be exhaustive not if it is 
merely the case that it has no more members, but only if it cannot have any more 
members: another prior modal condition is required (1994, 679-680). If the 
Lewisian meets conditions (i) and (ii), his account will be circular; if he attempts to 
jettison the two prior modal constraints, then the modal theory which results will 
be arbitrary (1994, 680). 
 Shalkowski contends that the condition requiring that impossibilia are 
debarred from featuring in the reductive base shows that ‘modal facts’ are 
metaphysically prior to ‘nonmodal facts involving the existence of worlds’ (1994, 
678). Divers (1997, 156) raises the suspicion that this is question-begging against 
the reductionist, since it seems to suggest, contrary to the reductionist’s contention, 
that two distinct sets of facts are at issue.94 Shalkowski, like Lycan, has failed 
adequately to justify the allocation of priority to the modal over the non-modal. 
Nevertheless, Divers contends that Shalkowski’s claim that Lewisian reductionism 
is either arbitrary or circular might stand: 
 
it is fair to raise the question of what it is that the reductionist has to do 
to convince us that, even if there does exist a suitably rich totality of 
worlds and other objects, the set of facts so constituted does suffice as 
truthmakers for left-side as well as right-side sentences. The anti-
                                                 
94 In addition, I would suggest that even if modal restrictions are prior to the postulation of 
worlds, this does not, contrary to Shalkowski’s suggestion, show that modal facts are prior 
to non-modal facts, but at best that modal notions enjoy a priority over non-modal notions. 
Even if primitivism could be established on such a basis, ontological primitivism does not 
follow.  
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reductionist might reason, following reflection on arbitrary cases of 
material equivalence, that to get beyond material equivalence to identity 
of truthmakers, we need the supplementary hypothesis that the 
equivalences are also...necessary. Divers (1997, 156) 
 
The relevant notion of necessity is described by Divers as ‘metaphysical’, but 
given that he means an unrestricted sense of necessity perhaps subject to ‘the S5 
principle that whatever is possible is necessarily possible’ we would do better 
merely to describe it as ‘unrestricted’. In accordance with the S5 principle, and 
expanding upon Shalkowski’s point (ii), Divers indicates that even if reductionism 
satisfies the demands of material equivalence, it remains to be demonstrated that it 
meets the necessary condition upon non-arbitrariness that the equivalences hold of 
necessity. The reductionist still has to demonstrate ‘that all and only the possible 
objects exist and necessarily this is so’ (1997, 157). So, the reductionist must 
assert: (i) ‘that the objects that exist are all and only the objects that there could be’ 
(1997, 157); (ii) that the equivalences to which he subscribes hold of (unrestricted) 
necessity; and (iii) the (unrestricted) necessity of (i).95 If the reductionist cannot 
adequately express these commitments in purely non-modal terms then he will be 
guilty of circularity in light of (NC2). In respect of (i), the specific problem relates 
to expressing the absolute unrestrictedness of the unrestricted existential quantifier 
of the first-order (worldly) language in that language itself. The reductionist must 
express the claim ‘that there could not be more than there unrestrictedly is’ (1997, 
158) in worldly terms. In respect of (ii) the reductionist might claim that the 
equivalences to which he subscribes hold at every world. A way of doing this has 
to be found which avoids the consequence that many worlds exist in each world 
(1997, 158).96 If this can be done then (iii) will be satisfiable by the same means, 
in respect of the necessity held to attach to (i), whilst the problem pertaining to the 
assertion of (i) itself remains unresolved. The Lewisian approach, then, is shown to 
be open to anti-reductionist attack quite independently of the implausibility of its 
metaphysics.97 
                                                 
95 (ii) and (iii) are rephrased versions of the formulations given by Divers (1997, 157). 
96 Cf. Plantinga (1987, 200) on satisfaction in a world and satisfaction at a world and 
Noonan (1994, 136) ‘“at w” is ambiguous between “accessible from w”...and “in w”’.  
97 We might add that Lewisian metaphysics is open to more than a mere ‘incredulous stare’ 
by way of objection. Divers (1990, Chapter 4) argues that worlds are not genuine 
individuals, and that we should be (ontological) anti-realists about worlds, because they fail 
to meet one of the necessary conditions upon individuality originally set out by McGinn 
(1981, 152), namely possession of extra-linguistic status. Divers’s version of the condition 
(1990, 71) is that ‘Entities of a purported kind are genuine individuals only if they admit of 
proper identification short of exhaustive characterization’. Possible worlds admit neither of 
causally dependent indexical identification nor descriptive identification (1990, 72-73). 
Since purported individuals are genuine only if they admit of identification, there are no 
possible worlds (1990, 76-78). 
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 It would seem that the Lewisian is faced with an unfortunate dilemma. If 
the Lewsian seeks to meet (NC2) by exempting ‘whatever other claims he is 
committed to expressing in defence of his proposal’ (1997, 153) from modal 
qualification then he will face the unhappy prospect of having to reject two 
principles enunciated by Divers (1999, 217), namely, 
 
the principle of modal ubiquity: 
 
(MU) For every true statement p, it is true that it is necessary 
          that p or it is true that it is contingent that p. 
 
and the principle of (the validity of) possibility introduction: 
 
(PI) p ? It is possible that p. 
 
On the other hand, if the Lewisian does not seek to exempt his claims from modal 
qualification then it would appear that the Lewisian is committed to primitive 
modality. 
 However, Divers (1999) advances an ingenious piece of advocacy on 
behalf of the Lewisian which will both establish (MU) and (PI) by the Lewisian’s 
own lights and permit the modal qualification of the claims at issue without 
thereby committing the Lewisian to primitive modality. The strategy involves a 
redundancy interpretation of modal operators where those operators contain 
unrestricted quantifiers within their scope.98 
 The focus of this strategy centres around the Lewisian’s view of the 
semantic functions of sentential modal operators. If a sentence which does not 
constitute a case of transworld quantification is modified by such an operator, this 
has the semantic effect of making the quantifiers transworld (i.e., unrestricted) 
quantifiers (1999, 228-229). (This is perfectly in accordance with the Lewisian’s 
reductionist project: ordinary modal claims are held to reduce to non-modal claims 
involving transworld quantification.) Divers (1999, 229) explains this using one of 
Lewis’s favourite examples. Ordinarily, when a claim of the form ‘There is some x 
such that A(x)’ is made it is understood to constitute a case in which the existential 
quantifier is restricted to the actual world: ‘we intend, or are charitably to be taken, 
to assert a content in which the domain of quantification is all actual things’ (1999, 
229). Thus, the truth-condition for the claim that there are talking donkeys is that 
the actual world has a talking donkey as a part (1999, 229): 
 
?x(Pxα & Dx). 
 
                                                 
98 Although this is explained primarily using the case of the possiblity operator, it applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to other modal operators. Also, a flight from the charge of primitivism is 
by no means the only benefit which the Lewisian might be afforded by this strategy. For 
details on both points, see Divers (1999, 230-233). 
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The existential quantifier is here restricted by the occurrence of ‘α’. This contrasts 
with the modalised claim, that it is possible that there are talking donkeys. The 
truth-condition for this claim is that some world has a talking donkey as a part (loc. 
cit.): 
 
?y(Wy & ?x(Pxy & Dy)). 
 
The modal qualification of the claim that there are talking donkeys, then, results in 
the replacement of a restricted quantifier with an unrestricted one. We can now 
take a case which might be held to be problematic for the Lewisian in respect of 
(MU) and (PI), namely the claim that there are many worlds. Since no world has 
any other world as a part, the semantics for the modal operator in the claim that it 
is possible that there are many worlds must differ from those for the modal 
operators in ordinary modal claims such as the claim that it is possible that there 
are talking donkeys. The claim that it is possible that there are many worlds is, 
unlike the claim that there are talking donkeys, an advanced modal claim: i.e., it is 
an example of the kind of modalizing that ‘primarily concerns…transworld entities 
and transworld states of affairs’ (1999, 220). Unlike the ordinary claim that there 
are talking donkeys, the claim that there are many worlds is a transworld claim. 
Accordingly, the introduction of the possibility operator cannot constitute a case in 
which a world-restricted quantifier is replaced by an unrestricted quantifier. 
Rather, ‘the possibility operator is semantically redundant in such a context, a 
semantically vacuous expression on a par with “It is the case that”’ (1999, 229). 
Accordingly, the truth-condition for the claim that it is possible that there are many 
worlds is identical to the truth-condition for the claim that there are many worlds 
(loc. cit.): 
 
?x?y(Wx & Wy & x ? y) 
 
Using the metaphor of logical space, the point can be put in a less formal manner. 
The claim that it is possible that there are many worlds and the claim that there are 
many worlds have one and the same truth condition, namely that logical space 
contains more than one world. 
 Armed with this redundancy account of advanced modal claims, the 
Lewisian is now able to side-step the difficulties mooted in Divers (1997) and 
described above. Divers (1999, 237) explains how the redundancy approach 
enables the Lewisian to explain the three problematic claims without appeal to 
modal vocabulary. The claim that there could be no more objects than there 
(unrestrictedly) are, is explained as follows.  
 
β is the maximal sum of individuals and it is not possible that there 
should exist any maximal sum of individuals that is non-identical to β. 
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When formalised in accordance with the redundancy interpretation of advanced 
modalising, this is represented as: 
 
?x(Pxβ) & ??y?z(Pzy & y ? β) 
 
‘which holds true in virtue of uniqueness for a sum of individuals which is 
genuinely maximal’. 
 The necessitated version of the claim just discussed can also be accounted 
for by the redundancy account. Unlike in the case in which a quantifier is restricted 
by ‘α’, no semantic content is added to a claim involving unrestricted 
quantification by the addition of the operator ‘it is necessary that’. The quantifiers 
which feature in the representation of the advanced possibility claim are 
unrestricted. So, by the lights of the redundancy interpretation of advanced modal 
claims, the necessitated claim has the same truth-condition as the first claim. Thus, 
it poses no challenge that has not already been met 
 The remaining problematic claim relates to the Lewisian’s ability to claim 
necessity for the equivalences he posits. Divers (1999, 237) claims that when such 
equivalences are ‘represented in a properly metalinguistic form’, such as 
 
(True, ‘??xFx’) ? ?x?y(Wx & Iyx & Fy) 
 
the equivalences will be transworld claims: thus, qualifying them with the 
necessity operator will not affect their semantic content.  
 It seems, then, that the Lewisian might escape from being ensnared by the 
charge that he is ill-placed to provide a non-circular explanation of the alethic 
modalities. Nevertheless, various other objections to the Lewisian account may 
arise. For instance, that it undercuts the purity of the logical modalities. For Lewis, 
worlds and their occupants are concreta, and facts about concreta will have a 
determining effect upon what is unrestrictedly possible or impossible. Lewis has it 
that if (unrestrictedly) all swans are birds then it is not logically possible that there 
are swans which are not birds (1986, 7). On the account of logical possibility to 
which I will subscribe in Chapter 4, allowing matters extensional to affect logical 
possibility in such a manner is undesirable because it conflicts with the point of 
having the notion and subverts its epistemology. 
 In addition, further possible sources of primitive modality might be 
identified. Lewis (1986, 7) depicts nomological modalities as restricted by 
accessibility relations between worlds. Nomological modalities, unlike logical 
modalities, require restrictions on the accessibility relation between the actual 
world and other (unrestrictedly) possible worlds. It has to be shown that an extra-
modal analysis of the accessibility relation is available.99 Since Lewis (1986, 7) 
admits that it is a contingent matter as to which worlds are nomologically 
                                                 
99 Mondadori and Morton (1976, 19) claim that ‘accessible from’ cannot be explicated non-
modally. 
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accessible from the world we inhabit, it appears that accessibility relations do not 
themselves admit of analysis in terms of quantification over worlds. If this is 
correct then they function as modal primitives. 
 Also, it is unclear that the Lewisian position can accommodate modality 
de re and do so in a manner which does not make appeal to primitive modality. 
Modality de re is depicted as quantification over possible individuals. Individuals 
in other possible worlds are held by Lewis (1986, 194) to participate in a relation 
of ‘representation de re’ with individuals in the actual world. The former are 
counterparts of the latter and vice versa. However, it is unclear as to what is to 
count as a counterpart of any actual individual: 
 
sometimes one is expected to take a position...about what is or isn’t 
possible de re for an individual. I would suggest instead that the 
restricting of modalities by accessibility or counterpart relations...is a 
very fluid sort of affair...Not anything goes, but a great deal does. 
(1986, 8; cf. [1968]1983, 42-43) 
 
This seems to undercut the point of the notion of necessity de re, since it is unclear 
that such fluidity could deliver anything that would merit the title of necessity. 
Counterpart Humphreys are supposed (1986, 194) to be ‘very like’ the actual 
Humphrey. But how is that supposed to fit with the claim that counterpart relations 
are very fluid? If they are fluid then it appears that attributions de re do not have 
determinate truth-values. This does not sit comfortably with an account which 
purports to provide a semantically realist account of modal idioms but which adds 
no caveat to the effect that some modal idioms are not included: on the contrary, in 
commenting that the primitivist has more to deal with than diamonds and boxes, 
Lewis (1986, 13-14) implies that his account can accommodate all modal idioms. 
It seems, however, that Lewis can claim semantically realist credentials only for 
his treatment of modality de dicto.100 As depicted by Forbes (1986, 3), Lewis is a 
contextualist about essence: he holds that ‘for each P and x...there is never an 
unqualifiedly correct yes/no answer to the question [is P essential to x?]’. The 
absolute essentialist denies this, but may hold that for some P and x there is no 
unqualified answer to the question.101 Forbes (1986, 24) observes that Lewisian 
contextualism is motivated by ‘skepticism about the existence of modal facts that 
determine the de re possibilities’. Thus, contextualism about essence appears to 
constitute a variety of anti-realism about essence.102 (It will therefore be 
vulnerable to criticisms, which I will outline at 3.3, common to anti-essentialist 
views.)  
                                                 
100 Lewis [1968](1983, 42) is aware of this point: ‘The true-hearted essentialist might well 
think me a false friend’.  
101 I hold, like Wiggins (1980), that vagueness arises where non-paradigmatic substances, 
such as artifacts, are concerned. 
102 Cf. Forbes (1986, 25). 
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 Forbes (1985, 64) indicates that the counterpart theorist’s notion of 
similarity appears to differ from our intuitive notion. Intuitively, we might 
reasonably hold ‘that Jones’s life could have been very different from the life he 
has actually led...while at the same time others lead lives quite similar to Jones’s 
actual life’. In such a situation, the counterpart theorist would have it that only the 
latter individuals count as counterparts, so the intuitive judgment about Jones 
would have to be deemed false. While there is no obligation on the reductive 
theorist to maintain our pre-reductive intuitions,103 this introduces an implausible 
measure of revision. Forbes remarks that the counterpart theorist might reply that 
he is using a technical notion of similarity, which he would then have to explain. 
Forbes (1985, 65) poses the following dilemma: if the counterpart theorist can 
provide no such explanation then the motivation for counterpart theory, that it 
avoids the purportedly problematic transworld identity relation, is undercut; if such 
an explanation is provided, then, unless it precludes counterparthood from being ‘a 
one-one equivalence relation, the same elucidation could presumably be applied to 
transworld identity, which eliminates the motive for developing counterpart 
theory’.104 
 Lewis (1986, 12-13) recognizes that the standard modal operators are not 
exhaustive of our modal idioms and that the form of essentialist claims may not be 
best represented by the employment of those operators. It follows from Lewis’s 
claim (1986, 13) that there are ‘modal idioms that outrun the resources of standard 
modal logic’ that even a successful reduction of the standard modal operators 
would not be sufficient to expurgate primitive modality. Lewis’s comment (1986, 
13) that ‘modality is not all boxes and diamonds’ illustrates that a reduction of the 
standard modal operators is not enough to establish modal reductionism. In 
particular, there is a case to answer where modality de re is concerned even if 
                                                 
103 Cf. Divers (1997, 144-145). A possible exception to this proposal is indicated by 
Casullo’s suggestion (1992, 133-139), that logicist reductions of number concepts are bound 
to retain our pre-reductive intuitions concerning the truth-values of judgments involving 
those concepts. Quine [1936](1966, 72-73) suggests that the logicist is bound to uphold 
‘traditional usage’, including judgments about truth-values, and that this is just a particular 
instance of a general adequacy condition upon ‘definitions’. 
104 Forbes (1985, Chapter 7) seeks to resolve this dilemma where artifact identity is 
concerned, by introducing ‘fuzzy essences’ and a many-valued semantics with degrees of 
possibility. Brody (1980, 106) suggests that, since the resemblance between an object and 
its counterpart is such that resemblance ‘in certain respects is obviously going to have to 
count more than resemblance in other respects’ it appears that ‘the properties to be weighed 
most are the very properties that are intuitively essential’. He then appears to suggest that 
counterpart theory may fail to meet a non-circularity condition: ‘Something analogous to a 
theory of essentialism is probably needed in order to develop an adequate theory of 
resemblance, and any approach that wants to use the latter to develop the former is in very 
serious trouble.’ (Cf. Forbes’s comments (1986, 22-26, esp. 23-24) on the dubious 
coherence of contextualism.) Criticism of Lewis’s notion [1968](1983, 28) of 
counterparthood in terms of resemblance ‘in important respects’ is offered by Kripke (1980, 
76-77), while Blackburn (1984, 215-216) raises concern about the counterpart theorist’s 
notion of similarity and its application. 
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modality de dicto admits of successful Lewisian reduction. In order to establish the 
genuinely reductionist credentials of his account of modality it has to be shown 
that quantification over possible individuals really is reductive of modality de re. 
To that end, the nature of the modality involved in accessibility and counterpart 
relations has to be determined. As has been indicated, this does not seem to be 
explicable, on Lewis’s account, in terms of quantification over worlds. 
 
In the broadest sense, all possible individuals without exception are 
possibilities for me. But some of them are accessible possibilities for 
me, in various ways, others are not....My qualitative counterparts are 
metaphysically accessible possibilities for me; or better, each of many 
legitimate counterpart relations may be called a relation of metaphysical 
accessibility. (1986, 234)  
 
Accessibility for me, is held, by Lewis to relate to the de re modalities pertinent to 
me. The Lewisian must either: revise his account so that accessibility is shown to 
be explicable in terms of quantification over worlds, proceeding to show that such 
quantification is genuinely reductive of de dicto modality; or, he must illustrate by 
some other means that the accessibility relation itself is not a modal primitive. 
Lewis might reply that accessibility is accounted for non-modally, since talk of 
accessibility just is talk of similarity, which seems to be a modally innocent notion. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how any truth conditions can be provided for a 
de re modal attribution involving a given individual in the absence of any prior 
modal restriction upon what is to count as sufficiently similar to that individual.105 
It might further be objected that merely qualitative similarity cannot play a crucial 
role in the determination of what is metaphysically possible for a given 
individual,106 since that possibility will be determined by the essence of the 
individual, which is not a purely qualitative matter, since qualities inhere in 
individual substances rather than bundles of qualities being identical with 
substances. In addition, the problem remains that the commitment to fluidity where 
modality de re is concerned is inappropriate, if not incoherent, in the case of 
paradigmatic essences (i.e., those pertinent to the objects subsumed under natural 
kind concepts). 
 Since identity relations for concreta are metaphysically necessary de re 
(not logically necessary), it is unclear as to how the Lewisian account can grant 
them accommodation.107 Lewis (1986, 192) takes identity to be ‘simple’ and 
                                                 
105 Cf. Brody (1980, 106) and Forbes (1986, 23-24). 
106 Cf. Kripke (1980, 45 nt. 13) who comments that both counterparthood and transworld 
identity, which it is meant to replace, ‘must be established in terms of qualitative 
resemblance’. 
107 The criticism I am about to offer contrasts with that of Forbes (1985, 66-69), e.g., in 
that he construes the necessity of identity in terms of the principle (1) a = b ? ?(a = b) and 
charges that the counterpart relation is incompatible with the S5 logic of identity. I am in 
agreement with Forbes’s charge, but I take the S5 logic of identity to constitute an incorrect 
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‘unproblematic’. Lewis comments (1986, 192-193) that ‘nothing can ever fail’ to 
be self-identical and that ‘two things never can be identical’. If, however, identity 
is necessity-involving, on Lewis’s account that would entail that either 
accessibility relations or counterparthood comes into play. Since identity relations 
pertinent to concrete entities cannot be expressed in terms of necessary truth, it 
would have to be counterparthood which pertained. Now a standard objection to 
counterpart theory, namely that what happens to a counterpart of Humphrey is 
irrelevant to Humphrey himself,108 acquires additional acuity. Humphrey’s self-
identity holds of metaphysical necessity and that metaphysical necessity cannot be 
accounted for by talk of counterparts precisely because the necessity concerns a 
relation of Humphrey to himself. So, neither the reduction of the standard modal 
operators to quantification over worlds nor the apparatus of counterpart theory can 
encompass identity relations pertinent to concreta. Self-identity cannot be 
accounted for via counterpart theory, nor can it be accounted for via unrestricted 
quantification over worlds. (The latter point is bolstered by the recognition that the 
necessity of self-identity is not logical necessity, at least so far as concerns 
concrete objects.) So, it again appears that an extra-modal analysis of all modality 
                                                                                                                 
explication of the necessity involved in identity (for at least a large class of entities), since 
that necessity is de re and the principles operant in the logic are equipped to handle neither 
modal attributions de re nor the de re modal-notional truth which expresses the general 
claim that where identities hold they hold of metaphysical necessity. Forbes (1985, 177-
179) seeks to save counterpart-theoretic semantics for de re modal attributions about 
artifacts by rejecting (1) via a rejection of the principle ?(?x)?(x = x) from which, in 
conjunction with Leibniz’s Law, the former principle is held to be derived. Forbes points 
out that the counterpart relation is a fuzzy relation introduced by de re sentences, and that 
where artifacts are concerned, there is no firm intuition to rule out exceptions to (1). 
Whether or not this is so, Forbes’s strategy does not resolve the problem I point to, since I 
point out a problem for the Lewisian when identity is construed in terms of metaphysical 
necessity de re, not logical necessity. 
108 E.g., Kripke (1980, 45 nt. 13). Forbes (1985, 65-66), after Hazen (1979, 321) dismisses 
the objection on the grounds that it misrepresents the counterpart theorist’s semantics. 
Kripke, in commenting that, according to the counterpart theorist, when we attribute a de re 
possibility to Humphrey, ‘we are not talking about something that might have happened to 
Humphrey but to someone else’ does misrepresent the counterpart theorist’s semantics, 
because it is not what might happen to the counterpart which is held to be relevant, but what 
does. Nevertheless, it might still be objected that something which does happen to a 
counterpart Humphrey is irrelevant to what is de re possible for the actual Humphrey. (Cf. 
Rosen (1990, 349). The non-misrepresentative version of the objection is given by Weiss 
(1980, 202), who comments that ‘possibility for this paper is identified by Lewis with 
actuality [at another world] of that paper’—although the use of the latter indexical is 
inappropriate.) The objection highlights the conflict between our modal intuitions 
concerning the truth values of de re modal claims and the Lewisian semantics for such 
claims. ‘I can speak Arabic’ and ‘I might have learned Arabic’ can have neither the same 
truth conditions nor the same truth-values: the truth of one precludes the truth of the other. 
By the lights of Lewis’s semantics the two claims differ in neither respect. This constitutes a 
reductio of the theory. (Like all theories which construe de re modality as relativized logical 
modality, Lewisian theory is semantically ill-equipped to cope with the distinction between 
possession of an ability and possession of the capacity to acquire the ability.) 
Modal Primitivism 77 
is elusive. In addition, as Plantinga (1974, 111-114) observes, Lewisian semantics 
has it that Socrates is not necessarily identical with Socrates, since his counterparts 
are distinct from him. Lewisian semantics secures the truth of the general claim 
that necessarily, everything is self-identical but fails to secure the truth of the 
particularized claim that it is necessary for Socrates to be identical to Socrates. 
Socrates’s self-identity is, in the terms of Grossmann (1983, 173), ‘an instance of 
the ontological law that every entity whatsoever is identical with itself’.109 So far 
as objecthood is concerned, this ‘ontological law’ is, by the lights of my modal 
epistemology, a necessary a priori truth. Where concreta are concerned, I take it, 
unlike Plantinga, that its instances are not of the essences of the objects they 
involve. Particular instances of the law constitute true statements of metaphysical 
necessity de re, but this is insufficient for their essentiality with respect to their 
objects. Particular instances of the law are, on my account, not dependent upon the 
natures of the entities they involve: the former are not explanatory with respect to 
the abilities of concrete objects. 
 On the modal epistemology offered at 2.2, knowledge of concrete 
identities is a species of substantive modal knowledge which derives from a 
conceptual truth about the notions of objecthood and identity and an empirical 
premise relating to a concrete particular. The major premise, although itself 
necessary, contains an embedded de re necessity. If this account is correct then the 
counterpart theorist cannot account for a given thing’s being such that it is 
necessary for it to be identical with itself by claiming that all of the thing’s 
counterparts are such that it is necessary for them to be self-identical. This cannot 
be done because irreducible necessity de re is still involved. The best the 
counterpart theorist can hope for is: (i) a worldly explication of the necessity of the 
claim that objecthood involves self-identity, since (unrestrictedly) all objects are 
self-identical, and (ii) the claim that all of the counterparts of an object are self-
identical and that this makes it true that it is necessary for the object to be self-
identical. This seems to leave the theorist with no means to account for truths 
about our de re modal notions (contrast substantive de re modal truths). 
 There are several reasons, then, why we ought to be suspicious of the 
Lewisian’s claim to have provided a genuinely extra-modal analysis of our modal 
idioms. Furthermore, even if success can be achieved where some of these idioms 
are concerned, that does not establish the wider aim of banishing all appeal to 
primitive modality. 
 Other purported reductions do not succeed in eradicating primitive 
modality. The standard twentieth-century empiricist account of modality involved 
attempting to reduce the modal to our linguistic conventions. This account was 
concerned to reduce the logical modalities; modality de re was either rejected or 
classified as ‘linguistic’ by fiat. Radical conventionalism, as specified by Dummett 
[1959](1978, 170), is not a form of reductionism: it depicts necessity as consisting 
in nothing more than ‘our having expressly decided to treat [a] statement as 
                                                 
109 Cf. Grossmann (1983, 177) and Plantinga (1974, 111). 
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unassailable’. Beside the fact that radical conventionalism (like moderate 
conventionalism) could at best account for modal attributions de dicto, it provides 
an implausible account of logical necessity, in that it fails adequately to distinguish 
between dogmatically accepting a statement and deeming it to be logically 
necessary, and it fails to accommodate our acceptance of certain statements, such 
as (on a classical account) Goldbach’s conjecture, as if true then necessarily 
true.110 Further, since only finitely many such decisions can be made the view has 
the implausible consequence that there is a finite number of necessary truths.111 
Moderate conventionalism, which was the logical positivists’ preferred view, is a 
reductionist thesis according to which the class of necessities includes both our 
linguistic conventions and those truths which are true in virtue of those 
conventions. Moderate conventionalism is discredited because it results in a 
regress.112 The class of necessities is to include not just our linguistic conventions 
themselves, but their consequences. There is no way to explain the consequence 
involved without appeal to the very notion which is supposed to be up for 
reduction.113 If necessity reduces to our linguistic conventions then the necessity 
involved in the consequence would have to so reduce: therein is the regress.114 
                                                 
110 Cf. McFetridge’s critique (1990, 150) of the non-cognitivism about necessity advanced 
by Wright. Wright’s position is inspired by his own interpretation (e.g., 1980, 372-373, 375, 
379) of the intent of the later Wittgenstein’s account. Wright distinguishes between radical 
conventionalism as described (and attributed to Wittgenstein) by Dummett (loc. cit.) and the 
position which Wright attributes to Wittgenstein. Wright seeks, and sees Wittgenstein as 
having sought, to advance a conventionalism which is non-cognitivist but which does not 
suffer from what Wright views as the incoherence of the radical conventionalism described 
by Dummett. (Wright (1980, 379): ‘The [non-moderate] conventionalist must hold that we 
are not required—by the constraint of conformity to the facts, or whatever—to accept the 
new necessary statement which we allow; but neither [contra Dummett’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein] do we have a freedom intelligible in terms of the idea of arbitrary choice.’ Cf. 
Stroud [1965](1971).) Nevertheless, McFetridge’s criticism is generally applicable to non-
cognitivist conventionalism. 
111 The point is emphasized by Putnam [1979](1983, 116) and Hale (1996, 107). Radical 
conventionalism is thus, for example, unable to account for arithmetical necessities. 
112 This apparently unassailable objection is due to Quine [1936](1966, 96-97), cf.: Pap 
(1958, 167, 419); Dummett [1959](1978, 169-170); Putnam [1979](1983, 116); Mounce 
(1981, 114-115); Hale, (1996, 107-108). J. Bennett (1961, 20) describes this as an ‘invalid 
objection to modified conventionalism’ on the basis that the demand for a reduction is 
‘absurd’: this misses the point that the objection works against the position precisely 
because the position is intended to supply a reduction (cf. Wright (1980, 350-351)). 
Shalkowski (1996, 375-381) criticizes attempted linguistic reductions of the modal, 
contending that, like Lewisian reductionism, they fail to meet the conditions of non-
arbitrariness and non-circularity. 
113 Putnam [1979](1983, 116) puts the point thus: ‘The “exciting” thesis that logic is true 
by convention reduces to the unexciting claim that logic is true by conventions plus logic. 
No real advance has been made.’ 
114 The failure of conventionalist reductionism, awareness of the inadequacies of 
expressivism, and the desire to avoid a problematic, necessity-detecting faculty have 
prompted anti-reductionist conventionalist approaches to modality, such as that offered by 
Modal Primitivism 79 
 Combinatorialism, which attempts to reduce the modal to combinations 
between actual elements, is advanced by D.M. Armstrong (1986; 1989).115 
Armstrong’s theory includes commitment to the following theses (1986, 576-577). 
Atomic states of affairs are held to be ‘Hume distinct’, i.e., logically independent. 
The constituents of states of affairs are simple (i.e. indivisible) individuals and 
simple properties and relations. Simple properties and relations are conceived of as 
simple universals. Armstrong subscribes to the Tractarian thesis that simple 
elements have all possibilities written into them: the totality of combinations of the 
elements provides for all possibilities. So, the possible is held to be dependent 
upon the actual in the sense that actually existing individuals and universals 
determine the possible. There are no disjunctive or negative properties. An 
individual cannot both possess and lack a given property, because, although 
conjunctions of universals count as properties, the only conjunctions of universals 
which are admissible are those which are actually instantiated (1989, 70). No 
individual can both have and lack a given property because no individual does 
possess contradictory properties (and there are no negative properties anyway).  
 Properties are regarded as ways that individuals are; relations as ways 
they stand to one another. Accordingly, there are no uninstantiated (or ‘alien’) 
universals. All individuals are such that they possess at least one property. That is 
to say, individuals exist only in states of affairs: there are no bare individuals 
(1986, 578; 1989, 43, 47). The possible is restricted by the actual in the sense that 
all possibilities are composed from actually existing elements, but actually existing 
combinations form a subset of possible combinations. Any statement which 
respects the form of atomic states of affairs constitutes a statement of possibility: if 
a is F in the actual world, a is G in another possible world. Armstrong summarizes 
the approach thus: 
 
The simple individuals, properties and relations may be combined in all 
ways to yield possible atomic states of affairs, provided only that the 
form of atomic facts is respected. That is the combinatorial idea. Such 
possible atomic states of affairs may then be combined in all ways to 
yield possible molecular states of affairs. If such a possible molecular 
                                                                                                                 
Wright (1980; 1986; 1989). Criticisms of such contemporary views are offered by 
Shalkowski (1996, 383-386). On my account (at 2.2) modal knowledge requires a rational 
faculty, but no mysterious necessity-detecting faculty: cf. Divers (1990) and Peacocke 
(1997). Wright (1989, 237) comments that ‘the driving force behind non-cognitivism as a 
philosophy of modality has always been the belief that the cost of cognitivism must be 
epistemological extravagance or epistemological head-burying’. Realist conceptualism 
results in the former cost only by the lights of a hard-edged empiricism. It results in the 
latter only if an explanatorily viable account of the a priori cannot be provided: for a 
compelling attempt at such an account see Peacocke (1993). 
115 Armstrong is inspired by Skyrms (1981), reprinted as an appendix to Armstrong (1989). 
The reductionist intent of Armstrong’s project is displayed by (1986, 575) and (1989, 47-
48). Kim (1986, 597) provides an exposition of Armstrong’s reductionist aspiration. 
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state of affairs is thought of as the totality of being, then it is a possible 
world. (1986, 579; cf. 1989, 47-49) 
 
In addition, the theory is modified to allow for ‘expansion’ and ‘contraction’. 
Expansion allows for worlds in which there are individuals which do not exist in 
(i.e., are alien from the point of view of) the actual world. Contraction allows for 
worlds in which individuals and universals existent in the actual world are absent 
(1986, 580-586; 1989, Chapter 4).116 Armstrong suggests that alien individuals 
are permissible via analogy, whereby they are taken to be like existing individuals, 
but simply quantitatively other than existing individuals.117 Alien universals are 
held to be unacceptable since they would have to have their own natures or 
‘quiddities’. Since such quiddities ‘are not to be found in the space-time world’, 
they are unacceptable to a naturalistic theory of possibility such as Armstrong’s 
combinatorialism (1986, 581; cf. 1989, 55-57). Only instantiated universals exist, 
and these set a limit to the possible universals. Accordingly, Armstrong concludes 
(1986, 582) that ‘the denial of alien universals is a necessary truth’.118 
 Armstrong may not escape making appeal to primitive modality in setting 
up the basic apparatus of his theory. Possibilities are determined by simple 
individuals and relations. Armstrong states that the simples that exist are all and 
only the simples that could exist (although alien individuals are admissible via the 
method of analogy). The appeal to primitive modality might arise in relation to the 
characterization of simple individuals and universals.119 Armstrong (1989, 51-53) 
                                                 
116 Armstrong seeks to debar expansion, but permit contraction, for universals. 
117 Critics of this move include Kim (1986, 604-606), Bradley (1992, 215-216) and Bacon 
(1995, 66), the last of whom views it is as inconsistent with Armstrong’s commitment to 
actualism. 
118 Armstrong (1989, 57) writes, less dogmatically: 
 
I have not proved the impossibility of alien universals, but it does 
appear that the impossibility follows from a certain theory of possibility. 
If that theory is true, then alien universals are impossible. But it is an 
intelligible thought that alien universals are possible, if only because 
nobody, at this stage of philosophical inquiry, can know that he puts 
forward a true theory of possibility. 
 
Universals also pose problems for the constructivistic and conceptualistic account of 
possibility advocated by Rescher (1975), since he has it both that possibilities ‘are 
intellectual constructions (entia rationis) developed from a strictly actually-pertaining 
starting point’ the elements of which are actual individuals and their properties (1975, 2) 
and that ‘[p]roperties must admit of exemplification, but they need not be exemplified’ 
(1975, 6). Rescher thus seeks to establish his idealist theory of possibility such that 
possibilities are mental constructs from actual elements, whilst simultaneously denying the 
instantiation requirement. This anomaly is observed by Weiss (1980, 204-205). 
119 Cf. Newman (1992, 51): 
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maintains that there is never a necessity-involving relationship between a given 
simple individual and a given property. Armstrong takes this to constitute a 
rejection of essentialism, which indeed it does, since it constitutes a rejection of a 
necessary but non-sufficient condition—namely that some of the traits of 
individuals are had of metaphysical necessity de re—for the existence of essences. 
(Armstrong does not himself acknowledge this distinction.) Nevertheless, he holds 
that every such individual must possess some property, although there is no 
property such that the individual must have that property. Armstrong claims that he 
rejects an ontology of bare particulars on the grounds that: 
 
To be individuals, individuals must be an individual, must be one thing. 
But this demands that they ‘fall under a concept’ as Frege would put it, 
that they have some unit-making property. (1986, 578; cf. 1989, 43) 
 
Now the ‘must’ here looks like a clear example of the ‘must’ of metaphysical 
necessity de re. Armstrong’s rejection of bare particulars and his supposed 
rejection of primitive modality appear to be in tension, since it is unclear that it 
makes sense to deny that individuals have any necessary properties whilst asserting 
that they must have some unit-making property. Having to have some property 
looks like a candidate for being a necessary predicate of its bearer: even if there is 
no lower-order property such that an object must possess that property, the object’s 
having to have some property is a higher-order property had of metaphysical 
necessity de re. Since the ‘must’ is involved in the characterization of simple 
individuals it cannot be reducible to those individuals. If it is to be accounted for 
along the lines of Armstrong’s reductionism then it would have to reduce to 
properties and relations. Armstrong (1986, 587) writes: 
 
that a certain universal is or is not simple...seems to me to be a 
necessary truth. Certainly, it may be a question to be decided a 
posteriori to the extent that it can be decided. But it is not a contingent 
matter. It is what we might call a Kripkean necessity. 
                                                                                                                 
A thing that is a universal and happens to occur just once has the 
potentiality for repeated presence, whereas a thing that is a particular 
and happens to occur just once lacks that potentiality. These...strike me 
as being brute facts. They are modal facts because if something is a 
universal then necessarily it is a universal, and therefore necessarily it 
can occur many times, whereas if something is a particular then 
necessarily it is a particular, and therefore necessarily it can occur only 
once. 
 
(Cf. the characterization of the universal/particular distinction provided by Lowe (1989, 38; 
1994b, 532) according to which universals are instantiable and particulars instantiate but are 
uninstantiable.) Newman rejects the possibility of an extra-modal analysis of the modal 
throughout the chapter, which includes a discussion (1992, 69-72) of Lewisian 
reductionism. That discussion is less intricate than Divers (1997) and more forthright in its 
denunciation of reductionism. 
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This claim again appears to be in tension with others made by its author. The claim 
that it is a necessary truth that there are no alien universals means that there are no 
worlds in which there are universals that are not instantiated in the actual world, 
not that all actually instantiated universals are instantiated in every world. Now if 
it were a necessary truth that a given universal is simple then that universal would 
have to be instantiated in every world: but contraction is provided precisely to 
avoid the requirement for such instantiation. Simples are characterized by 
Armstrong in modal terms. He does not show that those modal terms can 
themselves be explained by appeal to his own theoretical apparatus. It appears that 
in characterizing simples Armstrong either posits brute modal facts or makes 
arbitrary stipulations on controversial matters for the sake of consistency with his 
account. Since the very notion of simplicity required by Armstrong’s theory 
appears to be such that its sense can be conveyed only in terms which employ 
modal vocabulary,120 the theory stands accused of employing primitive 
modality.121 
 An epistemological objection to Armstrong’s theory is that it is 
incompatible with the a priori status of logic. That concrete individuals cannot 
have contradictory properties holds a priori, as a matter of logic, if it holds at all. 
In proposing that mere possibilities depend upon the actually existent simples 
Armstrong appears to award paradigmatically a posteriori status to all mere 
possibilities. In accordance with the approach to modal epistemology proposed 
earlier in this chapter, it is mistaken to portray the determination of logical 
modalities as dependent upon the a posteriori. Armstrong does not pay much 
attention to the issue of the epistemology pertinent to modality-involving axioms 
and principles of inference, although his account would seem to involve their 
being dependent upon the a posteriori, since the fundamental restrictions on 
possibility deriving, for example, from supposed necessary truths about universals, 
are held by him to be paradigmatically a posteriori.122 I have already argued for 
their a priori status. I suggest that it is more likely that such principles (e.g., that 
actuality entails possibility) have a role in shaping the theory offered by Armstrong 
than that they can be shown to reduce to the factors provided by the apparatus of 
that theory. A posteriori means can provide us with neither modality-involving 
axioms nor principles of deductive inference. Even if there were necessary a 
                                                 
120 Pap (1958, 408) suggests that the notion of simplicity implicated in logical 
independence theses (e.g., the thesis of ‘Hume independence’ adopted by Armstrong) is 
such that ‘the concept of entailment, or alternatively the concept of possibility, must be used 
in stating this requirement’. 
121 In relation to this charge and to others below, it should be noted that it remains to be 
seen whether Armstong’s account might be rescued via means similar to those advanced on 
behalf of the Lewisian by Divers (1999). Practical constraints preclude me from pursuing 
this issue here. 
122 E.g. (1986, 587; cf. 1989, xi), where necessary truths about universals are characterized 
as exhibiting ‘Kripkean necessity’. 
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posteriori truths, the identification of the modal status of such truths could not be 
established via purely a posteriori means. Armstrong’s naturalism would appear to 
construe logic as an a posteriori science, but whatever the observation of the 
concrete realm can do it cannot supply us with the apparatus of deductive 
reasoning. 
 Armstrong acknowledges that the principles of inference employed in the 
construction and defence of his account of possibility raise problems as to their 
own status: 
 
I postulated a certain structure for the world which yields a certain 
theory of possibility, and I reasoned about this structure. Possibility was 
defined using that structure. But...what of the status of the postulation 
and of the theory, and, again, the principles of reasoning used in their 
development? Are they to be taken as necessary truths? If they are 
necessary, how are they to be brought within the scope of my theory? 
(1989, 138) 
 
In drawing consequences, I was deducing. But what is the status of the 
principles of deduction thus tacitly employed? It seems natural to treat 
these principles as necessary truths. But given the general theory they 
are used to develop, what is the force of calling them necessary? (1989, 
138) 
 
Armstrong makes three points in relation to such difficulties. Firstly, he suggests 
that many of the claims made and the principles of inference employed in the 
construction and defence of the theory are ‘analytic’: they are held to be ‘true 
solely by virtue of the meanings of the symbols employed in the statement’ (1989, 
138-139). He invites us to recall 
 
that by ‘property’ should be meant ‘ways particulars are’ and by 
‘relation’ should be meant ‘ways individuals stand to each other’. If 
these are correct definitions (I pass over the truly delicate question of 
how to establish this antecedent), then it is analytic that properties and 
relations demand particulars to instantiate them. And, it would seem, 
analyticity of this strong sort yields necessity without appeal to 
Combinatorial theory. (1989, 139) 
 
He proceeds to point to the plausibility of the claim that modus ponens ‘flows from 
the very meaning of “if...then...”’ (1989, 139). Various problems arise in relation 
to this first response to the difficulties. Firstly, even if it is true that this ‘strong’ 
analyticity ‘yields necessity without appeal to Combinatorial theory’, the question 
remains as to whether the necessity can be analyzed via the theory. With the 
benefit of the insights afforded by Divers (1997), Armstrong might be seen, in his 
emphasis upon necessity arising from meanings here, as suggesting that the 
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necessity in question, given its intensional source, arises independently of his 
theory, which provides a metaphysics for modality. Thus, the necessity in question 
arises independently of commitment to that metaphysics. However, this would 
undermine the claim made by Armstrong (1989, 48) that his combinatorial theory 
renders a reductive analysis of the notion of possibility. The commitment to a 
reductive metaphysic does not necessarily furnish an account which is non-
primitivist at the level of meaning.123 In order to provide a reductive analysis of 
modality which succeeds in doing more than registering a commitment to the 
ontologically derivative status of modality, it has to be shown that modal notions 
can be accounted for non-modally. Thus, the issue is not whether ‘strong’ 
analyticity yields necessity without appeal to combinatorial theory, but whether 
that analyticity can be accounted for non-modally via notions employed in that 
theory which are themselves either explicable non-modally or explicable via 
modality-involving notions which are conceptually prior to the very notions of 
necessity and possibility which they involve. Secondly, just as Divers identifies 
ambiguity in Lycan’s suggestion that ‘world’ means ‘possible world’, so we may 
accuse Armstrong of ambiguity in claiming, for example that ‘property’ means 
‘ways particulars are’. Armstrong’s casting of the relationship between these terms 
in prescriptive terminology does not help, since it lays him open to the charge that 
he affords no analysis of modality by stipulating the meanings of certain terms 
employed in a reduction of the modal. Setting that to one side, and more 
importantly, it is unclear whether such claims are to be taken as expressing 
commitments as to the extensions of the terms at issue or specifications of their 
intensions. Since Armstrong emphasizes analyticity, and independence from 
combinatorial theory, it appears that he is concerned with the latter, but this is not 
clear given that his original claims appear under the heading ‘Sketch of an 
Ontology’ (1989, 38) and concern, e.g., what properties ‘are to be thought of as’ 
(1989, 43), i.e., what sorts of things they are to be conceived of as being, not the 
intension of ‘property’. Armstrong’s claims suggest a commitment to the claim 
that ‘instantiated universal’ is an analytic definition of ‘universal’. It might be 
objected, however, that there is no extra-modal analysis of this claim to be had if it 
is held to exhibit a necessity not explicable via appeal to the apparatus of 
combinatorial theory itself. In addition, the charge might be levelled that 
Armstrong’s explicit commitment regarding the extension of ‘universal’, i.e., the 
instantiation requirement, in that it dictates that the only universals which can exist 
are those which are instantiated in the actual world, falls foul of Divers’s (not 
untentatively) proposed condition on non-circularity (NC2).124 Thirdly, the 
combinatorialist, like any modal reductionist, faces the difficulty of explicating the 
necessity which must attach to the equivalences which he posits between modal 
                                                 
123 Armstrong himself recognizes metaphysical approaches which ‘might be said to be 
ontologically reductionist, without being semantically reductionist’ (1989, 104).  
124 A similar concern seems to pervade Newman’s critique of Armstrong. The seriousness 
of the charge will depend upon the defensibility of (NC2), which Divers admits (1997, 159) 
might require to be bolstered further, as a condition upon non-circularity.  
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and reductive terminology: their necessity is a necessary condition upon their non-
arbitrariness.125 
 This last problem relates also to Armstrong’s second proposal concerning 
the difficulties concerning the theses and rules of inference involved in the 
construction and defence of the theory. He suggests that he might have to be 
committed to the postulation of truths which are classifiable neither as necessary 
nor as contingent. 
 
Where necessity and contingency are analysed by means of a certain 
theory, the Combinatorial theory, then the price that may have to be 
paid is the denial that the theory itself is either necessary or contingent. 
I do not think the price is too high. (1989, 139) 
 
Armstrong is here confronting a similar problem to that faced by Wittgenstein 
concerning the status of the contents of the Tractatus, but where Wittgenstein 
denied them genuinely propositional status, Armstrong adopts the more contorted 
position that the theses of combinatorial theory are true, but have no modal 
status.126 It is difficult to see how this move can be defended other than in so far 
as it is intended to save the theory: it has a definite air of arbitrariness. In addition, 
this mooted response would not be sufficient to cope with the reductionist’s 
equivalences between modal and supposedly extra-modal discourse because, as 
has been mentioned, these have to have a certain modal status, namely that they 
hold of necessity, if the proposed reduction is to provide non-arbitrary truth-
conditions for modal claims. Furthermore, the stipulation that there is a species of 
truth with no modal status might justifiably be said to constitute an unacceptably 
strong revision of our pre-reductive intuitions. The proposal would presumably 
entail that other theses, such as the commitment to the necessary truth of the 
statement that there are only instantiated universals, would have to be revised. This 
in turn would have the uncomfortable result that, if it is merely true (but neither 
contingently nor necessarily true) that there are only instantiated universals, then 
the statement would appear to be unequipped to restrict possibilities, if, that is, we 
make the plausible assumption that a statement which is restrictive of possibilities 
cannot itself be devoid of modal status. Armstrong’s proposal would suggest a 
rejection of the idea that only necessities restrict possibilities. Accordingly, the 
proposal has little claim to intelligibility. 
 Armstrong’s third response to the problem is to state (1989, 139) his 
hope, rather than his conviction, that his theory does not employ primitive 
modality, and to state that even if it did, it would still count as a worthwhile modal 
theory in so far as it attempts ‘to exhibit in a perspicuous manner the structure of 
                                                 
125 This echoes Divers’s discussion (1997) of Lewisian reductionism. 
126 Consider the opening gambit of Divers (1999, 217): ‘The principle of modal ubiquity—
that every truth is necessary or contingent—and the validity of possibility introduction, are 
principles that any modal theory suffers for failing to accommodate.’ Armstrong’s 
combinatorialism, at least as it stands, can accommodate neither principle. 
Modality and Anti-Metaphysics 86 
modality’.127 The third response, then, although unobjectionable in itself, does not 
serve to rescue the reductionist credentials of the theory. Armstrong comments that 
he does ‘not like the idea that modality is a fundamental, unanalysable feature of 
reality’, because he believes that this presents ‘great epistemological problems’ 
(1989, 139-140). This comment is intended to be expressive of the contrast 
between reductive and non-reductive modal theories. It illustrates a crudity in 
Armstrong’s appreciation of reductionism and primitivism, which is related to the 
general intension/extension ambiguities in discussions of this issue which are 
identified by Divers (1997). As I have emphasized, the primitivist need not posit 
that actuality itself is modal in nature: minimally, all that the primitivist claims is 
that modal notions are up neither for elimination nor for reduction to non-modal 
notions. The problem for Armstrong’s account which is at issue, relating to the 
modal status of the contents of the theory and of the reductive equivalences it must 
posit, is not one of ontology, but of conceptual priority. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
It has been suggested that modal eliminativism is untenable due to global problems 
which call its very coherence into question. Linguistic versions of modal 
reductionism, as has been long and apparently unassailably established, generate 
an infinite regress. It is open to question as to whether more recent attempts to 
reduce the modal to the non-modal succeed. Besides the dubious metaphysics and 
epistemology associated with these attempts, it has yet to be demonstrated that they 
do not collapse into primitivism. There is nothing theoretically, metaphysically or 
epistemologically objectionable about the minimal primitivist’s thesis that 
modality is up neither for elimination nor for reduction. Accordingly, modal 
primitivism is vindicated. 
                                                 
127 Bradley (1992, 219) argues that Armstrong’s theory does fail to be genuinely 
reductionist on the ground that the crucial ‘notion of respecting the form of a state of affairs, 
as Armstrong employs it, is...irremediably modal’. Bradley claims (1992, 220) that the early 
Wittgenstein ‘took pains to point out the modal nature of the notion of form’ (this claim 
seems to be borne out by the early parts of the Tractatus, esp. 2.0141, 2.033) and that, 
unlike Armstrong’s account, Wittgenstein’s account of modality was explicitly primitivist. 
Chapter Three 
 
Modal Realism 
 
 
 
 
Once the case for modal primitivism has been established, the fundamental choice 
which remains is between the broad options of realist modal primitivism and anti-
realist modal primitivism. For the sake of this discussion the former will be defined 
as the view that at least some modality inheres in reality,1 the latter as the view 
that, despite the primitiveness of modality, no modality is so grounded. Only 
realist modal primitivism challenges the thesis (common to rigid actualism and 
Lewisian possibilism) that the actual is non-modal. I defend realist modal 
primitivism both by arguing against the opposition and by setting out the case, 
independently of the shortcomings of the opposition, for favouring realism. Anti-
realist modal primitivism can be characterised as a sort of ‘anti-realist 
conceptualism’, in the terminology of Wiggins (1980, Chapter 5). Anti-realist 
modal primitivism is anti-realist conceptualist in that modality is regarded as 
having purely mind-dependent status: it is not to be identified with conceptualist 
reductionism, which holds the further thesis that modal notions reduce to non-
modal notions. 
 
 
3.1 Anti-Realism I: Against Projectivism 
 
Anti-realist approaches to modality which may qualify as primitivist are various. 
We might envisage a theory which endorses error theory but also holds, contrary 
to eliminativism, that modality is indispensable or that it is dispensable in principle 
but ought not to be eliminated.2 Such an approach would not be intentional in 
Blackburn’s sense, since error theory operates from within the standard truth-
conditional rubric. Nonetheless, it would attribute purely conceptual status to 
modality.3 (Such an error-theoretic but non-eliminative approach would be 
                                                 
1 So, on this account, the realist modal primitivist need not be committed to the view, 
expressed by Fisk (1973, e.g., 44), and suggested by Fine (1994), that all objective modality 
is grounded in the natures of things. The view of Weiss (1980, 212) compares with those of 
Fisk and Fine. 
2 Non-eliminative varieties of error theory are described by Railton and Rosen (1995, 434-
435). 
3 Fisk (1973, 28-29) contrasts ‘the real’ with ‘the intentional’ in respect of necessity. His 
terminology is at variance with that employed here in that he applies the latter term to non-
projective anti-realist conceptualism. 
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conceptual in this metaphysical sense, but not in the epistemological sense 
according to which there is modal knowledge via knowledge of concepts.) 
 Subsequent to my discussion of the realism favoured herein, I will turn 
my attention to the general thesis that the actual is non-modal. By taking issue with 
this thesis I hope to discredit anti-realist primitivism of whatever hue. In this 
section, however, one of the main strains of anti-realist primitivism, namely 
projectivism, will be independently discussed.  
 Projectivism about modality holds that modal discourse has a non-
representative function: it has some role other than the statement of (standard) 
facts, such as the expression of attitude. There are some fairly well-known 
objections to expressive theories (which take their most familiar form in an 
objection to the emotivist’s claim that moral discourse is non-factual). It would be 
dishonest to pretend that these can conclusively discredit a projective account of 
modality, but they do have considerable persuasive force. The central problem 
which confronts the projectivist is how to account for the propositional behaviour 
of the discourse deemed expressive: the anti-projectivist will take exception to the 
projectivist’s denial that locutions which are, on the surface, truth-conditional, 
merit genuinely truth-conditional status. If, as the projectivist would have it, the 
meaning of any statement in a given discourse is (nothing but) expressive, then the 
problem arises as to how such a statement can feature in a context with which such 
an account is not harmonious. An example of such a context is argument by modus 
ponens. Ethical projectivism may be objected to on the grounds that a purely 
expressive account of the meaning of moral discourse is implausible given that 
ethical statements can feature in apparently valid arguments such as: 
 
(1) If lying is wrong then getting little brother to lie is also wrong. 
(2) Lying is wrong. 
Hence 
(3) getting little brother to lie is wrong.4 
 
In (1), lying is wrong is not an evaluation: this appears to undermine the 
emotivist’s thesis that it has purely expressive meaning. This complaint may also 
be raised against modal projectivism.5 Constructions incorporating modal idioms 
can feature in such apparently valid arguments. Given that, on a standard account, 
attitudes are taken not to feature in logical relations such as entailment, the 
projectivist must provide an alternative account of what is going on in such cases. 
The projectivist will proceed either by denying that the discourse in question 
should properly be considered to partake in such relations or by seeking an 
                                                 
4 Blackburn (1984, 189f) is well aware of the difficulty. This example is a modified version 
of Blackburn’s own: it is provided and discussed by Hale (1986, 71f). Both the point and 
this form of example originate from Geach (1972, 250-269, esp. 268). 
5 Blackburn seeks to provide a quasi-realist projectivist account of moral and modal 
discourses. He does not point to any substantive difference between the two cases as to how 
this account is to be constructed.  
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alternative account of such propositional behaviour (which, in this case, amounts 
to an account in some terms other than those employed in the standard account of 
the notion of logical validity). Blackburn adopts the latter course: the function of 
the ‘quasi-realism’ with which his projectivism is combined is to explain, and 
preserve, the propositional behaviour of the purportedly projective discourse. The 
alternative to logical validity which Blackburn proposes is attitudinal approval. 
Rather than the conclusion in the above argument following, in the traditional 
sense associated with logical entailment, from the premises, the argument is 
explained such that: the consequent in (1) follows from the antecedent in the sense 
that if the antecedent expresses the appropriate ethical attitude, then the acceptance 
of the consequent is the appropriate ethical attitude; given that (1) and (2) express 
appropriate moral attitudes, it is attitudinally appropriate to accept (3). There is no 
(traditional) logical entailment involved here. Both the holding of the conditional 
and the legitimacy of the inference from premises to conclusion are explained by 
reference to attitudinal appropriateness. The failure to recognize that the 
consequent follows from the antecedent is a moral-attitudinal failure, rather than a 
failure to recognize logical entailment. Someone who rejects the inference from 
premises to conclusion cannot be said to lack the competence to recognize, or 
accurately opine upon, logical validity, since it is moral-attitudinal 
appropriateness, not logical validity, which is pertinent.6 
 Blackburn does not deal explicitly with the occurrence of modal idioms in 
arguments which are traditionally regarded as valid. It would appear that modal 
cases could not be implanted in the explanatory framework which Blackburn 
provides for moral cases without some prior tweaking of the account. The failure 
to recognize that a modal consequent follows from the acceptance of a modal 
antecedent cannot be an identical sort of attitudinal failure as that displayed in the 
first (moral) case: that failure was a moral failure, whereas the one with which we 
are now concerned must be interpreted as a modal failure. Wright emphasizes that 
the problem remains that the failure to accept an argument considered valid on the 
traditional account is irrational: it is not solely a moral (nor, we will add, modal) 
attitudinal failure. Wright (1988, 47-48 n. 19) gives the following example, 
 
Provided that stealing is wrong, and that, if stealing is wrong, 
encouraging others to steal is wrong, then encouraging others to steal is 
wrong 
 
the point of which is to illustrate the claim that the failure to accept as valid 
arguments such as (1)-(3) above involves a failure of rationality. No moral attitude 
towards all or any of the statements in the antecedent of Wright’s example is 
necessary in order to recognize that the consequent does indeed follow from the 
antecedent. One ought to accept the conditional, regardless of one’s moral attitudes 
(and indeed regardless of the appropriate moral attitude). Wright’s example 
                                                 
6 Cf. Wright (1988, 32-33) on these expository points. 
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isolates the rational element in arguments employing moral discourse, facilitating 
its recognition in arguments in which moral evaluations do occur. The projectivist, 
then, still has a case to answer concerning the propositional behaviour of moral 
and modal discourse. The predisposition to regard the sorts of inconsistencies 
under discussion as logical, and not merely attitudinal, has not been overcome.7  
 Another difficulty for the projective account, emphasized by Hale (1986, 
78-79) and Wright (1988, 34), concerns iterated modalities. According to the 
projectivist, a modally qualified locution asserts no facts. The modal attitudes 
which modal idioms express are attitudes to propositions, but a modally qualified 
proposition, taken as a totality (i.e. the proposition plus the modal modifier) is not 
itself a proposition, since it is expressive rather than fact-stating. The problem for 
the projectivist is that this account precludes iterated modalities from featuring in 
well-formed constructions. On the projectivist’s account, ‘necessarily, necessarily 
p’, and equally, ‘necessarily, possibly p’, cannot be well-formed since ‘necessarily 
p’ and ‘possibly p’, although well-formed, are not propositions. Modal idioms are 
taken to qualify propositions, not expressive discourse: ‘necessarily p’ is 
expressive, so ‘necessarily p’ cannot be qualified by a further modal operator. 
Modal projectivism thus renders iterated modalities unintelligible and is 
incompatible with their featuring in modal logic. Given that iterated modalities are 
generally regarded—by those who regard modality as intelligible—as intelligible 
and that they are admissible within,8 or feature in the axioms of, each of the usual 
systems of modal logic, the onus is on the projectivist either to convince us that the 
failure of projectivism to accommodate them is not unsavoury or to attempt to 
reconcile them with the projective account.9 
 A further point is especially relevant to the project in which this chapter is 
ultimately engaged. As the previous paragraph notes, the projectivist treats modal 
idioms as functioning solely as sentential operators. This leaves room only for de 
dicto modalities. On the credible assumption that de re modal locutions are 
grammatically irreducible features of natural language, it follows that the 
projectivist’s account is incomplete. This incompleteness rests upon no prior 
endorsement of any metaphysical position. A very closely related issue is that the 
account apparently fails to accommodate the common distinctions between 
different kinds of necessity and possibility with which philosophers are 
acquainted, regardless of whether or not they would grant them endorsement. Hale 
(1986, 79) relates this to the issue of the presence, or avoidance, of vicious 
circularity in the projectivist’s account of modality. On the projective account, in 
modally qualifying a proposition we are expressing an attitude: that attitude is a 
modal attitude. In treating a proposition as possible I express (but do not say 
                                                 
7 Further debate on the issue occurs between Schueler (1988) and Blackburn (1988), and 
Hale (1993a, 1993b) and Blackburn (1993). 
8 Cf. Hughes and Cresswell (1996, 51). 
9 Shalkowski (1996, 382) rejects modal projectivism on the basis of the objections raised by 
Hale. 
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anything about) an ability of mine to accept it, imagine it, or what have you; in 
treating it as necessary I express the relevant inability. What is the nature of the 
notion of possibility appealed to in the projectivist’s account? Hale points out that 
if it is logical possibility then the theory is circular. (There are good reasons why it 
cannot be logical possibility anyway since, pace Schlick [1938](1979, 311), the 
notion of logical possibility for me implausibly conflates logical and non-logical 
modalities.10 In any case, the projectivist may be due the benefit of the doubt 
here.) Hale mentions that circularity in the account is avoided if the modality 
involved is psychological (as distinct from logical), but then the trouble is that this 
does not sit comfortably with the normative force allocated to logical modalities, 
which Blackburn (1984, 217) appears to want to preserve. If modal projectivism is 
intended to account for both logical and metaphysical modality (rather than being 
restricted to logical modalities), as there is good reason to think that it is, then it 
seems to be committed to regarding all modal talk as expressive of one and the 
same type of psychological attitude. Thus it appears to be committed to the view 
that there is only one sort of modal notion, pertaining to the relevant psychological 
modality. If indeed it is so committed then the projectivist has a considerable job 
of work to do in convincing us that the intuitions and practices which incline us 
away from such a view are misplaced or are assimilable into the projective view. If 
a credible defence of realism about modality de re is available then the prospects 
of a comprehensive projectivism are undermined. Independent of that, the 
projective account as it stands is incomplete due to its failure to accommodate a 
large class of ordinary modal discourse.11 
 
 
3.2 Realism 
 
According to the realist, there are ontologically grounded necessities and 
possibilities. The thesis that they are ontologically grounded need make no 
stronger a claim than that purely intentional and purely conceptual (i.e., 
intensional) accounts of modality are misplaced. The thesis does not entail that 
concepts are irrelevant to the metaphysics or the epistemology of modality. The 
argument I will support will be confined to discussion of modality de re. I seek to 
avoid commitment concerning the question as to whether modality de dicto is a 
subspecies of modality de re. I aim to establish that there is at least a range of 
modality de re which is neither dispensable nor (grammatically or ontologically) 
reducible. This lack of reducibility should here be understood to include a lack of 
                                                 
10 Ayers (1968, 33-37) and Hacking (1975, 322-323) distinguish two sentential forms 
concerning two kinds of possibility: ‘It is possible that p’, and ‘It is possible for A to x’. My 
suggestion is that logical possibility typically relates to the former, not the latter. Hacking’s 
own view (1975, 332-334) is that logical possibility typically relates to the latter. I take up 
the issue in Chapter 4. 
11 Cf. the observation of A.R. White (1975, 174) that expressive and illocutionary accounts 
of modal terms exhibit ‘a clear allegiance to a de dicto interpretation of their application’. 
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reducibility to modality de dicto. I will argue that a necessary but non-sufficient 
condition for the success of such a reduction, namely the holding of equivalence 
relations such that all modal locutions de re are translatable into modal locutions 
de dicto, cannot be met.12 
 
Metaphysical Necessity as Distinct from Logical Necessity 
 
I seek to establish the credentials of realism about objective non-logical modalities 
both as a means of undermining anti-metaphysics and to establish that the 
requirement for substantive metaphysical possibility cannot be usurped by 
attempting to use logical possibility as a surrogate. I seek to establish that 
metaphysical modalities do not reduce to logical modalities, and a large part of the 
rest of my project rests upon that view. (I emphasize that it is no part of my project 
to try to reduce logical modalities to metaphysical modalities: I try to remain 
neutral on this issue.) There is a prima facie acceptable assumption to the effect 
that logical necessity is de dicto. In accordance with this assumption, if primitive 
logical necessity were to be interpreted realistically that might involve a 
commitment to a certain sort of abstract entities, such as propositions. Thereby, de 
dicto necessity might be construed in terms of the de re necessities characteristic of 
such entities.13 On such an account, logical necessity, although explicable in terms 
of de re necessity, would nonetheless be distinct from the sort of necessity which 
qualifies predicates in constructions concerning ordinary spatiotemporal entities.14 
One might deem the latter sort of necessity to be metaphysical, rather than logical. 
This is without prejudice to the view that some abstract entities (e.g., numbers) or 
metaphysically necessary beings (e.g., God) have essences. My contention is that 
metaphysical necessity concerns concreta (not necessarily to the exclusion of 
abstracta), whereas logical necessity does not. (We are, of course, free to hold that 
                                                 
12 Thus Plantinga’s strategy (1969, 248-257; 1974, 29-34), cf. D. Bennett (1969, 491-499), 
whereby appeasement of the sceptic about modality de re is attempted by explicating it in 
terms of modality de dicto, is impossible to follow. It seems that even if any such strategy 
could succeed, it might fail to appease the sceptic whose worry is metaphysical rather than 
semantical. In addition, the attempt of Fumerton (1986) to reduce essence to modality de re 
and modality de re to modality de dicto cannot succeed. Fumerton’s discussion is all the 
less credible given that he (1986, 281) makes the mistaken claim that essential attribution 
and talk involving necessity de re are equivalent and his entire argument rests on the 
illegitimate assumption that definition is a sufficient condition for reduction. 
13 This, or a similar account, is implicit in Fine (1994), criticized by Hale (1996, 102-114), 
although matters are considerably obscured by Fine’s misrepresentation of de re necessity 
per se in terms of necessary truth. A related view is suggested by Shalkowski (1994, 687), 
conditional upon the supposition that ‘propositions and other linguistic units are 
entities...whether abstract or concrete’, while Forbes (1986, 11-12) suggests that de dicto 
necessities are grounded in de re necessary features of properties. 
14 Even on Shalkowski’s suggestion, logical necessity would still be distinct from the class 
of metaphysical necessity de re, since the former would concern only a subclass of all 
necessities. 
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human beings are natural entities whose rational operations are, so to speak, bound 
by logical necessity: by saying that logical necessity does not concern concrete 
entities I mean that the logical necessity operator does not qualify such entities or 
the predicates attributable to them.) So, that may be a reason for maintaining that 
logical and metaphysical necessity should be distinguished. My intention is to 
endorse a distinction between these species of necessity whilst remaining neutral 
on whether they are disjoined. My account excludes the possibility of metaphysical 
necessity being a subspecies of logical necessity or merely a restricted version 
thereof.15 It does not rule out the converse.  
 There is another way of putting the matter, which relates to the notions of 
existence and contingency. Shortly, it will be illustrated by a consideration of an 
interpretation of an aspect of Leibnizian modal metaphysics. The identification of 
logical and metaphysical necessity is fairly common in contemporary discussions, 
both generally and in the interpretation of Leibniz. According to Slote: 
 
a property p is essential to an entity e if and only if e (logically or 
metaphysically) could not have failed to have p. A property p is 
accidental to an entity e if and only if e has p, but (logically or 
metaphysically) could have failed to have p. (1974, 1) 
 
I shall not distinguish logical impossibility from metaphysical 
impossibility. (1974, 1 n. 2) 
 
This is ambiguous.16 Slote may be expressing abstinence from attempting to 
elucidate any such distinction or he may be deeming metaphysical necessity and 
                                                 
15 Farrell (1981) argues that metaphysical necessity is not logical necessity on the ground 
that metaphysical necessity is a variety of Popperian natural necessity. The argument 
involves a de dicto interpretation of metaphysical necessity (since Popperian natural 
necessity is held to qualify statements) and it involves a weaker distinction than that 
advanced here. In so far as Farrell’s account is couched in terms of a contrast between 
logical necessity and the empiricist’s physical necessity the conception of metaphysical 
necessity I advance escapes its attention. (In Chapter 4 I suggest that physical and natural 
necessity are subspecies of metaphysical necessity de re and that, as a consequence of this 
and the theses of the irreducibility of, and lack of adequate equivalences between, the de re 
and the de dicto, they are neither de dicto nor explicable in terms of the de dicto.) 
16 In my discussion of modal epistemology I have already emphasized the differences 
between essentialist necessity per se and logical necessity. The attack upon accounts (more 
explicit than Slote’s) which portray essence in terms of logical necessity or necessary truth 
will be a recurring theme. Such accounts include: Sprigge (1962, passim), Plantinga (1974, 
passim), Bolton (1976, e.g., 517-518) and Jacob (1987, 532-533). Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 
(1994, 90 n. 1) claim to account for the concept of substance in purely de dicto terms, but 
this cannot be done if, as I maintain, even necessary truths concerning essentialist concepts 
include embedded modalities of an irreducibly de re character. Wolfram (1989, 112-115) 
specifies ‘several senses’ of ‘essentialism’, all of which concern belief in synthetic 
necessary truths. Although Sorabji holds that Aristotelian essences for destructible entities 
relate to modality de re, he nevertheless characterizes such essences in terms of necessary 
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logical necessity to be one and the same. Perhaps ironically, the following 
comment is expressive of a consideration which suggests the appropriateness of 
rejecting such an identification: 
 
In many or even most cases, an object can have properties essentially 
without having the property of existence essentially, without being a 
necessary existent. (1974, 1 n. 3) 
 
This requires a distinction between metaphysical and logical necessity. Logical 
necessities hold independently of the existence of contingent existents. 
Metaphysical necessities, on the other hand, are attributable to entities of a sort 
which might not have existed, although this does not preclude them from being 
attributable to necessary existents. 
 We can now turn to Leibnizian metaphysics for an illustration of this 
point. There is a debate about the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles as to 
whether it conveys a necessity and, if so, as to the nature of that necessity. Russell 
(1937a, Chapter V) argues that although the modal status that Leibniz himself 
wished to attribute to the principle is unclear, it should be regarded as logically 
necessary for the sake of congruence with Leibniz’s system as a whole. Now 
Russell (1937a, 55) actually writes that the principle should be regarded as 
‘metaphysically necessary’ but it is clear that he intends the term to designate 
logical necessity, since he depicts it as concerning that the opposite of which is 
self-contradictory and which contrasts with contingency (1937a, 65, 69). It is 
argued that since the Identity of Indiscernibles derives from the principle of 
Sufficient Reason it is logically necessary. I contest this view. 
 Leibniz, like Russell thereafter, uses the term ‘metaphysical necessity’ to 
designate truth in all possible worlds, i.e., logical necessity.17 Nevertheless, I 
contend that Leibniz’s philosophy employs the notion which I designate by 
‘metaphysical necessity’, i.e., essentialist necessity as pertinent to (at least) 
                                                                                                                 
truths (1980, e.g., 215). Such confusions have typified twentieth-century philosophy since 
the heyday of logical positivism. Carnap [1934](1937a, 304) provides talk of the ‘analytic’ 
as the translation into the formal mode of philosophical talk of the ‘essential’; this is 
especially odd given that he argues that the use of the latter but not the former idiom 
reduces to absurdity. We might take it, therefore, that Carnap holds that the former is the 
(legitimate) counterpart, rather than a literal translation, of the (illegitimate) latter. 
17 Leibniz, Philosophical Writings (1973, 96-97, 108). The use of ‘metaphysical necessity’ 
in these passages coincides with the use of ‘logical necessity’ in New Essays [1765](1996, 
499). Cf. this fairly Humean tenet in accordance with his use of ‘metaphysically possible’: 
‘sugar could change into a switch’ (1996, 412). Cf. Hume [1740](1938, 14): ‘whatever we 
conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense’. (The emphasis is Hume’s. The 
quotation is meant to illustrate the comparably wide uses to which ‘metaphysically 
possible’, and paraphrases thereof, are put by Hume and Leibniz, rather than any kinship 
between their views of the relationship between conceivability and possibility.) It is clear 
that the natures of entities in the actual world do not restrict that which Leibniz would call 
metaphysically possible. 
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contingent beings. According to Leibniz, God could not have chosen any 
alternative to a truth which is logically necessary. Since the principle of Sufficient 
Reason does not have this privileged status, in that God could, although he does 
not, choose to breach it, the Identity of Indiscernibles cannot be said to hold as a 
matter of logical necessity. The latter principle is dependent upon the former: since 
the former is not logically necessary neither is the latter. (This, of course, is 
distinct from the issue of whether the latter follows from the former as a matter of 
logical necessity.) Sufficient Reason holds in the actual world: it is expressive of 
the essence of the actual world. Truths which hold in virtue of Sufficient Reason 
cannot be logical necessities. Rather, they express (what I call) metaphysical 
necessity: they are true in virtue of the nature of the actual world, but they are not 
logically necessary since some other world might have been created.18 There is 
reason, then, for the maintenance of a distinction between logical and metaphysical 
necessity, quite apart from any commitment to the metaphysics of essentialism. 
The distinction concerns the sense of essentialist claims, not their truth or falsity. 
We need the distinction in order to understand what the essentialist is really 
claiming, regardless of whether we endorse any kind of essentialist metaphysics. 
Of course, someone, like Quine, who protests that essentialist attributions are 
unintelligible, will not find this to be of use. However, it is preferable to try to 
understand, rather than dismiss, such claims. My contention is that if the sense of 
such claims is to be adequately conveyed there is a requirement for a notion of 
necessity other than logical necessity. This does not constitute a commitment to a 
realist view of metaphysical necessity, although it does lay the Quinean critic of 
essentialism open to the charge that he is ill-placed to refute that which he has 
precluded himself from understanding. 
 
Irreducible Modality De Re and the Case for Realism 
 
I have maintained, and will seek to sustain, the claim that there are notions of 
metaphysical possibility and necessity distinct from the notions of logical 
possibility and necessity. My argument also has it that claims involving the former 
are neither reducible to nor wholly explicable in terms of claims involving the 
latter. I will proceed to attempt to defend realism about a class of metaphysical 
modality de re whilst seeking to uphold neutrality on the issue of whether modality 
de dicto should be treated as a subspecies of modality de re. 
                                                 
18 Leibniz’s use of ‘metaphysical necessity’ might be said to coincide with mine, in the 
sense that it relates to a de re impossibility, namely the impossibility for God to have 
created a world in breach of the principle of non-contradiction. (Hacking (1975, 336) notes 
that ‘Leibniz keeps de re possibility separate from de dicto possibility, but [holds that] at the 
apex of creation the two concepts intersect’.) Nevertheless, Leibniz uses the phrase to 
signify truth in all possible worlds, whereas I use it to signify the modality which is 
involved in the characterization of the natures of contingent existents. The distinction 
between metaphysical and logical necessity I defend compares with that adopted by 
Moravcsik (1990, 101-102). 
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 There is a grammatical distinction between modal locutions de re and de 
dicto (and between de re and de dicto readings of the same sentence) which has, as 
Burge (1977, 339) and Wiggins (1980, 107) indicate, been most prominently 
discussed in the Aristotelian tradition. The distinction is well-founded on the 
grounds of grammar alone. Recognition that de re locutions do not reduce to de 
dicto locutions entails no metaphysical commitment, so the recognition of the 
distinction as grammatically well-founded does not in itself constitute an assent to 
Aristotelian essentialism.19 The intelligibility of essentialist attributions is immune 
to Quinean attack in that, on the de re reading pertinent to their proper 
interpretation, such attributions do not pose the problems with respect to referential 
opacity which are at the heart of the Quinean complaint.20 (Since what Quine 
[1953](1966, 174) calls ‘Aristotelian essentialism’ involves only sentential modal 
operators it is not truly representative of a metaphysical thesis which involves a 
commitment to real modality de re. Indeed, it fails even to represent the idea that 
modality de re is intelligible. Even if Quine’s account did provide for the logical 
form of essentialist theses, it would fail to establish that the use of that idiom 
commits us to realism about essence.) 
 On the assumptions, which I will substantiate in the next chapter, that 
modality de re and de dicto are distinct and that the former is not reducible to the 
latter, I should henceforth be understood to refer to the ontological issue when I 
use the word ‘irreducibility’ in the current chapter. My concern is now to establish 
that irreducible modality de re is, following what I take to be the strongest defence 
of essentialism currently available, namely Wiggins (1980), a feature of the reality 
with which an important class of our concepts are reciprocally related. 
 That there is irreducible metaphysical modality de re is a consequence of 
the theory of individuation defended in detail by Wiggins.21 I will try to give a 
précis of his argument. The first two steps in the argument are: 
                                                 
19 Burge (1970, 340) rightly emphasizes that the grammatical well-foundedness of the 
distinction is a quite separate issue from the metaphysical position of realism about 
modality de re. Cf. Sidelle (1989, 72), who regards the distinction as one of ‘logical form’, 
not metaphysics. 
20 This is illustrated by Hacking (1975) and Mondadori (1995, 229-234). Modal locutions 
de re containing terms with extensions exhibit no referential opacity. Phrases such as ‘the 
number of planets’, ‘the price of wheat’ and ‘the colour of the sea’ at best ‘“denote” a 
function in intension, an “individual concept”’, writes Hacking (1975, 328). The problems 
of referential opacity attaching to modal locutions de dicto stem not from modality but 
‘from the fact that one is talking about a dictum’ (1975, 327). Della Rocca (1996b, 187) 
comments that ‘essentialists may be said to regard modal contexts as extensional and not 
intensional’. The comment is misrepresentative: essentialism requires that de re modal 
contexts are extensional, not that de dicto modal contexts are extensional. 
21 This would appear to be a theory in which, in the terms of Fine (1994), a definitional 
approach to essence is shown to have modal consequences. Although Fine mentions the de 
re, in effect he takes talk of necessary truth to be exhaustive of modal accounts of essence. 
That shortcoming is encapsulated in his claim (1994, 6) that ‘any statement of necessity [is] 
necessarily true if it is true at all’. In addition, Fine (1994, 14-15 n. 2) misconstrues Wiggins 
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1. Identity is not relative—i.e., not-R; Wiggins (1980, Chapter 1). 
2. Identity is sortally dependent but absolute—i.e., D; 
Wiggins (1980, Chapter 2). 
 
In accordance with D, the sortal dependency of identity does not entail that there is 
a range of sortals from which we may more or less arbitrarily choose, thereby 
determining identity relations. The contrary view, that identity is relative to the 
sortal concept employed, is the thesis of the relativist (i.e., the ‘R theorist’) about 
identity. The absolutist, in contrast to the relativist, holds that identity relations are 
not determined (merely) by our choice of sortal concepts: there is a (non-
exhaustive) class of sortals which are sanctioned by reality. 
 Wiggins argues for the falsity of R and the truth of D on the basis that R 
consists in the denial of the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (i.e., 
‘Leibniz’s Law’) to which there is no convincing alternative. So, since R is 
unacceptable, D must be preferred. According to the aforementioned principle, 
where a and b stand for entities, f and g for sortal terms, a cannot be the same f as 
b and yet not be the same g as b. More formally, 
 
((?f)(a is the same f as b)) ? ((g)(g(a) ? a is the same g as b)). 
 
This principle is denied by the R theorist and upheld by D theorists such as 
Wiggins (1980, 18-23) and Lowe (1989, Chapter 4). The distinction between 
substance concepts and phased sortals is introduced in discussing some of the 
proposed cases in which the relativist maintains that a is the same f as b without 
being the same g as b.22 The relativist may claim, for example, that the man is the 
same human being as the boy but not the same boy as the boy. Far from this being 
supportive of the relativist’s position, however, it shows that boy, a phased (i.e., 
temporally restricted) sortal, does not have a proper role in an elucidation of 
identity: that role belongs to the (temporally unrestricted) substance concept 
human being. Substance concepts are distinct from phased-sortals23 in that the 
former are crucial in providing fundamental answers to questions such as ‘what is 
x?’. They are temporally unrestricted in that an object subsumed under such a 
                                                                                                                 
(1976): the point of the latter is to illustrate the de re form manifested by essential 
attributions and to show how a de re account does not suffer some of the problems 
associated with an account of essence in terms of necessary truth. Contra Fine, it is not ‘to 
claim that the de re modal statement does not give the correct logical form of an essentialist 
attribution’. 
22 Wiggins (1980, 23-25). Other supposed cases of relative identity are discussed (1980, 
27-44) and a summary of the confusions inherent in putative examples of relative identity is 
given (1980, 43).  
23 The distinction is implicit in Brody (1973, 351-355; 1980, 20-24, 70-83) and Kirwan 
(1971, 54). 
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concept falls under the concept throughout the course of its (i.e., the object’s) 
existence. 
 The first two steps in the argument are established on the grounds that 
there is no convincing alternative to Leibniz’s Law, and that purported cases of 
relative identity are shown to rest on confusion (and in some cases to provide 
covert support for absolutism). 
 According to D, ‘if a is the same as b, then it must also hold that a is the 
same something as b’ (1980, 47); ‘the elucidation [contrast reduction] of the 
identity “a = b” depends on the kind of thing that a and b are’ (1980, 48). So, a = b 
? ?f (a is the same f as b). This is developed as follows: 
 
it is enough for everything to be something, and for a = b ? ?f(a [is 
the same f as] b) to hold, if for all times t at which a continuant a exists 
there is a g under which a falls at t; or more perspicuously 
 
D(i): (x)(t)[(x exists at t) ? (?g)(g(x) at t)]. 
 
What this guarantees is only a succession of possibly different phased 
sortals for every continuant. (1980, 59)  
 
In order to give due weight to the role of substance concepts as against phased 
sortals, the following principle is required: 
 
D(ii): (x)(?g)(t)[(x exists at t) ? (g(x) at t)]. (1980, 59)24 
 
This gives due expression to an entity’s falling under a determinate sortal 
throughout the course of its existence (i.e., to its falling under a substance concept, 
not a mere succession of phased sortals). Also, it relates to the distinction between 
those changes through which an entity can persist and those which constitute its 
passing away.25 
 So, there are correct answers to questions such as ‘is a the same thing as 
b?’. Our arrival at these answers is dependent upon the employment of the correct 
sortal concepts. The paradigmatic substance concepts relate to natural unities,26 
since there are difficulties peculiar to other substance (or at least virtual substance) 
concepts relating, for example, to artifacts. It is not necessary for us to go into 
these difficulties here: for the sake of the establishment of our relatively minimal 
thesis that there is a range of irreducible metaphysical modality de re we will 
concern ourselves mostly with the paradigmatic substance concepts. 
                                                 
24 The case of Lot’s wife, which will be discussed later, arises (1980, 60, 66-67) as a 
purported counterexample to D(ii). 
25 This is expressed in the formulation D(iv) (1980, 68-69). 
26 Cf. Clark (1975, 50). 
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 The third major step in the argument relates to a further development of 
D: 
 
D(v): f is a substance concept only if f determines either a principle of 
activity, a principle of functioning or a principle of operation for 
members of its extension. (1980, 70) 
 
A natural kind term can refer if and only if ‘there is some nomological grounding 
for what it is to be of that kind’; to be a thing of a particular kind is to exemplify its 
‘distinctive mode of activity’ (1980, 80). Being a thing falling under a given 
natural kind concept is what Wiggins calls a ‘deictic-nomological’ matter. This 
captures the notions that being a thing of a given kind depends upon nomological 
grounding in actuality and that the answers to questions such as whether a given 
thing falls under the natural kind concept f, or whether any natural objects fall 
under a mooted natural kind term g, will be arrived at in the light of empirical 
considerations. 
 The fourth step elucidates the modal consequences of the theory of 
individuation outlined in steps one to three, and the connections between 
essentialism, conceptualism, and realism. In any instance, where the Aristotelian 
question ‘what is x?’ arises, the correct sortal concept to employ in order to reach 
the correct answer is determined by the nature of the thing, not just by our minds, 
conventions, or what have you. There are limits placed on the range of 
conceivability where the entities subsumed under a natural kind concept are 
concerned. Whether or not one can conceive of a thing x being ø will depend upon 
what x actually is: ‘ø cannot assume just any value’ (1980, 106). There will come a 
point in our conceiving when the value of ø is such that we cannot conceive of the 
thing having the property assigned by ø because to do so would no longer be to be 
conceiving of that thing at all. For example, contra Armstrong (1989, 51), we 
cannot conceive of Russell’s being a fried egg, since we do not have it at our 
disposal to regard human fried egg as a sortal concept, there being no principle of 
persistence which could sanction such a mooted concept.27 On this notion of 
conceivability, a thing cannot be conceived such that it does not exemplify the 
distinctive mode of activity of the objects subsumed under the sortal concept under 
which the thing is itself subsumed. (This point relates to Aristotelian 
considerations about change which will soon be discussed.) That a thing cannot be 
so conceived is a modal fact about the thing, rather than some expression of a 
psychological inability on our part or an assertion about some limit to the powers 
of the human imagination or some restriction imposed by more or less arbitrary 
conventions.28 That the necessity involved here is metaphysical rather than logical 
                                                 
27 Both Armstrong (1989) and van Fraassen (1977; 1978; 1980) are proponents of the view, 
described by Della Rocca (1996a, 4) as an ‘unpalatable version of anti-essentialism’, that 
things have no essential traits. (Della Rocca says he knows of no proponents of the view.)  
28 The import of this aspect of Wiggins’s account apparently escapes Forbes (1985, 220-
224) who erroneously characterizes Wiggins’s approach as advancing a ‘quasi-
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is illustrated by its deictic-nomological character. The bounds of conceivability are 
determined by the nature of the thing; by its principle of persistence. This principle 
of persistence relates to the characteristic activity of the thing, which is expressed 
in irreducibly de re modal locutions. Substance concepts relate to the real 
definitions of things. They are what Wiggins calls ‘extension-involving 
substantives’ (1980, 233). The limits to the conceivability at issue concern 
metaphysical, not logical, necessity, precisely because they are determined by the 
deictic-nomological persistence principles of things. There should be no 
temptation to regard the modal restraint as epistemic here, since the entire account 
acknowledges that wherever an Aristotelian ‘what is x?’ question arises there is 
some known or unknown principle of persistence involved. Also, questions as to 
whether a mooted natural kind term will ultimately refer may not always be 
answered by the introduction of considerations relating to actual experience and 
existing knowledge: future experience will often be crucial (1980, esp. 82). What a 
thing can do and what it can or cannot endure, as well as what properties it can be 
conceived as having, are determined by its principle of persistence. The 
essentiality of a trait is such that ‘the very existence of the bearer is unqualifiedly 
conditional upon the trait in question’ (1980, 121).29 Since the grammatical form 
of locutions employing the modality pertinent to essentialist claims (at least about 
contingent existents) is de re, not de dicto, and logical necessity is de dicto, 
regardless of whether or not it is also de re, it follows that the modality at issue is 
non-logical. We are now in a position to see that de re modality is not only 
grammatically well-founded, intelligible and acceptable, but also that Wiggins 
provides an argument supportive of realist modal primitivism. 
 The crucial notion of a persistence principle has its roots in Aristotelian 
metaphysics and is strenuously emphasized by Leibniz. Hacking (1972) and 
Wiggins (1980, e.g, 80) both point to the notion, awarded much significance by 
Leibniz, of substance as an active principle of unity. This entails a notion of 
essence as dynamic: to be a thing of a particular kind is to manifest its activity.30 
Essence is manifested by the actualization of the real powers/potentialities of 
                                                                                                                 
psychologistic’ view of the justification of modal concepts according to which ‘the modal 
status of truths and falsehoods is ultimately grounded upon human intellectual abilities’ 
(1985, 220). These matters are not even Wiggins’s concerns. For Wiggins, whether or not 
we can conceive of x that it is ø is determined in large part by the nature of x itself. The 
restrictions on conceivability relate to what it is possible to conceive of an entity; to how it 
is possible for an entity to be conceived. They do not restrict the class of those propositions 
which it is possible, for the purposes of logic, to conceive that they are true.  (The failure to 
distinguish between conceiving de re and conceiving de dicto colours Forbes’s 
interpretation of Wiggins, and leads him to make it look as if modality de dicto is Wiggins’s 
central concern.) I take up the point in the next chapter. 
29 Cf. Witt (1989, 107). 
30 Cf. N.P. White (1971, 194-195) and Witt (1989, 120) on Aristotle and Ishiguro (1972, 
67) on Leibniz. Also, cf. Hegel [1812-16](1969, 546): ‘What is actual can act; something 
manifests its actuality through that which it produces.’ 
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objects.31 Aristotle’s notion of the ergon of a thing (e.g.: Physics, 194b14, 
202a24; Metaphysics, 50a21)32 is the source of this notion of essence as an active 
principle of unity. This notion of essence affords us some intuitively 
unproblematic epistemology: we are well-acquainted with the characteristic modes 
of activity of a large range of natural kinds. These are known a posteriori, albeit 
via conceptual mediation: natural kind concepts and experience are not divorced. 
(Recall the account of substantive modal knowledge de re provided at 2.2.) 
 On the view I have adopted, contrary to the views of the rigid actualist 
and the Lewisian possibilist, there is modality in nature. There are irreducibly de re 
modal predicates properly attributable to natural objects: predicates relating, for 
example, to disposition, capacity and ability, which, writes Wiggins, fail to have 
any ‘natural de dicto translation’ (1980, 107). Furthermore, these concern 
irreducibly modal features of the world. In the following paragraphs I will expand 
upon this realist view. 
 The notion of essence discussed so far is related to considerations about 
change which again go back to Aristotle. (Non-reductive analyses of different sorts 
of predication and of different sorts of change are the two main routes by means of 
which the Aristotelian tradition introduces and explains the category of substance.) 
From some unobjectionable distinctions between changes we can come to 
understand, and see the need for, the category of substance. First, we can 
distinguish between changes which are grounded in the thing and those which, 
although predicable of the thing, are purely relational. For example, after 
Christopher Martin (1988, 51-52), at t1 Theaetetus is shorter than Socrates; at t2 
Theaetetus is taller than Socrates. Although the change is relational, it is grounded 
in reality. Specifically, it is grounded in the reality of Theaetetus’s new height at t2 
which is the result of a process of growth. However, given that the real change 
which has occurred is due to Theaetetus’s growth, it does not follow that Socrates 
has not changed. At t2, but not at t1, it is true of Socrates that he is shorter than 
Theaetetus. Nevertheless, Socrates has neither suffered nor initiated any real 
change with respect to his being once taller and now shorter than Theaetetus.33 It 
is real change which is relevant to our discussion (and, historically, to the 
Aristotelian examination of change). 
 Among real changes we can distinguish, in Aristotelian terms, between 
those which, on the one hand, constitute generations (comings-to-be) and 
destructions (passings-away) and those which, on the other, constitute mere 
                                                 
31 A distinction can be drawn between power and potentiality on the basis that the exercise 
of the former requires an event, whereas that of the latter requires a process. Cf. Elizabeth 
Prior (1985, 101) and the distinction between abilities and capacities implicit in 2.2. 
32 A rich account of this notion is provided by Clark (1975, esp. 14-27). 
33 Geach (1969, 72), upon whose account Martin’s example is predicated, labels these two 
forms of change ‘real’ and ‘mere “Cambridge”’. 
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alterations in a persisting object.34 Where an already existing object is concerned, 
there are certain sorts of event which it could suffer, or in which it could 
participate, through which it would persist. There are others which would 
constitute its destruction or replacement with something else. This Aristotelian 
distinction is employed by contemporary philosophers of Aristotelian influence 
who seek to establish the credibility of non-objectual modal realism. Like Wiggins, 
Brody (e.g., 1973, 351) emphasizes the metaphysical irreducibility of a class of de 
re modality. Brody (1973; 1980, Chapter 4) endorses the Aristotelian distinction 
between those sorts of change through which an object can endure and those 
which are incompatible with its persistence. The latter sort of change does not 
entail that there is complete annihilation. Rather, that there are certain changes 
which a thing a of a kind f cannot suffer without ceasing to exist is compatible 
with the replacement of a with some thing(s) not of the kind f. In the case of the 
paradigm substance concepts, it is never a merely conventional or conceptual 
matter as to the sorts of changes through which a thing can persist: with regard to 
artifacts it is often not a merely conceptual or conventional matter. Brody 
illustrates this point by considering two event types which can happen to a tree: its 
losing a branch and its being burnt down. That it persists through the former but 
not the latter is no matter of mere convention. Trees do not have the capacity to 
persist through their being burnt down. In Wiggins’s terms, this is a deictic-
nomological, as opposed to a merely conceptual, matter.35 
 The anti-realist is likely to object that it is indeed true that a tree does not 
continue to exist, qua tree, after being burnt down. The anti-realist may then add 
that this is a merely conceptual matter, entirely determined by our arbitrary 
individuative practice. We divide the world up into kinds but that is an affair in 
which only the operations of our conceptual framework are implicated, it is not 
about how the world is. The realist will reply that correct answers to questions of 
identity can be arrived at only through employment of the correct sortals: the 
selection of the appropriate sortal is dependent upon the nature of the thing. In 
fact, as will emerge, the realist may claim that an anti-realist conceptualist account 
of individuation and essence undermines the import and intelligibility of such 
questions. 
 Brody argues that given that there are some changes which a thing can 
endure and others which bring about its passing away, it follows that things have 
some of their properties essentially: 
 
an object o1 has a property P1 essentially just in case o1 has P1 and 
would go out of existence if it lost it (1973, 354; 1980, 81). 
 
                                                 
34 The two sorts of change are distinguished by Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, 
319b7-32. 
35 Cf. Newman (1992, 165). 
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So, on Brody’s account, any property the loss of which constitutes the passing 
away of a thing is an essential property. Kung (1977) protests that this formulation 
provides a necessary but non-sufficient condition for a property’s being essential 
to a thing.36 She argues that there are some properties such that their possessors 
would cease to exist were they to lose them, but which do not count as essential. 
To take one of her more plausible examples, she suggests (1977, 364) that if Jones 
ceases to be over eight years old then he ceases to exist, but being over eight years 
old is surely not essential to Jones.37 This points to an advantage in Wiggins’s 
characterisation of essence over that offered in Brody’s original formulation, since 
the very existence of Jones is not conditional upon his being, or ever reaching, an 
age greater than eight. A trait is essential to a thing, then, not merely if the thing 
would cease to exist if it were lost: a necessary—but non-sufficient—condition 
upon a trait’s being essential to an object is that the object could not have existed 
without the trait. A tree is distinct from the pile of ash which remains when it has 
been burnt down: the tree manifests a principle of activity (e.g. in its biological 
development) which a pile of ash cannot exhibit. That principle of activity is not 
merely such that the tree ceases to exist if it is lost; it is such that the tree would 
not have existed without it and it characterizes the organism throughout the course 
of its existence, including the stages prior to adulthood during some of which we 
would not call it a tree at all. 
                                                 
36 Cf. S.M. Cohen (1978, 389). Brody (1980, 116-123) acknowledges the insufficiency of 
his original formulation. Marcus [1971](1993, 57) and Teller (1975, 236) fail to specify that 
the condition such a formulation lays down is non-sufficient. Kung indicates that Marcus 
commits the further error of equating essential properties with properties which are 
necessary to all of their bearers. As against Marcus, not all things which are triangular are 
necessarily triangular; since being necessarily ø is necessary to being essentially ø, being 
triangular is not essential to all things which happen to be triangular. (This is without 
prejudice to the question as to whether any triangular thing is so essentially. Also, it does 
not deny that being a triangle is necessary to all things which are triangles; triangles are not 
the only triangular things. There can be triangular helipads, but no helipad is a triangle. The 
distinction between the necessity and the essentiality of a trait —the former is necessary, 
but not sufficient for the latter— has a recent advocate in Fine (1994, 5).) Cohen (1978, 
392) distinguishes between ‘an absolutely essential attribute...that is essential to any 
individual that has it at all’ and attributes which are essential to some, but not all of their 
bearers. The denial of Marcus’s claim does not entail that no essential attributes are 
absolutely essential, it merely asserts that some are not. Penelope Mackie (1994, 313) 
defines ‘essential sortal’ such that ‘A sortal concept S is an essential sortal if and only if the 
things that fall under S could not have existed without falling under S’, adding that ‘I ignore 
the possibility that there might be a sortal such that some, but not all, of the things that fall 
under it fall under it essentially...such a possibility would be an embarrassment to a sortal 
essentialist’. This suggests that the attributes of a thing must be distinguished from the 
essential sortals under which it falls. This in turn accords well with the notion of essence 
urged by Witt (1989) and with Wiggins’s emphasis on the centrality of the distinction 
between ‘predications in the category of substance and predications in the category of 
quality or relation’ (1980, 67). 
37 Cf. Matthews (1990, 252-255). 
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 Since the form of essentialism derived from Aristotelian considerations 
about change does not entail that there are names for all essential properties, Brody 
concludes (1973, 354-355) that it is committed to the existence of irreducible 
modality de re. In order to explicate all modality de re in terms of modality de 
dicto it is necessary that all entities with necessary traits have names in the 
language in which the purported explication is to take place.38 Since the 
essentialism in question does not meet this condition it follows that metaphysically 
irreducible modality de re is admitted. This argument makes the unobjectionable 
assumption that our language may be semantically impoverished, or our 
knowledge may be restricted, such that there may be a thing in the world whose 
principle of persistence is unknown/unnamed, or that the thing itself may be 
unknown/unnamed. We might compare this observation with this remark of 
Wiggins (1980, 141) about the sortal concepts we employ: 
 
what sortal concepts we bring to bear upon experience determines what 
we can find there—just as the size and mesh of a net determine, not 
what fish are in the sea, but which ones we shall catch. 
  
On an anti-realist view of individuation, a thing’s distinctness is not due to how the 
world is. As against the relativism which can contribute to this view, Wiggins 
(1980, 60-61, 66-67) considers the case of Lot’s wife.39 How are we to deal with 
this story, where God changes a woman into a pillar of salt? According to 
Wiggins, the suggestion that the same thing starts off with the principle of 
persistence for one thing and that this principle of persistence then ceases to 
pertain, being replaced by the principle of persistence for another thing, is unviable 
because it is contradictory.40 It is incompatible with such a change in persistence 
                                                 
38 This consideration is raised as an objection to Plantinga’s strategy of attempting to 
explicate de re modalities in de dicto terms by Cartwright (1968, 622). Cf. the criticism of 
Kripke offered by Wiggins (1974, 344-345). Plantinga (1969, 252-254) attempts to answer 
the objection, but even if the problem could be resolved the result would lead nowhere 
given the absence of exhaustive non-arbitrary equivalence relations between de dicto and de 
re forms. 
39 This is part of Wiggins’s argumentative procedure against the ‘R theorist’ (i.e. the 
relativist about identity) who ‘typically exaggerates the autonomy of thought in the singling 
out of objects of reference’ (1980, 101). ‘The anti-realist conceptualist may or may not be 
an R theorist’ (1980, 129). This conveys the point that, although anti-realist conceptualism 
is fostered by R-theory, R-theorists do not have a monopoly on the position. 
40 Lowe (1989, 103) agrees that it is conceptually impossible for Lot’s wife to change into 
a pillar of salt but (as he has pointed out to me) on the different grounds that ‘living 
organisms and parcels of matter have different criteria of identity’. On Lowe’s account, 
criteria of identity differ from persistence principles as understood by Wiggins and myself 
in that the former but not the latter are known a priori. According to Lowe (loc. cit.), ‘it 
would be wrong to [rule out] as being conceptually, as opposed to merely physically or 
naturally, impossible’ cases in which ‘the same living organism’ changes ‘from being an 
organism of one species, say a dog, to being one of another, say a cat’. This points to a 
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principles that it is actually the same thing that is under consideration: a human 
being cannot properly be said to fail to exhibit the persistence principle pertinent to 
human beings and yet to continue to exist. Wiggins sets out three other ways of 
describing the miraculous events in the biblical story: 
 
(1) the identity of Lot’s wife and the pillar of salt may be denied; 
(2) a sortal predicate like ‘woman pillar’ may be invented to 
cover the identity and supplant the self-contradictory 
descriptions we began with; 
(3) the very coherence of the whole story may be challenged. (1980, 66)  
 
The anti-essentialist will incline towards (2). In order for (2) to be applicable, the 
invention or selection of sortal concepts has to be detached from nature, becoming 
a matter solely of human convention or stipulation. The problem then is that all 
questions relating to the persistence of objects will be trivialized. Notions such as 
existence and persistence will themselves lose the import with which they are 
ordinarily regarded. The very supposition that the answer to the question ‘what 
exists?’ is determined solely by human invention undermines the seriousness of 
the question itself. The intelligibility of talk of existing and ceasing to exist may 
well require the rejection of (2).41 The intelligibility of talk of a three dimensional 
continuant’s ceasing to exist requires that ceasing to exist be construed as ceasing 
to be a substance of a determinate kind: 
 
an individual a’s having ceased to exist at t is a matter of nothing 
identical with a belonging to the extension at t of the ultimate 
individuative kind (or to the extension at t of any sufficiently high 
individuative kind) that is a’s kind. (1980, 67) 
 
The essential necessity of a trait arises at that point of unalterability 
where the very existence of the bearer is unqualifiedly conditional upon 
the trait in question. Here, at this point, a property is fixed to its bearer 
                                                                                                                 
much wider area of dispute which I cannot go into here, save to mention two relevant 
points. Firstly, my conception of metaphysical necessity, unlike Lowe’s, counts natural 
necessity as a kind of metaphysical necessity. Secondly, after Wiggins, I distinguish (in 
Chapter 4) between conceiving de re and conceiving de dicto. 
41 Let the conventionalist give up our actual practice. Wiggins’s D(ii) expresses the tenet 
that every three dimensional continuant that exists falls under a determinate sortal concept. 
Wiggins comments (1980, 62) that: 
 
the denial of D(ii) or the sacrifice of the substance assumption would 
entail the denial of truth or significance or possibly both to indefinitely 
many of our existing beliefs...these beliefs are fundamental to our actual 
individuative practices. Whoever wants to give these up may do so. 
When he has done that (not merely said he will), we can take him as 
seriously as he takes himself. 
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by virtue of being inherent in the individuation of it—inherent in the 
very possibility of drawing a spatio-temporal boundary around it. The 
closer the source of the attribute to the singling out of the thing itself—
the more it is bound up with the whole mode of articulating reality to 
discover such an object in reality—the more exigent, obviously, is the 
necessity that, if there is to exist any such thing as the bearer, it should 
have the feature in question. The de re ‘must’ of causal inflexibility here 
passes over at a certain threshold into an inflexibility that is conceptual 
(though only loosely speaking logical). There is no reason why this 
should make the essentialistic de re attribute any less of a real attribute 
of the thing itself. (1980, 121) 
 
To cease to exist is to cease to be a thing of a determinate kind. To be a thing of a 
determinate kind is to exhibit the persistence principle characteristic of things of 
that kind. It is substance concepts, rather than phased sortals which are relevant, 
since it is the latter which relate to principles of persistence. It is not a matter of 
mere invention or of nothing but conceptual considerations as to what counts as a 
principle of persistence: rather, it is a deictic-nomological matter. Principles of 
persistence relate to the de re modalities properly attributable to things in the 
world. This can be illustrated by consideration of artifacts, let alone the objects 
subsumed under the paradigmatic substance concepts. Hacking (1972, 147) 
considers a ‘bundle of contiguous qualities’ composed from ‘the bottom part of my 
pen, the inside of my thumb, and a bit of yellow paper’ and given the name ‘berk’. 
Berks cannot be substances. There are no persistence principles apposite to berks 
because berks cannot do anything or have anything done to them: 
 
My pen and my berk differ. As a matter of fact, but not of logic, my 
pen, all by itself, can be thrown, heated, repaired, crushed, locked away, 
and wiped when wet. It can be posted, buried, and the like. It is hard to 
do many of these things to my berk, all by itself....Pens do all sorts of 
interesting things and have all sorts of interesting things done with 
them. Berks might be like that, but are not. 
 
As far as the Aristotelian question ‘what is x?’ is concerned, things are what they 
are in virtue of their principles of persistence. Principles of persistence are active 
in the sense that they concern what a thing can do or have done to it without 
ceasing to exist. Principles of persistence are thus modal: they relate to the 
capacities/potentialities and abilities/powers of things. Since these, and the 
principles of persistence which underlie them, are discovered a posteriori, our 
individuative practice is not explicable in purely conceptualist terms. Our concepts 
do not create the abilities of things nor, accordingly, their principles of persistence, 
although they mediate our knowledge of those abilities and persistence principles. 
Whether or not a putative sortal concept can be genuinely individuative will 
depend upon whether there is a corresponding persistence principle. Questions of 
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identity and individuation can only be genuine, and can only be settled, where 
entities exhibit de re modal principles of persistence. Hacking (1972, 148) writes: 
 
Which bundles [of qualities] are substances? Only those bundles that are 
active, in the sense of having laws of their own. Laws provide the active 
principles of unity. There is a tendency in much analytic philosophy to 
conceive things as given, and then to speculate on what laws they enter 
into. On the contrary, things are in the first instance recognized by 
regularities. 
 
The regularities in question are those which concern what things can do and can 
have done to them; and, what they must do if they are to exist. These are not 
determined by projections of ours or by conceptual considerations alone, but by 
how things in the world are. The actual is not non-modal, and should not be so 
characterized. 
 
 
3.3 Anti-Realism II: Against Anti-Realist Conceptualism 
 
The conceptualism to be contested is the full-blooded variety which contends that 
all modality has purely intensional or purely intentional status (i.e., anti-realist 
conceptualism, not conceptualism tout court). Furthermore, since conceptualist 
reductionism has already been criticized, the conceptualism which is of current 
concern is of a sort which designates at least some modal notions as irreducible 
(e.g. it may hold that essence is a reducible notion, but that possibility is not). The 
aim then, is to mount an attack upon anti-realist modal primitivism. 
 Wiggins (1980, 134-137) employs an objection against the anti-realist 
conceptualist. He directs his attack against a conventionalist reconstruction of 
essence and modality de re. The scope of Wiggins’s objection may be extended to 
apply to some recent positions which foster anti-realism about essence and 
modality de re. Crucially, Wiggins’s objection may help to discredit the view that 
modality is not ontologically grounded. The anti-realist would have it that our 
convictions concerning de re modalities are to be fully accounted for by 
conventionalist or projectivist explanations; that no such modality is ontologically 
grounded. The problem with the anti-realist’s conviction is more likely to occur to 
the unabashed metaphysician, than to the neo-empiricist or the specialist 
philosopher of language. The problem identified by Wiggins is that the anti-
realist’s account has to rely upon the notion of entities as bare particulars.42 
According to van Fraassen (1978, 13-14),  
 
                                                 
42 On the connection between anti-essentialism and commitment to an ontology of bare 
particulars, cf. Marcus [1971](1993, 64). 
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At bottom, everything that can be said about the world, can be said in 
purely general statements, without modalities. There is no thisness 
beyond suchness, but every actual individual is individuated already by 
the properties it has in this world; hence can be denoted in principle by 
a definite description (in which the quantifier ranges over actual 
existents alone). At this bottom level the only necessity we can 
countenance is purely logical or verbal necessity which, like God, is no 
respecter of persons. In this modality, whatever Peter can do, Paul can 
do also.43    
 
Wiggins objects that van Fraassen’s account is no respecter of identity: it is 
unintelligible unless ‘we can make sense of an entity that is nothing in particular’ 
(1980, 135). The objection is, of course, that this notion of particulars as bare is 
not intelligible at all.44 This lack of intelligibility is made all the more apparent in 
the light of the Aristotelian considerations mentioned above. It seems that any 
variety of anti-realist primitivism about de re modality would face the root 
problem identified by Wiggins, namely commitment to a bare particular ontology. 
 Anti-essentialism collapses into incoherence. The anti-realist 
conceptualist about essence has it that objects have properties but no essential 
properties. However, objects cannot have attributes but have none of their 
attributes essentially. This follows from the logic of modal notions de re. For any 
object, if the object has a property then it is able to have the property. (By the 
lights of 2.2, the foregoing is a necessary a priori truth.) Abilities, although non-
spatial, are not occult entities. Rather, they require grounding in their possessors. 
For any ability, there is some vehicle in its possessor which grounds the ability. In 
order to acquire a property or to always have had it, the individual must have 
acquired, or always have had, the vehicle. That is not to say that the vehicle is of 
the essence of the individual. Nevertheless, the possession of the vehicle itself 
requires the ability to have or to acquire the vehicle. All the abilities of a thing 
cannot be merely accidentally had, since the absence of some fundamental 
capacities/abilities precludes a thing from having any abilities: abilities have to be 
grounded. (All of these claims follow from claims proposed at 2.2 as necessary a 
priori truths involving the de re modal notions.) So, objects cannot be such that 
they possess properties but lack essences. (This follows from the foregoing, and (j) 
of 2.2, i.e., the principle that that which accounts for a thing’s possession of its 
fundamental capacities is of its essence.) Thus, this form of anti-essentialism 
makes all particulars bare in the thoroughgoing sense that they are precluded from 
having any properties at all. To reject essence is to reject an ontology of non-bare 
                                                 
43 Quoted by Wiggins (1980, 134). 
44 Cf. Forbes (1985, 146), who comments that bare individuals ‘are surely unintelligible’. 
Also, cf. the contentions of Lowe (1989, 3; cf. 4-5, 11-13, 38-39, 65): ‘particular objects are 
only individuable and identifiable as particulars of this or that sort or kind (there are no 
“bare” particulars)...the notions of “individual” and “kind” are mutually dependent, with 
neither being in any sense more fundamental than the other’. 
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individuals (and vice versa). Since the postulation of objects with no properties is 
absurd this form of anti-essentialism reduces to absurdity.45 
 The postulation of bare particulars breaches the principle that only 
identifiable entities are genuine individuals.46 Since we have no way of identifying 
bare particulars47 they are not admissible into any sound ontology. Indeed, bare 
particulars are precluded from being identifiable since objects are identifiable, in 
even the most liberal sense, only in virtue of their having attributes48 and, as we 
have seen, metaphysical modalities de re are involved in identity and 
individuation. Thus, being identifiable is incompatible with having no essential 
attributes. In addition, since such ‘individuals’ can neither be referred to nor 
described, they are ontologically inadmissible and epistemologically 
inaccessible.49 McGinn (1981, 152) lays down an ‘extra-linguistic’ condition on 
individuality: ‘something is a genuine individual only if it admits of proper 
identification short of exhaustive characterization’. Divers (1990, 71-76) applies 
this to Lewisian worlds in order to show that they fail to constitute genuine 
individuals: they admit of neither ‘causally dependent indexical identification’ nor 
‘descriptive identification’ (1990, 72, 73). Likewise, it applies to bare individuals. 
Neither a monistic bare noumenal world nor a world populated by a plurality of 
bare particulars can contain causal relations, since the existence of causal relations 
requires the existence of properties. Having properties is also necessary for 
admitting of descriptive identification. These considerations bring home Wiggins’s 
                                                 
45 The necessary condition on individuality proposed, but not justified, by McGinn (1981, 
152), that ‘something is a genuine individual only if...its properties partition (non-trivially) 
into the essential and the accidental’, is vindicated by the foregoing argument, at least so far 
as concrete entities are concerned. E.J. Lowe has pointed out to me that the argument just 
given is consistent with the thesis that any object whatever can have any property whatever 
and thus with the thesis that the ability to have any property is the only essential property— 
an essential property had by every object. The point is well-taken. Nevertheless, the point of 
my argument is to highlight the dubious coherence of anti-essentialism rather than to 
establish an essentialism more substantive than that just mentioned. 
46 The principle follows from the principle, implicit in Lowe (1994b, 533), that the 
possession of ‘determinate and non-arbitrary identity-conditions’ is a necessary condition 
on objecthood. By the lights of the theory of de dicto necessity I adopt, these principles are 
necessary a priori truths. They are true in virtue of the concepts object and individual. 
47 Cf. Wiggins (1974, 353). 
48 Cf. Wiggins (1980, 115). 
49 Cf. Lowe (1989, 12): 
 
the noun ‘thing’...has no criterion of identity associated with it, is not a 
genuine sortal, and consequently cannot be used unambiguously to pick 
out some identifiable individual either as an object of knowledge or as 
an object of reference. 
 
Cf. the cases of ‘individual’ and ‘particular’. 
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charge (1974, 352) that if anyone merits being accused of having a ridiculous 
conception of substance it is the anti-essentialist. 
 One anti-realist development, the conventionalism proposed by Sidelle 
(1989), can reasonably be accused of falling prey to Wiggins’s objection to anti-
realist conceptualism. This is important since, unlike many other modal anti-
realists, Sidelle has a conventionalist reconstruction of necessity a posteriori as his 
primary aim. Questions may be raised as to whether Sidelle’s account can succeed, 
as he intends, in explaining necessity a posteriori via convention and analyticity. A 
very serious shortcoming of his account is that it construes essentialist claims as 
involving necessary a posteriori truths. In addition, the account rests on 
contestable arguments about the intelligibility of real necessity. For example, it is 
argued (1989, 117) that if the necessity involved in true essential attributions were 
real then it would rule out some states of affairs; it does not do this, so it is not 
real. In the light of the Aristotelian considerations on change considered above it 
should be clear that the soundness of this argument can easily be challenged. 
 A further point relating directly to the realism/conceptualism issue is as 
follows. Sidelle accuses the realist of regarding the world as existing already 
individuated. But, contrary to Sidelle’s accusation, the realist can recognize that 
individuating is a human activity. This in turn need not entail that the world does 
not contain already discrete entities. The conventionalist’s account is incoherent, 
though, because if individuation is, as the realist and the conventionalist can agree, 
an activity, then the activity has to have a basis resident in some object. Given that 
the individuating thing and the ‘stuff’ which is being individuated are not the 
same, and that the conventionalist account requires this non-identity, the 
conventionalist cannot insist that there are no already discrete entities prior to the 
individuating activity. This point is illustrated by Ayers’s (1974, 134) comment 
that ‘If there were no natural objects there would be no conventional objects 
either’. On the acceptance of Ayers’s conditional, and the denial of its consequent, 
it follows, by modus tollens, that there are natural objects. The denial of the 
consequent of Ayers’s conditional can be accepted by both the realist and the 
conventionalist. Sidelle’s conventionalism goes so far as to assert that there are 
only conventional objects, or at least that there is only one non-conventional 
object, namely the (mind-independent) world as it is prior to the imposition of our 
individuative practices. On the acceptance of Ayers’s conditional—given that the 
natural objects referred to therein are meant to include individuating beings—such 
a militant conventionalism reduces to absurdity.  
 Sidelle’s account assumes that anti-conceptualist realism and anti-realist 
conceptualism are the only options in the philosophy of essence, individuation and 
modality de re (1989, e.g., ix, 2, 14-16, 87). So, Sidelle’s account is framed in 
such a way that it leaves the most convincing form of realism (i.e., conceptualist 
realism) unconsidered and immune to the neo-empiricist attack upon ‘real’ 
(contrast ‘nominal’) essentialism which he seeks to mount. It follows, then, that by 
attacking such views he does nothing to discredit realism, but at best one form of 
realism (i.e., its implausible form: anti-conceptualist realism). In fact, most of 
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those who have recently sought to defend non-objectual modal realism have 
offered accounts consistent with what Wiggins calls ‘sober conceptualism’.50 
 The accounts of van Fraassen and Sidelle both result in an untenable and 
epistemologically unrespectable bare particular ontology. Nevertheless, there is an 
important difference between their accounts. The nominalist position adhered to by 
van Fraassen rests upon the assumption of an ontology of bare particulars in that it 
is anti-realist conceptualist about non-logical necessity and essence but anti-
conceptualist realist about individuation: ‘every actual individual is individuated 
already by the properties it has in this world’ (1978, 14), i.e., independent of 
modality and conceptual considerations. As Wiggins (1980, 136) notes, 
‘ideological’ talk of necessity and essence is here taken to be posterior to pure 
ontology uncontaminated by such talk. The individuals posited by van Fraassen 
constitute an ontology of bare particulars because there are no properties which 
they must or must not have: this leads Wiggins (1980, 135) to characterize them as 
entities that are nothing in particular. (Anti-conceptualist realism about 
individuation need not be committed to an ontology of bare particulars so long as it 
is not anti-realist about essence and metaphysical necessity.) 
 Although Sidelle slides into anti-conceptualist realism about individuation 
when he asks whether ‘modality is a real, mind-independent feature of the world, 
like wetness and dogs’ (1989, 2), his anti-realism is officially directed towards 
necessity, essence and individuation. Although Sidelle’s account does not rest on 
an ontology of bare particulars it does rest upon a bare particular ontology. This is 
because the world (as distinct from entities) is taken to be entirely independent of 
our individuative practice and our modal constructions. Sidelle, like Wiggins, 
emphasizes that individuating is a human activity. His anti-realist conceptualism, 
in contrast to Wiggins’s realist conceptualism, entails that the world and this 
activity are independent of one another. Unlike van Fraassen, Sidelle does not 
posit a world of bare particulars: in Sidelle’s view the entities that exist are 
determined entirely by our conceptual practice. But Sidelle does posit an 
unindividuated world independent of our conceptual scheme: he is not committed 
to a world of bare particulars, but he is committed to the world as a bare particular. 
                                                 
50 The most rigorous account being that of Wiggins himself. McGinn (1981, esp. 157-158) 
adopts a conceptualist realism. I know of no comment of Kripke’s which is inconsistent 
with sober conceptualism: contrast Sidelle’s misattribution (1989, 15) of anti-conceptualist 
realism to Kripke on the basis of Kripke’s supposition (1980, 124) that essences are 
discovered by natural scientists. (It should be clear from 2.2 above, and from my discussion 
of Wiggins’s views, that there is no conflict between the tenet that essence is discovered 
empirically and a sober conceptualism. Indeed, I do not see how an ontology of essences for 
concrete objects could be epistemologically sustained by anti-conceptualist means.) Harré 
and Madden (1975) give a conceptualist realist account of causal modalities. An approach 
which appears to take the other route (i.e. anti-conceptualist realism) is that of Ayers (1974). 
Some of the criticism directed at conceptualism by Ayers could threaten only anti-realist 
conceptualism, e.g., (1974, 116): ‘A serious objection to conceptualism...is that the life-
histories of natural things have to be discovered, often gradually and with difficulty, and so 
cannot be supposed to be determined by an observer’s conceptual scheme.’ 
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According to Sidelle, ‘we get essences...only from our methods of carving up the 
world’ (1989, 19). Since our method of carving up that world is entirely a matter 
of convention it follows that the world is prior to the delineation of entities within 
it. The raw material upon which our conventions are brought to bear is the world. 
The world, then, as distinct from the aggregate of individuated entities dependent 
upon our conceptual scheme, is a bare particular on Sidelle’s account. By way of 
illustration, consider his comment (1989, 55 n. 11) that 
 
the conventionalist should, and should be happy to, say that what is 
primitively ostended is ‘stuff’, stuff looking of course, just as the world 
looks, but devoid of modal properties, identity conditions, and all that 
imports. For a slogan one might say that stuff is preobjectual...there is 
nothing mysterious going on here—this is just the elaboration of the 
rejection of real necessity. 
 
The objectual world, then, is foisted upon the preobjectual world. The preobjectual 
world just is stuff that is nothing in particular. Sidelle’s position is quirky in that it 
posits a world entirely independent of our conceptual scheme but which, 
apparently, it is possible for us to know. Sidelle’s claim that such a world could be 
ostended is implausible. Sidelle’s comments are instructive in that they illustrate 
the price at which the rejection of real necessity comes on what is apparently the 
only other anti-realist path besides the adoption of an ontology of bare particulars. 
As a consequence of Sidelle’s commitment to the idea that the world is a bare 
particular, he falls prey to an objection which is of the same broad form as that 
offered against van Fraassen by Wiggins. The thesis that the world is a bare 
particular is no more intelligible than the thesis that there is a world of bare 
particulars. The notion of a something which is nothing in particular is no more 
respectable in the case of the world than in the case of a set of particulars held to 
be in the world. From a metaphysical point of view, bare particular ontologies are 
profligate. Furthermore, any philosopher who is opposed to the idea that there are 
realms which it is entirely impossible for cognizing beings to know will deem such 
ontologies to be epistemologically unacceptable. Such ontologies violate the 
restrictions which Hume rightly sought to impose upon metaphysics, in that they 
postulate a realm entirely outwith the reach of our understanding. It is a virtue of 
the conceptualist realist approach that it has no such consequence. The choice 
between the acceptance of a conceptualist realist essentialism and a bare particular 
ontology is at the fundamental core of the debate between (the best form of) 
realism and anti-realism about essence. Essentialism must be favoured since the 
postulation of bare particulars is incoherent. 
 The realist about essence, modality and individuation can recognize that 
individuating is a human activity, without being committed to the view that the 
world does not already contain discrete entities. As Wiggins (1980, 139) writes, in 
depicting his own conceptualist realism, 
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Conceptualism properly conceived must not entail that before we got for 
ourselves these concepts, their extensions could not exist autonomously, 
i.e. independently of whether or not the concepts were destined to be 
fashioned and their compliants to be discovered. 
Once these facts about that to which the realist need not be committed are 
acknowledged, the dialectic of Sidelle’s discussion is undercut. 
 The anti-realist conceptualist’s account undermines our ordinary 
distinction between artifacts and natural beings whose existence is not due to 
human invention. We take ourselves to be ontologically prior to the artifacts we 
bring into being, but not ontologically prior to the natural entities we recognize. 
The best the anti-realist conceptualist could hope to achieve would be the 
maintenance of the claim that we are, or perceive ourselves to be, causally 
responsible for the existence of those entities ordinarily deemed to be artifacts in a 
way in which we are not, or do not perceive ourselves to be, causally responsible 
for the existence of those entities ordinarily deemed natural.51 Nevertheless, from 
the point of view of fundamental ontology, the conventionalist account would 
obliterate all differences between the ordinary classes of artifacts and natural 
entities. Both classes of entities, are, on the conventionalist picture, ontologically 
dependent upon us. This might be taken to reduce the conventionalist position to 
absurdity given that there are well-established difficulties concerning the 
persistence principles of artifacts as against natural objects which carry over into 
problems about essentialist claims concerning the former but not the latter.52 That 
the difficulties attach to artifacts and not to natural kinds suggests that, contrary to 
conventionalism, there is a fundamental ontological distinction between artifacts 
and natural kinds. Better, then, to adopt a conceptualism according to which, 
 
although horses, leaves, sun and stars are not inventions or artifacts, 
still, in order to single out these things, we have to deploy...a conceptual 
scheme which has itself been fashioned or formed in such a way as to 
make it possible to single them out. Wiggins (1980, 139) 
 
This conceptualist premise richly illustrates the reciprocal relationship between 
reality and the sortal concepts we employ. Our concepts do not furnish themselves 
with extensions.53 In order for a natural kind concept to be fulfilled it has to be 
possible for reality to meet that concept. That possibility is written into reality prior 
to the exercise of our individuative apparatus, and prior to the existence of 
                                                 
51 Cf. Sidelle (1989, 51-52). 
52 On artifact identity, see Wiggins (1980, 90-99). 
53 Cf. Strawson (1966, 225). So, the anti-realist conceptualist claim of van Fraassen (1978, 
19) that ‘we do not have the task of representing the world the way it is, but only the way it 
is thought of’ is quite outrageous. 
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concept-using beings.54 Thus, when such a concept is met a modal fact about 
reality is revealed. 
                                                 
54 In contrast, concept-using beings are ontologically prior to artifacts. (Cf. the conviction 
of Lowe (1989, 1) that natural entities ‘must enjoy some sort of ontological priority over 
both abstract and artefactual objects’.) To avoid begging the question against theism, we 
might amend the claim in the text such that the possibility referred to is written into reality 
prior to the (metaphorically speaking) earthly existence of concept-using beings. 
Chapter Four 
 
Modality and Anti-Metaphysics 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will examine the modality involved in the logical positivists’ 
notion of verification in principle. I will argue that they conflated substantive 
modality and logical modality. If their notion of verifiability employs the former it 
is inconsistent with anti-metaphysics. If it employs the latter it will fail to grant 
cognitive meaningfulness to a class of statements which do possess cognitive 
meaning. 
 
 
4.1 De Re and De Dicto 
 
The argument for modal realism offered in the previous chapter employed a 
distinction—whilst seeking neither to pursue nor reject a divorce—between 
locutions de re and locutions de dicto. Contrary to the apparent fears of its 
empiricist critics, the grammatical distinction at issue by no means entails 
commitment to essentialism.1 The view that the distinction is grammatical rather 
than metaphysical is defended at 3.3 above. I hold that the distinction can be 
recognized without non-trivial metaphysical commitment. However, unlike 
William Kneale (1962, 631), I do not take it that the distinction between modalities 
de re and de dicto is at best grammatical, just that the theorist who wishes to attach 
metaphysical weight to modality de re does not establish a case for such an 
attachment merely by pointing to the distinction between modal locutions de re 
and de dicto. The latter distinction can be admitted without inconsistency by the 
anti-realist about modality de re. It is a historical contingency, but no surprise, that 
anti-realists have tended not to do so. 
 Indeed, empiricists have tended to be staunch in their refusal to recognize 
this grammatical distinction. Two of the most prominent, Ayer and Quine, provide 
us with ample evidence of this tendency. 
 Ayer (1946, 149) claims that ‘to say that a property p is a defining 
property of a thing A is equivalent to saying that the sentence which is formed out 
of the symbol “A” as subject and the symbol “p” as predicate expresses an analytic 
proposition’. He was later to declare boldly that ‘there are only de dicto 
modalities’ (1976, 24).2 
                                                 
1 Contrast Ayer (1976, 24). 
2 Ayer (1979, 311) is somewhat ambiguous: ‘No doubt there do [exist de re usages in 
English]’. Ayer says that he does not see, contra Wiggins, how this admission commits him 
to a belief in natural necessity. But this rests upon a confusion: Wiggins does not contend 
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 Quine [1953](1966: 156-174, esp. 156-157) distinguishes between three 
ways in which modal expressions may function. On this account, modalities are 
taken to function only as semantical predicates (attachable to names of statements), 
statement operators (attachable to statements, not names of statements) and 
sentence operators (an expansion of the second grade, which allows the attachment 
of modal operators to open sentences—Tichy (1972, 90) and N.P. White (1986, 
492 n. 3) erroneously take this to express distinctively de re modality). As Wiggins 
(1980, 107) notes, de re forms such as ‘x can be ø’ and ‘It is possible for x to be ø’ 
(which pervade everyday language) fall entirely outwith the scope of the three 
grades of modal involvement identified by Quine.3 
 Consider the following comments made by Lamprecht: 
 
there is no point at which...empiricists are more adamant than in their 
resolute denial of natural necessity. Necessity holds between or among 
propositions, they say, not among things....If necessity be a term applied 
solely to the logical bond between premise and conclusion, then 
necessity is not found in nature, and even the adverb ‘necessarily’ 
would be a misfit for metaphysical use. But...there is in common 
parlance another sense of necessity in which necessity is constantly 
found in nature. The falling tree crushes the blades of grass. The grass 
can not resist the tree’s impact. The tree makes the blades bend and lie 
prone. There is compulsion here. There is compulsion of that kind 
throughout nature....no member of the school of empiricists or any 
other, has the philosophical right to reject the facts indicated by a 
certain language because they do not themselves choose to use that 
language. And that is what the empiricists have done. They have denied 
the facts of coerciveness in nature’s operations (that is, what might be 
called physical necessity) on the ground that natural connections are not 
like implications among propositions (that is, what might be called 
logical necessity). [1961](1967, 109-110) 
 
This passage is rich with matter for the illustration of crucial elements in our 
discussion. Lamprecht rightly observes that empiricists have been (historically, not 
logically) led, through the rejection of real necessity, to a rejection of the very 
                                                                                                                 
that the grammatical point establishes the metaphysical point, contrary to Ayer’s apparent 
assumption. In addition, Ayer’s comments are inconsistent with Ayer (1976, 24), where 
Ayer implies that the recognition of de re modal idioms commits one to essentialism. W. 
Kneale (1962, 624) indicates, after a remark of Abelard, that the doctrine ‘that every modal 
statement was about the sense of another statement’ was adhered to by some medieval 
logicians, not including Abelard himself, who apparently deemed only de re constructions 
to be authentically modal. The view attributed to Abelard by Kneale compares with that of 
A.R. White (1975, 171), notwithstanding White’s accession to the view that ‘the 
modals...are “referentially opaque”’ (1975, 176). 
3 Similarly, Quine (1980, 4, 143-145, and esp. 151) does not allow for the grammatical 
distinction at issue. 
Modality and Anti-Metaphysics 117 
idiom in which we express that necessity. However, Lamprecht is at fault in a 
manner akin to those who expound the very view which is the subject of his 
critique, since he takes it that the everyday uses of the notion of natural necessity 
in the locutions we employ in attempting to depict the world around us establish 
that there are natural necessity-involving facts. If it is the intelligibility of the 
concepts and linguistic forms we employ which is of immediate concern, then the 
discussion ought to be realigned, such that the facts at issue concern usage, rather 
than the extra-mental realm. What is then shown is that, in expressing our beliefs 
about the world, we actually employ locutions which do make use of a notion of 
non-logical, yet objective, necessity. Some empiricists have denied this because 
they have erroneously taken it that the acknowledgment of this linguistic and 
conceptual point entails committal to a metaphysical standpoint they reject. 
Contrary to their view, a recognition that modal attribution de re features in our 
practice does not in itself involve us in the acceptance of such a metaphysic. The 
cynic might observe, though, that by the denial of the very intelligibility of modal 
attribution de re and of the very employment of the notion of objective non-logical 
necessity, the empiricist practises an unseemly form of philosophical economy 
since such a denial precludes the empiricist from having to account for our de re 
modalizing practice (via the very refusal to accept what are facts about our 
practice). Thus, the empiricist is saved from a formidable and bothersome task. I 
hope to establish that despite the adamant rejections, by prominent empiricists, of 
the very notion of necessity de re and modal attribution de re, the logical 
positivists were themselves reliant on both. Lamprecht is right to indicate that 
many traditional empiricists profess to reject the notion and the idiom in question, 
but they, no more than contemporary empiricists of similar opinion, do not really 
refrain from employing that idiom. Such empiricists may not explicitly employ talk 
of necessity in nature, but they certainly help themselves to modal attributions de 
re. (So, their denial of facts which characterize our practice is undercut by their 
own participation in that practice. Consequently, they cannot shirk from the 
formidable and bothersome task already mentioned: they are bound to account for 
the notion of objective non-logical necessity and modal locutions de re. Since they 
reject essentialism they will have to do so along anti-realist lines. Thus empiricism 
is seen to be incompatible with the advocacy of the elimination of metaphysics.) 
Furthermore, some of their proposals concerning verifiability appear to require that 
there is necessity in nature: this takes us beyond merely linguistic and conceptual 
points and into realist metaphysics. Before proceeding to examine modal issues 
regarding the notion of verifiability in principle, it will be useful to restate and 
bolster the de re/de dicto distinction. 
 Opponents of modality de re, often motivated by the mistaken suspicion 
that recognition of de re modal locutions entails the acceptance of real essence, 
have either attempted to reduce locutions de re to locutions de dicto or maintained 
that at best de re locutions will so reduce if they are to make any sense at all. 
Conversely, and ironically, some of those sympathetic to essentialism have sought 
to allay the fears of those who abhor modality de re by attempting to explicate it, 
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and accordingly the notion of essence, in terms of modality de dicto.4 I have 
maintained that whether or not de dicto modality is reducible to  modality de re—
an issue concerning which I have sought to preserve neutrality—modality de re is 
definitely not reducible to modality de dicto. Also, in contrast to the approach just 
mentioned, I hold that modality de re is not just irreducible to modality de dicto, 
but is not even explicable in terms of modality de dicto. (I have associated 
metaphysical modality with modal locutions de re and, perhaps implicitly, logical 
modality with modal locutions de dicto.5 Later, this latter association will be 
discussed in more detail.) 
 I endorse Hacking’s view that the de re/de dicto distinction may be 
explicated in terms of the contrast between the following forms of locution: 
 
  (I). It is possible that p, and 
(II). It is possible for A to x. 
 
These two sorts of modal locution exhibit important differences.6 Examining these 
ordinary syntactic differences has considerable heuristic value in helping to 
explain the logical differences between modalities de re and modalities de dicto. 
                                                 
4 The most prominent being Plantinga (1969; 1970; 1974, Chapter 3). Contrary to the 
charge levelled against him, on the basis of readings of the earlier works, by Marcus 
[1971](1993, 66), Tichy (1972, 88) and Burge (1977, 344), Plantinga eschews reduction of 
modality de re to modality de dicto, taking both to be primitive. Plantinga states (1969, 248) 
that he seeks to explain modality de re via modality de dicto. Explanation of x in terms of y 
does not amount to a reduction of x to y, as Plantinga recognizes. Plantinga (1969, 257) 
expresses manifest hostility to the reductionist project, maintaining that de re and de dicto 
modalities are reciprocally explicable and that this will serve to allay the worries of those 
who are comfortable with modality de dicto but uncomfortable with modality de re. 
Although Plantinga’s aspiration is to provide definitional equivalences between modal 
discourses de re and de dicto, he recognizes that definitional equivalence is a necessary but 
non-sufficient condition for reduction: this is implicit in (1974, 42). (Reduction requires 
asymmetry: cf. Mumford (1994, 422). The conceptual priority of modality de dicto over 
modality de re is required for a reduction of the latter to the former.) Fumerton (1986, 294 
n. 8) perpetuates the reductionist misinterpretation. 
5 I do not suggest that all modal locutions de re relate specifically to metaphysical modality 
or that all modal locutions de dicto relate specifically to logical modality. (The statement 
that it is necessary for me to serve a prison sentence does not concern metaphysical 
necessity. Similarly, if someone says ‘it is possible that I will win the lottery’ we can 
reasonably take it that the speaker is concerned with a possibility other than merely logical 
possibility.) In addition, my discussion avoids ‘the assumption of surface synonymy 
between “is essentially” and de re occurrences of “is necessarily”’ described, and rejected, 
by Marcus [1971](1993, 59-60). I do hold, however, that de re modal truths reflect the 
natures of entities, as my discussion of the epistemology of substantive modality de re at 2.2 
above has hopefully made clear. 
6 These differences are documented by Hacking (1975), whose account I follow but not 
without qualification, as will become clear. The distinction between the two forms of 
locution is also drawn by Ayers (1968, 13ff). The differences apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
necessity-involving constructions. 
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(I) displays a manifest dictum, p, whereas (II) does not: typically, the place of A is 
filled by an individual, x by an activity. 
 Hacking (1975, 323) claims that (II) does not entail (I). G.E. Moore 
(1962, 188, cf. 185) noted that examples like ‘It is possible that I will go, but I 
won’t’ involve ‘a sort of’ contradiction, whereas those such as ‘It is possible for 
me to go, but I won’t’ do not. In the case of possibility-involving constructions, a 
lack of entailment from (II) to (I) would appear to rest upon ‘possible’ being 
interpreted in an epistemic sense in (I) but in an objective sense in (II).7 So far as 
concerns objective possibility, the lack of entailment is from (I) to (II). From the 
premise that it is logically possible that I should levitate it does not follow that it is 
possible for me to levitate.  
 The differences between modal constructions of the forms (I) and (II) can 
also be highlighted by appeal to the notion of contingency and, more generally, by 
appeal to principles of modal logic. Now contingency, unlike necessity and 
possibility, is an exclusively alethic notion: contingency is always contingency 
that. Furthermore, contingency, unlike necessity and possibility, is an exclusively 
logical notion. This is illustrated by the fact that it makes no sense to talk of 
something’s being logically contingent but not actually contingent, whereas it can 
make perfect sense to talk of something being logically but not actually possible. 
By definition, a proposition is contingent if it does not entail a contradiction and it 
is not logically necessary. By the lights of the modal logical system S5, a modal 
construction of the form (I) will entail its own necessity: both ?p ? ??p and 
?p ? ??p are theorems of S5.8 Since a (I)-style statement of possibility entails 
its own necessity, the modification of such a statement with a contingency operator 
will entail a contradiction. I have already noted, at 2.2, that standard modal logical 
systems such as S5 do not include the resources for representing constructions of 
the form (II) since such systems include only sentential modal operators. My claim 
is further substantiated by the observation that a (II)-style statement of modality 
need not entail its own necessity. In the case of possibility, it is possible for Tom to 
swim does not entail it is necessary that it is possible for Tom to swim. (This also 
applies to statements of ability more naturally phrased, such as Tom can swim.) 
There is no contradiction involved in the supposition that Tom might never have 
been able to swim. Thus, no contradiction is entailed by stating that it is contingent 
that it is possible for Tom to swim. 
 The distinction between the forms (I) and (II) is even more pronounced in 
the case of necessity than in the case of possibility (and it has already been alluded 
to at 2.2). So far as concerns objective necessity, there is no entailment in either 
direction. Concerning the claim that (II) does not entail (I), I do not mean to reject 
the tenet of classical logic that a necessary truth is entailed by any proposition 
whatever. Rather, my point is that the attempt to translate a ‘necessary for’ 
construction into a corresponding ‘necessary that’ construction will not always 
                                                 
7 I am grateful to E.J. Lowe for this suggestion. 
8 See Hughes and Cresswell (1996, 58-59). 
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preserve truth. Indeed, the classical logical principle can be invoked as a means of 
supporting my case. Cicero might never have existed. Thus, Cicero is identical to 
Tully is no necessary truth. It is contingent that it is necessary that Cicero is 
identical to Tully entails a contradiction. This ailment does not afflict it is 
contingent that it is necessary for Cicero and Tully to be identical. 
 In the case of necessity, the lack of entailment from (I) to (II) is illustrated 
by the fact that, on the usual assumptions (with respect to the truth-conditional 
nature of modal discourse and the truth-values of modal judgments), truth-value 
does not survive attempted substitutions across the two types. Burge (1977, 339-
340) gives as examples ‘The proposition that every man who steps on the moon 
steps on the moon, is necessary’ and ‘Every man who steps on the moon is such 
that he necessarily steps on the moon’. Rendering these constructions into the 
forms identified by Hacking, it is evident that the proposition that it is necessary 
that every man who steps on the moon steps on the moon is true, whereas the 
proposition that it is necessary for every man who steps on the moon to step on the 
moon is false.9 
 Hacking (1967, 151-153; 1975, 323-325) notes that the two forms admit 
of different adjectives. A key difference is that (I), but not (II), admits the 
substitution of the modal term by ‘probable’, whereas (II), but not (I), admits the 
substitution of the modal term by ‘permissible’. Hacking explicates the de re/de 
dicto distinction in terms of the distinction between (I) and (II), subject to the 
caveat that where ‘central de re’ modality is concerned, ‘the A denotes an 
individual thing or agent’, whereas type (II) locutions which involve reference to 
kinds are de re ‘only in an extended or Pickwickian sense’ (1975, 326-327). 
However, by the lights of a de re/de dicto distinction worthy of purely grammatical 
status this semantical consideration is irrelevant. I contend that the de re/de dicto 
distinction is well-explicated in terms of the evident differences between (I) and 
(II). Thereafter, I propose, in accordance with Hacking’s remark, that the 
centrally/non-centrally de re distinction is semantical/metaphysical. Hacking’s 
caveat notwithstanding, I see no problem in viewing species as res, even if this 
extends the ‘classical’ sense of the term.10 
                                                 
9 On this lack of equivalence, cf. Bradley and Swartz (1979, 238). 
10 Hacking (1975, 326) counsels that de re constructions may form only a subclass of the 
constructions exhibiting (II) on the grounds that ‘in It is possible for the sperm whale to 
survive at least two more years before extinction...the sperm whale designates not an 
individual but a species, and classically this is no res’. Given that the de re/de dicto 
distinction is exhaustive of the forms of modal constructions, species have to be counted as 
res, since they are not dicta. In addition, central modality de re may be viewed as 
concerning concrete objects, not just concrete individuals. (This allows propositions to 
feature in non-centrally de re constructions.) Since species are concrete entities reference to 
species can occur in centrally de re constructions. On the concreteness of species cf. Lowe 
(1994b, 531). There is reason then, to avoid any restriction dictating that central de re 
constructions are confined to those which feature names for Hacking’s ‘classical’ res. We 
might also note that it should not be laid down as a necessary condition for a construction’s 
being de re that it contains a genuine designator. Whether or not ‘God’ is a non-empty 
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 Logical modalities, which I take to be typically de dicto, may admit of de 
re expression.11 Indeed, this is suggested by Hacking (1967, 156): 
 
Conjecture I: Every use of the word ‘possible’ in an utterance has 
associated with it at least one noun phrase and a verb phrase (perhaps 
unuttered) that can serve as the subject and predicate of a corresponding 
‘possible for’ construction.12 
 
 
‘It is logically possible that p’ may be re-expressed, for example, as ‘It is possible 
for the proposition that p to x’, where x-ing is a function the performance of which 
is a distinguishing characteristic of logically possible propositions. Hacking (1967, 
157) writes that ‘one could say the verb V directly parallels the noun N if and only 
if something is an N if and only if it V. The verb indirectly parallels the noun if 
something is an N if and only if we, or someone else, or something else V.’ This 
suggests that there may be an alternative de re formulation pertinent to logically 
possible propositions, involving the latter sort of occurrence and perhaps relating 
to our reasoning faculties. Note that in such de re formulations (if that they be) of 
logical possibility claims, reference to manifest dicta is still evident. 
 Even if de dicto modalities were semantically or metaphysically reducible 
to de re modalities that would in no way undermine the de re/de dicto distinction. 
In such a circumstance, de dicto would be a subclass of de re, rather than being 
identifiable with it: de re modality per se would remain irreducible. In 
characterizing a modal locution as de dicto, then, I mean that it admits of 
unproblematic expression in terms of (I). If we accept that logical modalities can 
be expressed in de re form we have to be careful as to how this claim is 
understood. ‘It is logically possible that if you put the paper in the fire it will not 
                                                                                                                 
name, ‘It is possible for God to intervene in nature’ is a de re construction, by the lights of 
the syntactic de re/de dicto distinction I adopt. Whether or not a construction is centrally de 
re, i.e., whether it succeeds in saying anything about a genuine res, is a 
semantic/metaphysical issue separate from the distinction adopted at the basis of my 
enquiry. 
11 I register my disagreement with the view of Gomberg (1978, e.g., 398) that ‘it is possible 
that p’ and ‘it is not certain that -p’ are equivalent. Gomberg’s discussion seems to me to be 
unduly stipulative, if not question-begging, on this point. In so far as he argues for his view 
it is on the basis of ‘sentence deviance’ (1978, 402). I see nothing deviant in constructions 
of the form (I) which employ ‘logically possible’. Readers are free to exercise their own 
discretion in this matter but I take it that Gomberg’s suggestion is exceedingly implausible 
given that philosophers are apt to employ such constructions and that these are the natural, 
or at least commonly supplied, non-formal counterparts for formal constructions in which 
sentential modal operators feature. That philosophers grant them employ is no proof of their 
lack of deviance, but Gomberg provides no technical argument to establish such deviance. 
The point stands that if the constructions were intuitively or naturally regarded as deviant it 
would be most unlikely that they would feature as prominently as they do in philosophical 
discussions. 
12 Cf. Ryle’s talk of the ‘logical powers’ possessed by propositions (1959, 331). 
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burn’ may be expressible in the following de re form: (i) ‘It is possible for the 
proposition that if you put the paper in the fire it will not burn to x’. It is not re-
expressible as (ii) ‘It is possible for the paper to fail to burn when put in the fire’. 
Even if logical modalities can be expressed via de re constructions, as it seems 
they can, it is still dicta which are modally qualified, in contrast with cases such as 
(ii) in which modal expressions qualify simple or complex predicates.13 
 
 
4.2 Empiricism, Verifiability, Modality 
 
Verification in Principle  
 
To advance the dictum that what is empirically known, and what is 
meant, must be verifiable, and omit all examination of the wide range of 
significance that could attach to ‘possible verification’, would be to 
leave the whole conception rather obscure.  C.I. Lewis (1934, 137)14 
 
I now turn to an examination of the modality involved in the notion of verifiability. 
It will become apparent that there is considerable obscurity in the logical 
positivists’ conceptions of this notion, which is far from expurgated subsequent to 
examination. I contend, however, that, for the most part, their stated intention was 
that the relevant modal notion was logical possibility. 
 The logical positivists incorporated a modal element into the verification 
principle in order to avoid the undesirable consequences which would result from 
an excessively restrictive criterion specifying meaningfulness solely in terms of 
actual verification. Thereafter, Schlick introduced further modality by proposing a 
distinction between (what became known as) practical verifiability and verifiability 
understood more widely.15 Thus, the class of non-analytic meaningful statements 
was to include statements such as the statement ‘that there are mountains on the 
farther side of the moon’.16 
 Ayer introduced the notion of verifiability as providing a necessary and 
sufficient condition for non-analytic meaningfulness: 
 
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, 
and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to 
express—that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under 
certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as 
being false. (1946, 35) 
                                                 
13 Cf. Wiggins (1980, 106). 
14 Cf. Misak (1995, 2, 206 n. 4) on Berkeley’s notion of conceivability. 
15 Schlick [1932b](1959, esp. 88-89); Ayer (1946, 36). 
16 Ayer (1946, 36), after Schlick. 
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He proceeded to specify that the relevant notion of verifiability was that of 
verifiability in principle, rather than practical verifiability. That which is 
practically verifiable is that which we have the means to verify: we could verify it 
‘if we took enough trouble’ (1946, 36). So, a statement is practically verifiable if 
we have the technical methods and equipment at our disposal via the exercise of 
which its truth or falsity could be indicated, regardless of whether the relevant 
process has been or will be pursued. Practical verifiability raises the same question 
as verifiability in principle regarding the nature of the relevant modality. I will 
concentrate upon the latter notion. 
 There are some grounds for doubt about the nature of the notion of 
verifiability in principle and, as we will soon see, unanimity on this matter was not 
exhibited among logical positivists. My contention will be that the modalities most 
widely reputed to have been involved in the notion of verifiability in principle are 
logical, and it is fair to say both that this was the most prevalent view among the 
logical positivists themselves and that it is the view which best accords with their 
philosophical programme. Before discussing this matter further, some comments 
regarding the role of the notion of verifiability in principle in the account of 
meaningfulness furnished by the logical positivists are in order. 
 Satisfaction of the formulation of verifiability in principle as set out by 
Ayer (1946, 35) came to be regarded as neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
meaningfulness of a statement since there was a desire to grant empirical 
significance to (particularly scientific) statements which could neither be 
justifiably asserted nor justifiably denied directly on the basis of empirical 
observation.17 The notion of verifiability in principle was not forsaken, it was 
qualified such that a statement was held to be empirically significant if it was 
either directly or indirectly verifiable.18 Indirectly verifiable statements were held 
to be ‘relevant’, or logically related, to statements directly verifiable in principle. 
Ayer noted that his talk of ‘relevance’ was imprecise, and attempted to provide 
greater clarity by specifying that: 
 
a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-
statement, or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-
statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is not 
deducible from these other premises alone; and...a statement is 
indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following conditions: first, that in 
conjunction with certain other premises it entails one or more directly 
verifiable statements which are not deducible from these other premises 
alone; and, secondly, that these other premises do not include any 
statement that is not either analytic, or directly verifiable, or capable of 
being independently established as indirectly verifiable....I can now 
reformulate the principle of verification as requiring of a literally 
                                                 
17 As Ayer (1946, 13) and Hempel [1950](1959, 118-122) noted. 
18 Ayer (1946, 11-13, esp. 13). 
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meaningful statement, which is not analytic, that it should be either 
directly or indirectly verifiable, in the foregoing sense. (1946, 13) 
 
Ayer was here attempting to avoid the logical problems, and the problems 
regarding excessive and deficient restrictiveness, arising from the introduction of 
the notion of indirect verifiability and mentioned at 1.1. Regardless of those 
problems, an examination of the modality involved in the notion of verification in 
principle goes to the roots of the logical positivist approach to empirical 
meaningfulness. Ayer used the term ‘“observation-statement”...to designate a 
statement “which records an actual or possible observation”’ (1946, 11). Hempel 
[1950](1959, 110) intended the concept of an observation sentence ‘to provide a 
precise interpretation’ of the vague notion of verifiability in principle. However, 
the concept of an observation sentence leaves unresolved the issue of the type of 
possibility which is pertinent to verifiability in principle.19 This is a murky area in 
the logical positivists’ writings: vital questions such as the aforementioned were 
infrequently raised. In addition, what critical literature there is examining modal 
aspects of the logical positivists’ philosophy tends to focus mostly on issues 
relating to their attempted reduction of dispositional attributions to conditional 
statements.20 
 I have already alluded to the absence of unanimity among the logical 
positivists concerning the sort of modality which was intended to be involved in 
the notion of possible verification. Their programme disqualifies the metaphysical 
modality with which we have been concerned from pertinence. If such modality 
were to be detected in their philosophy it would have to be regarded as 
inadvertently present, since an acceptance of such modality is entirely at odds with 
their positivist project of eliminating metaphysics: we will see, however, that 
verificationism by no means entails positivism and that, in fact, there is reason to 
doubt the consistency of their combination. Since the logical positivists recognized 
only logical modalities we will be strongly inclined to say that their intended 
modality was thus logical. However, matters are rather more intricate. Firstly, it is 
somewhat ambiguous as to what is implied by saying that one recognizes only 
logical modalities. One might be saying that the only modal notions one will 
countenance—the only modalities one will regard as intelligible—are the logical 
                                                 
19 Hempel [1950](1959, 110 nt. 5, 111 nt. 6) thought it to be logical possibility, but the 
issue is not as straightforward as he appears to have believed. Despite his assertion 
[1950](1959, 111 nt. 6) that ‘[as] has frequently been emphasized in empiricist literature, 
the term “verifiability” is to indicate, of course, the conceivability, or better, the logical 
possibility of evidence’ the logical positivists were not unanimous on this issue. Notably, as 
we shall see, Carnap construed verifiability in terms of physical possibility. 
20 E.g.: Hempel [1950](1959); E.C. Moore (1951); Poser (1988), his excessively wide 
application of the term ‘logical positivism’ (to the early views of Russell and Wittgenstein) 
notwithstanding. 
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modalities.21 On the other hand, one might be subscribing to the reductionist thesis 
that other modal notions, such as causal and physical necessity, are nothing but 
localized or qualified versions of the logical modalities which one regards as 
fundamental. 
 That the former attitude was adhered to by Ayer is evidenced by the 
following comments made to Ted Honderich: 
 
I regard necessity as a purely logical notion. I won’t have metaphysical 
necessity, which people now are going in for, and which seems to be 
horrible. Or indeed causal necessity, which I’m afraid to say you are 
rather tempted by. I think I give myself an Alpha for trying to stamp out 
that absurd heresy. Honderich (1991, 224) 
 
These comments express an attitude adhered to by Ayer throughout his career. 
Ayer states that the only modal notions he will countenance are those of logical 
necessity and possibility. Ayer appears to regard it as a violation of his empiricist 
commitments to use any modality other than logical modality. His comments 
preclude him from attempting to explicate non-logical modal notions such as 
causal and metaphysical necessity in terms of logical modality (or from reducing 
the former to the latter): in word, but not deed, he rejects all talk involving non-
logical modalities.22 
                                                 
21 Obviously any such comment coming from a logical positivist could not mean ‘the only 
necessity I regard as real is logical necessity’. The recognition of this point leads to an 
apparent problem for the anti-metaphysical credentials of logical positivism. The logical 
positivist is committed to denying the meaningfulness of metaphysical claims and is thus 
precluded, as was well-recognized, from either asserting or denying any metaphysical 
claim. However, it seems quite clear that where logical modalities—crucial to the entire 
workings of their philosophical framework—were concerned the logical positivists adhered 
to an anti-realist position, whereby logical modalities were regarded as reducing to 
linguistic convention. Unlike Wittgenstein, the logical positivists were committed to (a kind 
of) semantic realism about logical modalities: statements of logical modality were held to 
reduce to linguistic convention. Their stance on the logical modalities was semantically 
realist and ontologically anti-realist. Wittgenstein viewed logical discourse as (semantically, 
not syntactically) non-assertoric throughout his career: for him, it had similar status to 
metaphysical discourse (especially to the ‘propositions’ of the Tractatus). Unlike 
Wittgenstein, the logical positivists failed to realize that their own philosophy was 
metaphysical. The claim of Butchvarov (1970, 7) and Dummett (1992, 145), that it is an 
illusion to think that metaphysics can be abolished from philosophy, is borne out. 
22 Despite his professed attitude he continued to help himself to such talk, as is evidenced 
by the profusion of modal locutions de re in this passage (1991, 10): 
 
for there really to be a door there, or indeed any other physical 
object...that I could mention, it is not enough that it be visible to me. It 
has to be accessible to my sense of touch and it has to be accessible to 
other observers. It has to occupy a position in three-dimensional space 
and to endure throughout a period of time. Moreover, if it is correctly 
identified as a door it has, at least potentially, to fulfil a certain function: 
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 In contrast, Carnap has no compunction about talk of physical possibility: 
in fact he describes the modality involved in verifiability in principle as physical 
possibility (1936, 423).23 Carnap disputes a view earlier proposed by Schlick that 
verifiability in principle relates to logical possibility.24 At best, the empiricist can 
recognize a notion of physical possibility such that physical possibility is nothing 
but logical consistency with a certain class of statements treated as physical laws 
holding in the actual world.25 If physical modalities are recognized they will be 
interpreted as logical consequences of probabilistically construed natural laws, 
rather than as relating to necessity proper (i.e. that which does not admit of 
deviation).26 Carnap’s physical possibility-style verificationism would appear to 
                                                                                                                 
it needs to be solid; there is a limit to the sort of material of which it can 
be made. And similar considerations would apply to any other physical 
object that I had chosen for an example. 
 
23 Carnap’s contentions in this regard are overlooked by Hempel. Carnap (1937b, 37) also 
employs the notion of physical possibility. 
24 The view appears in Schlick’s ‘Positivism and Realism’, [1932b](1959: 82-107, 88-89). 
However, Carnap’s reference (1936, 423) is to ‘Meaning and Verification’, [1936](1979: 
456-481, 464), where Schlick repeats the claim: ‘It must be emphasized that when we speak 
of verifiability we mean logical possibility of verification, and nothing but this.’ Like 
Carnap, Schlick has no compunction about using talk of non-logical modalities. Schlick 
[1932b](1959, 89) draws a sharp contrast between logical modalities and empirical 
modalities, relating the latter to the laws of nature. 
25 The acceptability of such a notion of physical possibility is dubious since physical 
possibility, granting that it concerns concrete entities, is best regarded as a species of de re 
modality. Accordingly, in the light of the de re/de dicto distinction I have employed, it does 
not admit of explication in terms of logical modalities at all. Putnam (1990, 68) is among 
the many who depict laws of nature as ‘physically necessary truths’, while Bacon (1981, 
134) claims that ‘physical necessity follows from logical necessity’, such that for any 
statement p, if p is logically necessary, then p is physically necessary. This seems to be a 
mistake, like the empiricist interpretation of physical possibility as a qualification on logical 
possibility. On such a de dicto interpretation, the proposition that 2+2=4 is physically 
necessary, since it is logically necessary. Bacon’s view, like that of empiricists who employ 
a notion of physical possibility as qualified logical possibility, treats physical modalities as 
operators on statements. Where an adverb relating to a discipline modifies a modal term this 
is usually taken to indicate that the modal notion at issue is concerned with that which is 
studied by the discipline: cf. Hacking (1975, 325). Neither numbers nor propositions are 
part of the study of physics. The depiction of physical modalities as de dicto is, of course, a 
standard feature of empiricist accounts. One such example is Russell (1940, 170): ‘“The 
moon is made of green cheese” is syntactically possible, but not physically.’ Although there 
is room for doubt, this comment suggests that Russell takes physical impossibility to pertain 
to linguistic items. He seems to be denying that the statement in question is physically 
possible, rather than suggesting that statements are not the kinds of things which admit of 
physical possibility and impossibility. 
26 Cf. Fisk (1973, 27): ‘necessities restrict alternatives...a restriction...either closes down 
alternatives or it does not’. The positivist’s notion of physical necessity is not genuinely 
restrictive since physical laws themselves are not taken to express something which 
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be at odds with the strict analytic/synthetic and conceptual/empirical dichotomies 
(to which Quine has directed much critical attention) in the central nervous system 
of logical positivism, wherein the realm of necessity is confined to the former half 
of each dichotomy. 
 An example used by Schlick in his discussion of the modality involved in 
verifiability in principle is the statement ‘Rivers flow uphill’, subsequently called 
‘S1’ by Carnap.27 Schlick’s claim is that the statement is verifiable because it is 
logically possible. Carnap claims that confirmability relates to physical possibility. 
Carnap makes the obvious point that this claim does not constitute a denial of the 
claim that S1 is logically possible. More importantly, Carnap’s claim is not that the 
statement itself describes a physical possibility, but that the statement is 
confirmable ‘because of the physical possibility of the process of confirmation; it 
is possible to test and to confirm S1 (or its negation) by observations of rivers with 
the help of survey instruments’. Carnap’s account also appears not to resolve the 
issue of the modality involved in verification in principle. On a sensible reading, 
where Carnap refers to the physical possibility of processes of verification with the 
help of whatever equipment is relevant, he cannot be taken to be reverting to the 
point where practical verifiability alone is taken to prescribe meaningfulness. 
Where he says, in the passage just quoted, that ‘it is possible to test and to confirm 
S1’ citing this as the reason why S1 is deemed literally significant, I take it that he 
does not mean that S1 is meaningful because we presently have at our disposal the 
means to carry out the relevant process of confirmation. If we take it that Carnap 
does not mean ‘practical verifiability’ by ‘physical possibility of confirmation’ 
then he may be taken to mean ‘confirmability in principle’.28 If, for Carnap, 
physical laws are to determine meaningfulness then his account faces further 
difficulties. Firstly, the determination of meaningfulness is no longer an a priori 
matter, which sits very uncomfortably with the programme of logical positivism. 
Secondly, the laws of physics are themselves subject to processes of empirical 
confirmation, as Carnap states, in respect of a scientific law, ‘instead of 
verification, we may speak here of gradually increasing confirmation of the law’ 
(1936, 425). He notes that this is no different in the case of particular sentences. 
How can meaningfulness be, as Carnap suggests, determined by considerations 
relating to physical modalities when statements relating to those physical 
modalities require processes of confirmation meeting the same modal restrictions 
on meaningfulness as any other class of statements? (If physical modalities are 
adhered to here then the road to holistic anti-positivism appears to rise quickly.) 
The laws of physics cannot serve as modal conditions on meaningfulness if the 
determination of the meaningfulness of statements relating to those laws 
themselves requires that they are meaningful and that they hold. Carnap’s view 
                                                                                                                 
genuinely closes down alternatives: as far as the empiricist is concerned, natural events are 
not precluded from breaching the laws of nature. 
27 Schlick [1936](1979, 467); Carnap (1936, 423). 
28 On the basis of (1937b, 37), it is clear that Carnap recognizes distinctions between 
practical, physical and logical possibility of confirmation. 
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would appear to lead to the conclusion that a statement about the meaningfulness 
of a given statement itself constitutes an empirical hypothesis.29 
 Moreover, Carnap’s claim that ‘it is possible to test and confirm S1 (or its 
negation) by observations of rivers with the help of survey instruments’ may be 
reformulated as, ‘It is physically possible for us to verify S1’. The reformulation is 
perfectly in accordance with Carnap’s statement, and both are paradigmatically de 
re. We see, then, that substantive, rather than merely logical, modality is at play: 
the claim and its reformulation express beliefs about what is possible de re. 
Notions of the physical modalities which view them as qualified logical modalities 
are unacceptable since physical modality is de re, not de dicto. The very framing 
of verifiability in principle in terms of physical modalities employs modal 
locutions which are paradigmatically de re (and thus irreducible to modal locutions 
de dicto), as the quotation from Carnap illustrates. 
 Among the major characters in the logical positivist movement Carnap 
appears to be in a minority of one in stating that the modality of intended relevance 
to verifiability is physical. The view that the relevant modality was logical was 
prevalent, but substantive and merely logical modality may sometimes have been 
conflated: I will suggest that the accounts of Ayer and Schlick appear to display 
such a conflation (although they both intended the relevant modality to be logical). 
 Using an example gleaned from Schlick, and following Schlick’s 
discussion, Ayer introduces the notion of verifiability in principle as follows: 
  
No rocket has yet been invented which would enable me to go and look 
at the farther side of the moon, so I am unable to decide the matter [i.e. 
the truth-value of ‘There are mountains on the farther side of the moon’] 
by actual observation. But I do know what observations would decide it 
for me, if, as is theoretically conceivable, I were once in a position to 
make them. And therefore I say that the proposition is verifiable in 
principle, if not in practice, and is accordingly significant. (1946, 36, 
my emphasis) 
 
                                                 
29 This is not the same as the view that the verification principle is itself an empirical 
hypothesis. Despite all his protestations that the verification principle puts forth no 
hypotheses, and is not a theory, Schlick makes comments which appear to suggest this 
strategy, e.g., ‘the “experimental theory of meaning”...proposes to be nothing but a simple 
statement of the way in which meaning is actually assigned to propositions’ [1936](1979, 
458-459). Carnap (1937b, 33) views the principle as a prescription, rather than an empirical 
or analytic truth. Here Carnap writes rather vaguely about ‘the principle of empiricism’. We 
have previously noted that the verification principle is not entailed by the principle of 
empiricism. Nonetheless, in so far as we take the former to concern the criterion of 
meaningfulness and the latter as the epistemological position at the basis of that criterion, it 
is clear that Carnap is addressing himself to the former principle. That Carnap does not 
distinguish the two principles is consistent with his aspiration to restrict the language of 
philosophy to the formal mode: he would regard ‘all non-analytic knowledge is empirical’ 
as a material-mode version of the criterion of meaningfulness. 
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Ayer’s account suggests a distinction between what is ‘theoretically conceivable’ 
and what is not. It will be recalled that the defence of essentialism proposed in the 
last chapter employed the notion of conceivability in such a manner that there is a 
limit to the predicates in terms of which an entity can be conceived, since some 
predicates are not compatible with the identity of the entity. This essentialist notion 
of conceivability cannot be what Ayer intends to employ, but his account appears 
to rely upon it to some extent. Ayer is attempting to draw a line between what I 
would observe if I were appropriately situated and what I could not observe under 
any circumstances. But the above passage introduces theoretical conceivability not 
at the level of what cognitive faculties a human being might have, but at the level 
of the pertinence of the circumstances under which those faculties would function 
appropriately to the affirmation or denial of a given statement. Ayer is clearly 
seeking to delimit the range of ‘theoretical conceivability’ so that it is 
conceivability relative to our cognitive apparatus which is relevant. But from the 
point of view of logic our having the cognitive apparatus that we happen to have is 
contingent. Since it is not logically necessary for us to have these cognitive 
faculties a theory which sets out to restrict the realm of literal meaningfulness to 
that which we can observe (given those faculties) is employing a substantive, 
rather than a merely logical, modality: thus, it is a metaphysical theory. 
 Ayer makes the following remarks about the involvement of the modal in 
the verification principle: 
 
all propositions which have factual content are empirical 
hypotheses...the function of an empirical hypothesis is to provide a rule 
for the anticipation of experience. And this means that every empirical 
hypothesis must be relevant to some actual, or possible, experience... 
(1946, 41) 
 
Possible experience for whom? If we take it that the sort of experience referred to 
is that which it is possible for human beings to have, then we are dealing with a 
substantive de re modality. 
 
I distinguish between a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ sense of the term 
‘verifiable’...I explain this distinction by saying that ‘a proposition is 
said to be verifiable in the strong sense of the term, if and only if its 
truth could be conclusively established in experience’, but that ‘it is 
verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it 
probable’. Ayer (1946, 9) 
 
We have already seen that Carnap employs the de re grammatical form: in the 
quoted passage we see that Ayer also does so. The de re locutions he employs 
exhibit the form of the following: ‘It is possible for experience to render p 
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probable’.30 But if Ayer is really as hostile to de re modality (both grammatical 
and metaphysical) as he claimed throughout his career he cannot be taken to mean 
what the grammatical form of his locution entails. Rather, his claim must be 
reconstituted. The de re talk he actually uses is not equivalent to any de dicto talk, 
so we will have to speculate somewhat as to what Ayer really wishes to convey. 
Thus, we might recast ‘it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for 
experience to render it probable’ as ‘it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is 
logically possible that experience renders/will render it probable’. Unless the de re 
modality featuring in Ayer’s locution can be shown to be predicated upon logical 
possibility, Ayer is helping himself to the sorts of modal locutions to which, qua 
positivist, he is entirely opposed because of their metaphysical status: the only 
modalities which are supposed to be recognized by positivists are those which are 
uninformative about the world. I do not claim that Ayer is making real essentialist 
claims, but that the use of de re modal locutions conflicts with his anti-
metaphysical project at least so long as an account is not available whereby these 
locutions can be understood as embodying nothing more than the modal notions of 
logical necessity and logical possibility which are (supposedly exclusively) 
countenanced by him.31 The logical positivists provided no such account and I 
have argued that no such account is possible. Although Ayer does not mention 
logical possibility specifically—the closest he comes is in his talk of what is 
‘theoretically conceivable’—we have seen that there is good reason why he must 
regard the intended modality pertaining to verification in principle as logical 
possibility. 
 Other writers, such as Hempel and Schlick, combined formulations of the 
notion of verifiability in principle explicitly in terms of logical possibility with 
pervasive employment of de re modal talk. 
 
Our concept of observation sentence is intended to provide a precise 
interpretation of the vague idea of a sentence asserting something that is 
‘in principle’ ascertainable by direct observation, even though it may 
happen to be actually incapable of being observed by myself, perhaps 
                                                 
30 I acknowledge that, prima facie, the locution indicated does not involve central modality 
de re, since ‘experience’ is not an agent, an individual or a species. However, in so far as it 
is my or our experience which is at issue the locution is elliptical for one involving talk of 
what it is possible for me or us to experience. Such talk clearly involves central modality de 
re. 
31 The qualification ‘at least’ serves as a reminder of a point previously mentioned: the 
logical positivists could not be non-metaphysical in their philosophy since they had views 
about the metaphysical status of the logical modalities. At best, they might have sought to 
attain a minimal metaphysics free from the employment of substantive modal notions. 
(Even the possibility of a minimally metaphysical philosophy may be dubious, since 
philosophers who eschew substantive modalities or modality tout court have not managed, 
in practice, to eliminate substantive modal talk. According to Marcus [1971](1993, 55 incl. 
n. 8) and Wiggins (1979, 154-155 n. 14) even Quine does not refrain from the use, 
respectively, of essentialist and de re modal talk.) 
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also by my contemporaries, and possibly even by any human being who 
ever lived or will live. Hempel [1950](1959, 110, my emphasis)32 
 
Hempel appears to be indicating that anything which is possibly—in an 
unrestricted sense, regardless of actual incapabilities—subject to verification is 
meaningful. On the other hand, it appears that Hempel wishes to restrict 
meaningfulness, such that it is relative to the actual modalities which pertain, 
regarding, for example, our cognitive faculties and their relations with other 
aspects of the constitution of the actual world. This is suggested by his explication 
of his conception of an observation sentence: 
 
A property or a relation of physical objects will be called an observable 
characteristic if, under suitable circumstances, its presence or absence 
in a given instance can be ascertained through direct observation. Thus, 
the terms ‘green’, ‘soft’, ‘liquid’, ‘longer than’, designate observable 
characteristics, while ‘bivalent’, ‘radioactive’, ‘better electric 
conductor’, and ‘introvert’ do not. Terms which designate observable 
characteristics will be called observation predicates. Finally, by an 
observation sentence we shall understand any sentence which—
correctly or incorrectly—asserts of one or more specifically named 
objects that they have, or that they lack, some specified observable 
characteristic. [1950](1959, 109-110) 
 
In all this talk of observability it seems that Hempel is desirous of modal 
restrictions on meaningfulness relative to actual incapabilities. Hempel appears to 
attempt to promote the contradictory aims of providing an account of 
meaningfulness in terms of unrestricted possibility on the one hand, yet of 
restricting meaningfulness relative to considerations as to what happens to be the 
case concerning our sensory apparatus, the actual constitution of the world, and 
their relations. The notion of ‘logically possible evidence’ employed by Hempel 
[1950](1959, 111 n. 5) manifests the disregard for modal discriminations typical of 
the logical positivists and shared by many empiricists. The very phrase ‘logically 
possible evidence’ expresses much that was wrong in the logical positivists’ 
attempts to provide a criterion of non-analytic meaning. It also sums up the 
contradiction at the heart of the account of verifiability in principle attempted by 
                                                 
32 Hempel’s concept of an ‘observation statement’ is analogous to Ayer’s previously 
outlined concept of an ‘observation-sentence’. Hempel [1950](1959, 110 n. 5) expresses 
verifiability (and confirmability) in principle in terms of ‘logically possible evidence’. 
Later, he comments: ‘As has frequently been emphasized in empiricist literature, the term 
“verifiability” is to indicate, of course, the conceivability, or better, the logical possibility of 
evidence of an observational kind...’ [1950](1959, 111 n. 6). Cf. Stace’s use of logical 
possibility talk in his specification of the ‘Principle of Observable Kinds’ (1944, 218): ‘A 
sentence, in order to be significant, must assert or deny facts which are of a kind such that it 
is logically possible directly to observe some facts which are instances of that class or 
kind...’. Also, cf. Hempel [1950](1959, 115 n. 11).  
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Hempel. The phrase ‘logically possible evidence’ is messy. Does it relate to that 
which it is possible for us to observe, or to that which is logically possible, for 
example that it might have been the case that our cognitive faculties were other 
than those we in fact have (thus altering the range of observability)? It is evident 
that Hempel did not make up his mind on this issue: if the former is adopted then 
we have a de re modal attribution, the metaphysical innocence of which must be 
illustrated. The prospects for such a demonstration of the metaphysical innocence 
of de re modal attributions are anything but promising. 
 According to Schlick, ‘verifiable certainly means nothing but “capable of 
being exhibited in the given”’ [1932b](1959, 88). He adds: 
 
verifiability is used here in the sense of ‘verifiability in principle’, for 
the meaning of a proposition is, of course, independent of whether the 
conditions under which we find ourselves at a specified time allow or 
prevent the actual verification. There is not the least doubt that the 
proposition ‘there is a mountain of the height of 3000 meters on the 
other side of the moon’ makes good sense, even though we lack the 
technical means of verifying it. And it would remain just as meaningful 
if one knew with certainty, on scientific grounds, that no man would 
ever reach the other side of the moon. The verification remains 
conceivable; we are always able to state what data we should have to 
experience in order to decide the truth or falsity of the proposition; the 
verification is logically possible, whatever be the case regarding its 
practical feasibility, and this alone concerns us.  
 
On one reading, Schlick appears to operate with a revisionary notion of logical 
possibility as restricted relative to our cognitive faculties. That reading is 
dependent upon taking ‘capable of being exhibited in the given’ as conveying that 
which it is actually possible for us to experience. In accordance with this reading, 
Schlick is operating with a substantive modal notion. If this reading is rejected, as 
is advisable given the positivists’ anti-metaphysical pretensions, Schlick is still 
guilty of employing de re modal locution, in the phrase just quoted. This may just 
be slovenly talk on his part. It is plausible that it is just so, since Schlick 
[1932b](1959, 89) distinguishes sharply between logical and empirical modalities 
and quite explicitly states that the modality pertaining to the notion of verifiability 
in principle is logical: 
 
One cannot...suppose that the distinction between the impossibility of 
verifying something in principle and the mere factual, empirical 
impossibility is not clear, and is therefore sometimes difficult to draw; 
for the impossibility in principle is logical impossibility which does not 
differ in degree from empirical possibility, but in very essence. What is 
empirically impossible still remains conceivable, but what is logically 
impossible is contradictory, and cannot therefore be thought at all.  
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This is reiterated in ‘Meaning and Verification’, where Schlick distinguishes 
between two uses of ‘possibility’: ‘empirical possibility’, which is defined as 
compatibility with the laws of nature, and ‘logical possibility’ which is defined as 
that which can be described [1936](1979, 462-464).33 ‘It must be emphasized’, 
writes Schlick, ‘that when we speak of verifiability we mean logical possibility of 
verification, and nothing but this’ [1936](1979, 464). Schlick proceeds to specify 
verifiability as mere accordance with grammatical rules, which he takes to be 
arbitrary [1936](1979, 466). (He erroneously opines [1936](1979, 467) that a 
construction is either grammatically well-formed or not, and that there is therefore 
an absolute difference between meaningful and meaningless constructions.34) The 
immediate consequence of such remarks is that the anti-metaphysical credentials of 
verificationism are radically undercut. There is nothing ill-formed about many of 
the examples of metaphysical discourse mentioned by the logical positivists, e.g. 
‘the Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress’.35 
Furthermore, since meaningfulness is unconstrained, on Schlick’s account, by 
empirical modalities, it appears that the way is left open for talk, for example, of a 
transcendental realm or a noumenal reality empirically accessible to beings with 
cognitive faculties other than ours, or even to us, should our cognitive faculties 
change: 
 
There are...many questions which can never be answered by human 
beings. But the impossibility of finding the answer may be of two 
different kinds. If it is merely empirical in the sense defined, if it is due 
to the chance circumstances to which our human existence is confined, 
there may be reason to lament our fate and the weakness of our physical 
and mental powers, but the problem could never be said to be absolutely 
insoluble, and there would always be some hope, at least for future 
generations. For the empirical circumstances may alter, human facilities 
may develop, and even the laws of nature may change...[1936](1979, 
466)36 
                                                 
33 It is interesting to note Schlick’s move from talk of two kinds of possibility (in the earlier 
paper) to talk (in this piece) of two uses of the word ‘possibility’. This is relevant to some 
comments made by Hacking which will concern us later. (I do not imply that Schlick’s 
articles are in contradiction.) 
34 The correct view, that well-formedness admits of degree, is propounded by Chomsky 
(1965, 11, 148-153). 
35 A remark ‘taken at random’ from F.H. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality by Ayer (1946, 
36). 
36 The lack of restrictiveness afforded by Schlick’s conception of verifiability is evidenced 
by his admission [1936](1979, 470-471) that it allows talk of personal survival after death; 
furthermore, ‘immortality...is an empirical hypothesis, because it possesses logical 
verifiability’. The lack of restrictiveness is further illustrated by his claim that ‘only logical 
possibility of verification is required [not empirical possibility]. And verification without a 
“mind” is logically possible’ [1936](1979, 481). 
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Schlick employs de re modal locutions here.37 His last sentence may be slightly 
paraphrased to render this even more evident, such that ‘It is possible for empirical 
circumstances to alter, it is possible for human facilities to develop and it is even 
possible for the laws of nature to change’. Schlick is definitely making modal 
predications about the world. This is incompatible with the positivist agenda 
whereby necessity and possibility have their sole residence in linguistic 
convention. It is also incompatible with the anti-metaphysical project. The 
positivist may attempt to get off the hook by indicating, for example, that empirical 
possibility is just that which is logically consistent with the laws of nature. 
However, quite apart from the other problems associated with such a response (and 
indicated above), given the lack of equivalence between the forms ‘It is possible 
that p’ and ‘It is possible for A to x’, that response will not do—assuming, that is, 
that logical modalities are not paradigmatically de re. (I will proceed to defend that 
assumption in the next section.) 
 The form of my dialectic so far in this chapter has been as follows. There 
is some confusion over the nature of the modality involved in the notion of 
verifiability in principle. The stated intention of most positivists was that logical 
modality pertained. I agreed that this is as it should be, since substantive modalities 
are at odds with their anti-metaphysical (and, of course, anti-essentialist) 
intentions. I set about illustrating how de re modal locutions were employed 
nonetheless, and I attributed this to modal confusion on the part of the positivists. 
Substantive modal talk pervades positivist writings: it is at the heart of their 
attempts to explain the notion of verifiability in principle. I have repeatedly 
emphasized that the de re/de dicto distinction is grammatical rather than 
metaphysical. Nevertheless, the onus is upon the philosopher who employs de re 
modal constructions to provide an account of the metaphysical status of such talk. 
If one seeks to banish metaphysics one is required to exorcise all de re modal talk 
from one’s philosophical armoury, since it is no good helping oneself to such talk 
on the basis that some anti-realist account of it can be provided. That is no good 
because one precludes oneself from either asserting or denying any metaphysical 
claim. If one seeks to reject real metaphysical modality de re one must either avoid 
all such talk or, if one is prepared to allow the retention of metaphysics, provide a 
viable anti-realist account of such modality. The relevant requirements went unmet 
by the logical positivists. 
 If verification in principle rests upon substantive possibility de re, 
verificationism is incompatible with anti-essentialism and anti-metaphysics. What 
is possible for us, or for beings with our cognitive faculties, to verify cannot be 
explicated in terms of logical possibility. Cognitive faculties involve substantive 
modality de re, so the attempt to restrict meaningfulness by relativising it to our 
cognitive faculties involves substantive modality de re. Our cognitive faculties 
pertinent to empirical verification relate to that which it is possible for us to 
observe: they are abilities inherent in us. I know of no plausible reduction of the 
                                                 
37 Cf. Schlick’s use of the notions of capability and ability [1938](1979, 288, 292).   
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abilities of a thing (a de re notion) to talk of logical possibility (a de dicto 
notion).38 
 If, on the other hand, logical possibility is what is relevant, then the 
restrictions on cognitive meaningfulness would be such that what is to count as a 
literally meaningful statement would relate to that which it is logically possible 
that beings with our cognitive faculties would verify. Let us take modal attribution 
de re as a paradigmatic example of metaphysical discourse. Setting aside the 
logical problems relating to indirect verifiability, I concede to the positivist that it 
is not logically possible, concerning a statement of substantive modality de re, for 
the statement to be verified by us. I make this concession because it is entailed by 
the approach to logical modalities inherent in the epistemology adopted at 2.2. A 
statement of substantive modality de re that is known is dependent upon an a 
priori modal major premise. Necessary truths are true in virtue of their conceptual 
content and are such that, fundamentally, they do not admit of empirical 
justification. Given that they have purely conceptual status in respect both of 
metaphysics and of epistemology, no empirical data counts towards their 
fundamental justification. (I do not deny that such data can count towards 
                                                 
38 Dummett (1976, 110-111, 114, 116-117, 136) and Misak (1995, 56) illustrate the 
centrality of human capacities and abilities to verificationism. (Indeed the notion of ability 
is central to Dummett’s very formulation of the task of a theory of meaning as the pursuit of 
‘a theoretical representation of a practical ability’ (1976, 69, cf. 70-73), i.e., the ability to 
use a language.)  In the absence of a viable anti-realism about modality de re, Misak’s claim 
(1995, xi) that verificationism and realism are in conflict is open to doubt, although work is 
no doubt required in order to substantiate that doubt. Given Dummett’s own conception of 
verification in terms of ‘actual human capacities’ (1976, 136), and his characterization of 
decidability, as it bears upon the acceptance or rejection of the principle of bivalence for a 
class of statements, as relative to our powers (1976, 102), it appears that his position is 
misrepresented by Appiah (1985, 29), who claims that ‘verifiability has to do with logical 
possibility...as Dummett’s talk of verification “in principle” indicates’. (We have already 
seen that it is by no means clear that talk of verification in principle is a reliable indicator 
that logical possibility is taken to be central to verifiability. Cf. Dummett (1976, 99-100), 
although I disagree that realist views require a generous, i.e., epistemically unrestricted, 
interpretation of ‘in principle possible’ as it occurs in ‘a...regulative principle [K] governing 
the notion of truth: If a statement is true it must be in principle possible to know that it is 
true’.) Edgington (1985, 36) comments that a conception of verifiability in terms of logical 
possibility constitutes ‘a vacuous restriction on truth’. She gives a broad characterization of 
verificationism as acceptance of the principle K, that ‘If “p” is true then it is possible to 
know that p’, adding that she does not see that K ‘even expresses a “broadly empiricist 
temper”, at least until we have some restrictions upon the endowments of possible knowers’ 
(1985, 36-37). The comment raises a paradox at the heart of verificationism. In order to 
render epistemically constrained notions of truth and meaning, facts about human faculties 
must be brought to bear. These facts, however, contravene the traditional empiricist 
commitment, often taken to be essential to empiricism, that there are no modalities in 
nature, since faculties relate to metaphysical modality de re. The claim that realism and 
verificationism are in conflict is often predicated upon a transcendentalist characterization 
of realism which conceptualist realists reject. (One of the misfortunes of contemporary 
realism/anti-realism debates is that the characterizations of realism which have gained sway 
are those advanced by writers of anti-realist predilection.) 
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justifying the beliefs of particular thinkers.) Knowledge of the relevant concepts 
themselves yields the knowledge that the relevant truths do not admit of empirical 
justification.39 From my concession to the logical positivists it does not follow that 
statements involving essentialist attribution or substantive modality de re are 
cognitively meaningless. In fact it is via analysis of their cognitive content that it is 
recognized that they are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable. Such 
statements are known neither through relations of ideas, nor through empirical 
observation. Rather, they are hybrids: their truth is inferred from a necessary major 
premise and an empirical minor premise. They possess both empirical and non-
empirical content. It is not logically possible that their truth can be secured merely 
by empirical means: this is an a priori truth which derives from an understanding 
of the non-empirical content involved, by the lights of the epistemology for 
substantive modality de re I have supported (at 2.2). 
 Contemporary empiricists who recognize the naivety of the anti-
metaphysical project but who renounce essentialism still face the acute problem of 
having either to reject de re modal locutions or to provide a viable anti-realist 
account of such modality. The latter strategy has been attempted, but the anti-
essentialist is faced with the formidable problem that the most commonly followed 
path, the attempt to reduce modality de re to modality de dicto, is illegitimate. 
Moreover, the illegitimacy of that path arises from considerations of a logico-
grammatical nature, not via metaphysics. Anti-realist strategies tend to admit 
modalities only as, at best, operators on dicta: we have seen this in the case of 
eliminativism and projectivism. I have previously commented that, given the 
logico-grammatical considerations just mentioned, this is a formidable obstacle in 
the way of the development of a workable projective account of non-logical 
modalities. 
 
A Note on van Fraassen40 
 
An example of a contemporary empiricist who employs the de re modal form, yet 
wishes to retain traditional hostility to essentialism, is Bas van Fraassen. 
According to van Fraassen, 
 
                                                 
39 Cf. Peacocke (1993, esp. 197). 
40 I have said my piece against the more thorough elements of anti-realist conceptualism 
which characterize van Fraassen’s views. Wiggins has done enough to illustrate the 
centrality of modality de re to the very singling-out of entities. My primary concern here is 
to illustrate van Fraassen’s own heavy dependence upon the de re modal idiom, his (in my 
view inadequate) attempt to account for that idiom, and the parallels between the position I 
claim he is in with regard to modality de re and the case of the logical positivists as 
described above. With some threat of indulging in hyperbole, my claims in both cases might 
be taken to suggest that just as, in Dummett’s words, the ‘ambition to abolish metaphysics 
was positivism’s greatest illusion’ (1992, 145), so the ambition to abolish essentialism is the 
greatest illusion persistent in contemporary empiricism. 
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empiricism requires theories only to give a true account of what is 
observable, counting further postulated structure as a means to that end. 
In addition, empiricists have always eschewed the reification of 
possibility (or its dual, necessity). Possibility and necessity they relegate 
to relations among ideas, or among words, as devices to facilitate the 
description of what is actual. (1980, 3) 
 
He acknowledges (1980, 217 n. 6) that he helps himself to de re modal talk. This is 
illustrated by his claim that ‘what counts as an observable phenomenon is a 
function of what the epistemic community is (...observable is observable-to-us)’ 
(1980, 19). He holds (1980, 198-199) that de re modal attributions can be 
explained as follows: 
 
modality appears in science only in that the language naturally used 
once a theory has been accepted, is modal language....We do not say 
that the burning of copper at room temperature and pressure has no 
counterpart in any model of our physics; we simply say that it is 
impossible. Once the theory is accepted...it guides our language use in a 
certain way. The language we speak at that point has a logical structure 
which derives from the theories we accept.41 
 
However, this fails to answer the point that talk of the ‘observable’ and the 
‘empirically attestable’ cannot itself be explained in such a manner. The limits of 
our experience are radically under-determined by the scientific theories we happen 
to accept; if that were not the case then experience could never be recalcitrant with 
theory. Indeed, van Fraassen himself regards ‘what is observable as a theory-
independent question. It is a function of facts about us qua organisms in the world’ 
(1980, 57-58). Thus, he is precluded from explaining-away all de re modal talk 
along the anti-realist lines he seeks to develop, since a type of de re modal 
attribution crucial to his philosophy is precluded from having its locus (solely) ‘in 
the model’ (1980, 202).42 In addition, even supposing that there could be an 
entirely extra-modal empirical theory, any modalizing habits which might ensue 
upon the acceptance of such a theory could not legitimately be described as having 
a ‘logical structure which derives from the theories we accept’. Rather, the logical 
structure of particular de re modal attributions derives from general principles 
governing the modal notions employed therein. The logical structure of neither the 
principles nor the attributions derives from the empirical theories we accept. The 
logico-grammatical form of de re constructions cannot be explained by appeal to 
                                                 
41 Cf. (1980, 202): ‘The locus of possibility is the model...the language we talk has its 
structure determined by the major theories we accept.’ 
42 However, he comments (1980, 217 n. 8) that ‘the scientific theories we accept are a 
determining factor for the set of features of the human organism counted among the 
limitations to which we refer in using the term “observable”’. This appears, in contrast to 
(1980, 57-58), to be an epistemological, rather than a metaphysical, point. 
Modality and Anti-Metaphysics 138 
our acceptance of non-modal empirical theories. The best van Fraassen can hope 
for, therefore, is some purely psychologistic account of our employment of such 
constructions. 
 Observability relates to what it is possible for us to observe. This 
modality is clearly de re, yet the notion of observability-for-us is at the heart of 
empiricist philosophy, both in its positivist and in its contemporary incarnations. In 
the absence of a viable ontological reduction of modality de re, this foundation 
stone of empiricism is incompatible with the post-Cartesian empiricists’ continued 
insistence that there is no modality in nature and that the only intelligible notions 
of objective modality are, at best, the de dicto notions of logical necessity and 
possibility (and perhaps relativized versions thereof).43 
 
 
4.3 Logical Possibility as Typically De Dicto 
 
In the preceding section I attempted to characterize the modality intended by the 
logical positivists to feature in the notion of verifiability in principle. I claimed that 
the logical positivists mostly intended logical possibility to be the relevant 
modality. However, it should be clear from the comments I made in rendering this 
characterization that there was ambiguity in their accounts because, I have been 
contending, they conflated substantive modal talk and talk of merely logical 
possibility. I have been suggesting that they did not have the right to help 
themselves to such substantive modal talk, since they professed to reject 
essentialism. (Although the use of such talk does not in itself commit one to 
essentialism, if one rejects essentialism then one is bound either to reject such talk 
or to provide a viable anti-realist reconstruction of such talk. The latter path is 
obviously metaphysical.) The logical positivists did so, it seems, because they did 
not recognize that substantive modal talk for what it was: they thought they were 
sticking to their empiricist guns and employing only logical modalities, with any 
other modalities being seen as mere subsidiaries of logical modalities. This failure 
may have been born from disregard for the broadly Aristotelian tradition from 
whence the elucidation of discrete sorts of modal locution came. In order to justify 
the direction of the polemic I have mounted so far it is necessary to go into some 
more detail regarding the notion of logical possibility. 
 Much of what I have written has rested upon the idea that the logical 
modalities are best construed as de dicto, rather than de re. I claim that even if the 
notions of logical possibility and necessity can be rendered in terms of modal 
locutions de re, they are not typical cases, since the res referred to will be 
linguistic and/or abstract entities, which are res only in an extended sense, the 
word usually being understood to relate only to concrete (spatial/temporal) 
                                                 
43 This is illustrated by the centrality of appeal to observability-for-us in the definition of 
empiricism given by van Fraassen (1980, 202-203), despite the fact that, according to that 
formulation, the empiricist professes to reject the idea that there is modality in nature. 
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entities.44 A statement of logical possibility such as ‘It is logically possible that p’ 
may be rendered into the de re form: ‘It is possible for p to x’, where x relates to 
the performance of some function apposite to logically possible dicta, such as the 
ability to feature, without itself entailing a contradiction, as a premise in a valid 
argument. As we have seen, by refusing to rule out the possibility that logical 
modalities may be rendered de re, one does not thereby commit oneself to the view 
that what are modally qualified in such cases are anything other that dicta. 
Essentialist claims about contingent existents are not explicable via necessary 
propositions since such claims, properly construed, are paradigmatically de re and 
paradigmatically de re modal attributions do not reduce to modality de dicto. 
 
Hacking on Logical Possibility 
 
Hacking (1975) claims not only that logical possibility can be de re, but that it is 
de re ‘sometimes or always’ (1975, 333). In essence, his argument is as follows: 
 
1. Logical possibilities are most appropriately expressed in the 
subjunctive mood. 
2. Locutions in the subjunctive mood are of the (de re) form (II), 
i.e., ‘It is possible for A to x’. 
Therefore, logical possibility is sometimes or always de re. 
 
Although I reject the argument, the conclusion is not, in itself, inconsistent with 
the views I support herein, since I claim only that logical possibility is 
paradigmatically de dicto, without prejudice to the issue of whether it is sometimes 
or always de re. Nonetheless, Hacking’s argument is intended to suggest that 
logical possibility is paradigmatically de re. That suggestion is both at odds with 
my project and, for reasons given below, objectionable in itself. It should be noted 
that, although characterizing logical possibility as paradigmatically de re, Hacking 
(1975, 335) comments that: 
 
it would be fatuous to contend that just because of my grammar, we 
must reject any concept of de dicto logical possibility....We are at 
liberty to say that a statement which does not entail a contradiction is 
logically possible, and we are free to utter the sentence It is logically 
possible that p in the indicative mood, to express that fact. 
 
My view differs from Hacking’s in that I take the de dicto idiom to be 
paradigmatically, rather than merely permissibly, implicated in statements of 
logical possibility. Furthermore, Hacking (1975, 333) provides ‘It is logically 
                                                 
44 Three conceptions of abstractness are outlined by Lowe (1995, 513-514), the first of 
which I employ in the text above. The correlative conception of concreteness is employed 
by Lowe (1994b, 531). Cf. the elucidation of the concrete/abstract distinction offered by 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994, 182-187, esp. 184-185). 
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possible for A to x’ as illustrative of de re logical possibility. This differs from my 
analysis in the following respects. Granting the grammatical acceptability of 
Hacking’s construction, I deny that logical possibilities directly concern 
agents/individuals and activities. At best, if logical possibilities were to be depicted 
in terms of us and our cognitive operations, dicta would be manifested in the 
relevant constructions and the relevant verbs would indirectly parallel the noun 
phrases which pick out those dicta. In addition, I hold that the word ‘logical’ drops 
out of (II)-style constructions which are truly expressive of logical possibility and 
that dicta are manifested in the (II)-style constructions where the verb directly 
parallels the noun. Accordingly, the construction provided by Hacking is 
inconsistent with the semantics for logical possibility claims: in fact, I doubt that it 
could be provided with semantically intelligible instances. 
 Hacking’s claims (1975, 332-333) are built upon ‘appeal to authority’: he 
has it that Moore ‘said logical possibilities should be expressed in the subjunctive 
mood’. Moore (1962, 187) provides the following as examples of logical 
possibilities: 
 
It’s possible that I should have been seeing exactly what I am seeing, 
[and] yet should have had no eyes. 
I might have been seeing what I am [and] had no eyes. 
It’s possible that every dog that has ever lived should have climbed a 
tree. 
 
The first and the third of Moore’s examples might be read as of the form (I), ‘It is 
possible that p’. This would place in question Hacking’s supposition that if logical 
possibility is expressed in the subjunctive then it is of the form (II), ‘It is possible 
for A to x’. If we read Moore’s examples as of the form (II) then they will lack 
equivalence to the ‘corresponding’ (I) readings, since we have already established, 
on the basis of the views of Moore and Hacking themselves, that (I) and (II) are 
non-equivalent forms. That Moore’s examples employ the subjunctive does not 
show that logical possibilities should be so expressed nor that they are or should be 
typically so expressed. That they admit of expression in the subjunctive does not 
show that they are of the form (II). I have already expressed my view that although 
logical possibilities may admit of de re formulation there are good reasons for 
preferring to express them via (the de dicto form) (I), not least of which is the fact 
that no res (unless that notion is stretched quite remarkably) is picked out in 
logical possibility statements, and that even if we do view dicta as res, the fact 
remains that no concrete res seemingly referred to in a (I)-style logical possibility 
formulation is picked out.45 So, Hacking’s claim that logical possibility is 
typically de re does not appear to be particularly well-founded, and we have ample 
                                                 
45 I adopt the broadly Fregean position, supported below, that words which ordinarily 
function as genuine names lose their ordinary references when they feature in modal 
constructions de dicto. 
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reason to regard it as false, or at least inutile. However, Hacking has a separate 
reason for viewing logical possibility as typically de re which rests upon his 
reading of Kripke. 
 
Rigid Designation and Logical Possibility 
 
Hacking reports that having reached the conclusion that logical possibility is 
typically de re he thought that it would be met with incredulity by others. 
However: 
 
Then Kripke...changed everything. There is now a viable explication of 
de re logical modalities. On my account of ø-ly possible, it is logically 
possible for A to x if there is nothing of a logical sort that absolutely 
prevents A from x-ing. After Kripke we are able to say what it is for 
something of a logical sort absolutely to prevent A from x-ing. It has 
long been known, I think, that it is something to do with criteria for 
individuating A: if they are such that x-ing would preclude the 
individuation of an individual as A, then it is not possible for A to x. 
(1975, 333) 
 
These comments conflict with the tenet that concrete objects and logical objects 
are distinct. Logic does not study concreta. That is a tenet which we should not 
relinquish. Rather, logic studies entailment relations between propositions. (This is 
not to say that those propositions cannot concern concreta but merely that 
propositions are not themselves concreta.) Moreover, it should already be clear, on 
the basis of comments integral to my prior defence of non-objectual modal realism, 
that I am precluded from agreeing with Hacking’s comments here, and can only 
regard them as deviant and unhelpful. I have already explicated sortal essentialism 
in terms of metaphysical modality de re, in contrast with logical modality. I have 
taken the latter to be typically de dicto and I hold that it is entirely inappropriate to 
the explication of essentialist metaphysical theses concerning concrete entities. In 
respect of Hacking’s comments quoted above, I hold that where A is a concrete 
entity there is typically no restriction of a logical sort preventing A from x-ing. 
 Hacking contends that when we compare 
 
it is logically possible for Elizabeth II to have had parents other than 
George VI and his wife Elizabeth and It is logically possible for the 
present Queen of England to have had parents other than George VI 
and his wife Elizabeth...according to Kripke, if she is born of the 
persons stated, then my first statement about Elizabeth II is false, and 
the second is true. (1975, 333-334)  
 
Hacking holds this view on the basis that ‘Elizabeth II’ designates rigidly, whereas 
‘the present Queen of England’ designates non-rigidly. However, the fact (granting 
Modality and Anti-Metaphysics 142 
that it is one) that ‘Elizabeth II’ designates rigidly entails that those very words, 
wherever they occur, are fulfilling a referential role only if the standard explication 
of rigidity in terms of referential stability in modal contexts of the form (I) works. 
In my view that condition goes unmet. Putnam (1990, 62) claims that: ‘When 
terms are used rigidly, logical possibility becomes dependent upon empirical 
facts.’ However, it is a mistake to specify rigidity in terms of modal contexts of the 
form (I): modal idioms are not exhaustively de dicto. Modal contexts of the form 
(II) are typically extensional. Rigidity, linked as it is to essence, ought to be 
specified in terms of referential stability in respect of constructions pertaining to 
metaphysical modality de re. This does not constitute a revision of Kripke’s 
fundamental insight concerning referential stability, but rather a rejection of the 
move from the claim that, e.g., ‘Aristotle’ exhibits referential stability through 
whatever counterfactual suppositions consistent with his identity we make about 
Aristotle, to the claim that ‘Aristotle’ exhibits referential stability in all modal 
contexts. In considering what Aristotle might have been or done our concern is 
with substantive possibility de re; with possibilities for Aristotle. Kripke’s move 
does not accord with the de re/de dicto distinction as understood by Wiggins 
(1974; 1976; 1979; 1980), Mondadori (1995) and myself. His move rests upon 
both this and his attendant tendency to depict essences and de re abilities in terms 
of necessary and possible truths. Referential stability through de re modal contexts 
does not require referential stability through de dicto modal contexts. Given that 
suppositions about what was possible for Aristotle concern the former, Kripke’s 
move is mistaken. The considerations via which he introduces the notion of rigid 
designation sanction only de re modal stability. Accordingly, the characterization 
of rigidity in terms of referential stability in all modal contexts is mistaken. If 
Kripkean considerations about possibilities for Aristotle are intended to sanction a 
notion of rigidity as referential stability in all modal contexts they fail to do so. If 
the notion of rigidity is predicated upon possibilities for the ordinary referents of 
proper names then it does not require referential stability in all modal contexts but 
only in de re modal contexts. I take it that the latter scenario best accords with 
Kripke’s fundamental insight and that the move to talk of referential stability in all 
modal contexts is mistaken. I deny that rigidity is relevant to the logical modalities 
because (i) I take such modalities to be de dicto and thereby referentially opaque; 
and (ii) I take reference to concrete entities to be entirely irrelevant to the question 
as to what is to count as logically possible. (My position is thus in total 
disagreement with Putnam’s view.) The notion of rigid designation can be 
maintained independently of restrictions on logical possibility by realizing that it 
requires only de re modal stability. Hacking’s interpretation rests on the hidden, 
and implausible, premise that if a word ordinarily functions as a rigid designator it 
always fulfils a referential role.46 In pain of tautological triviality, an expression 
                                                 
46 I take my view to be advantageous in that it does not allow metaphysical necessities 
pertaining to concreta to restrict logical possibilities. It permits the retention by possible 
worlds talk of its expressive functions relating to (unrestricted) logical modalities. It also 
allows us to adhere to an explication (although not, of course, a reduction) of logical 
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designates an object in the concrete realm only when it picks out res. Logical 
possibility, being typically de dicto, not, as Hacking supposes, de re, is such that 
when words appear in statements of logical possibility, even if they ordinarily 
designate res (and even if they do so rigidly), they lose their ordinary referents. A 
statement of logical possibility makes no predication concerning concrete reality, 
so there is no reference to that reality.47 Whatever its initial implausibility, this 
view unites the semantics and the epistemology of de dicto modal claims and, as I 
will outline, it saves us from some less plausible accounts of logical possibility 
inspired by the new essentialism. My claim that words which ordinarily name lose 
their (usual) referents in modal locutions de dicto is after the fashion of the 
Fregean claim,48 rightly described as no ‘mere dodge’ by Dummett [1967](1978, 
105; cf. 1973, 90-91, 190, 266), that expressions which refer in ordinary (i.e., 
transparent) contexts lose their referents in opaque contexts, referring instead to 
their senses.49 
                                                                                                                 
modalities in terms of contradiction, whereas if this was to be admitted on Hacking’s 
account then that would involve an unacceptable, and, I do not doubt, unworkable, revision 
of the standard notion of contradiction. It will be apparent that my view is entirely at odds 
with Putnam’s one-time suggestion (1975, 233) that ‘Once we have discovered that water 
(in the actual world) is H2O, nothing counts as a possible world in which water isn’t H2O. 
In particular, if a “logically possible” statement is one that holds in some “logically possible 
world”, it isn’t logically possible that water isn’t H2O.’ On my account a metaphysical 
impossibility such as the impossibility (granting that it is one) of water being anything other 
than H2O does not translate into the (spurious) logical impossibility mentioned by Putnam. 
Putnam has more recently written (1990, 69) that ‘a criterion of substance-identity that 
handles Twin Earth cases’ will not ‘extend handily to “possible worlds”’, since substance-
identity involves logically contingent laws of nature. This motivates the comments that ‘the 
question, “What is the necessary and sufficient condition for being water in all possible 
worlds?” makes no sense...this means that I now reject “metaphysical necessity”’ (1990, 
70). Given Putnam’s change of view, the rejection of metaphysical necessity is not 
necessary: what is necessary is the rejection of the idea that all metaphysical necessities 
hold in all logically possible worlds. Accordingly, in contrast to Putnam (1990, 56-57, 71), 
physical necessity is classifiable as a species of metaphysical necessity, since the latter 
encompasses considerations concerning the natures of contingent existents. 
47 According to Read (1995, 109): ‘genuine names pick out an item in the actual world and 
maintain that reference in any modal context’. That, however, would undermine the 
standard notion of logical possibility. In defending his ‘moderate realism’ about possible 
worlds Read (1995, 106-117) does not distinguish between logical and metaphysical 
modalities. Further, he describes (1995, 109) ‘necessarily, Cicero is Tully’ as a ‘de re modal 
truth’. This last is a typically Kripkean, although well-entrenched, mistake: its lineage laces 
the history of modern empiricism, from whence it is inherited by contemporary essentialists. 
48 As Angelelli (1967, 63) indicates, Frege himself had little interest in the modalities. 
However, this historical point is no obstacle to an application of the Fregean claim to the 
modal case. Frege [1879](1980, 4-5) displays crudity in his brief comments on possibility, 
e.g., in that he presents ‘“a chill may result in death”’ as a case in which ‘a proposition is 
presented as possible’. 
49 Although Frege held that sentences containing non-referring terms such as ‘the present 
king of France’ lacked truth-value he did not deny that they had sense. Thus, only in 
extensional contexts is the lack of truth-value of a constituent sentence deemed, by Fregean 
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 The postulation of senses is not, contra R.M. Martin (1987, 185), an ad 
hoc manoeuvre designed to cope with opaque contexts. Rather, as Dummett 
suggests, the distinction between sense and reference is indispensable to the 
maintenance of a distinction between grasp of meaning and knowledge of truth-
value. A theory which is equipped with the distinction is, in turn, equipped to 
handle opaque contexts. Dummett (1973, 90) comments that to postulate sense 
merely as a means of coping with opacity would be to postulate sense on a poorly-
reasoned basis: but the sense/reference distinction is sanctioned, and indeed shown 
to be needed, by independent considerations, i.e. those pertaining in extensional 
contexts (1973, 91, 143). That the distinction equips us to cope with opacity is one 
of its virtues, not its predominant rationale. My claim that words which ordinarily 
name lose their (usual) references in modal locutions de dicto involves no breach 
of compositionality: it accords with the Fregean principle enunciated by Dummett 
(1973, 153) that the ‘sense of a complex sentence is...composed of the senses of its 
constituents’. 
 I follow Dummett (1973, 268-269) in eschewing the Fregean notion of 
indirect sense. Accordingly, an expression in an opaque context retains its ordinary 
sense and that sense becomes its reference. Thus, opaque contexts breach another 
Fregean principle enunciated by Dummett (1973, 84, 91), namely, that the referent 
of an expression is never a constituent of the meaning of a complex sentence in 
which it features.50 This is apposite to the modal case, since, for a class of analytic 
necessities (i.e., those the knowledge of which requires neither proof nor 
                                                                                                                 
lights, to render the complex sentence in which it features neither true nor false. It should be 
noted that the employment of a broadly Fregean notion of sense entails no universally 
platonistic commitment, since it can be held that there are senses which are ontologically 
dependent upon language-users. We ought not to balk at the suggestion that, accordingly, 
some broadly logical necessities are ontologically dependent upon us. Cf. Hymers (1996, 
604): ‘concepts have no existence outside cognitive practices [so analytic truths have] no 
existence outside such practices either’. If there had been no notion of marriage, there 
would have been no concept bachelor, but it is broadly logically necessary that bachelors 
are unmarried men. To say that it is true in all possible worlds is just to say, in this case, that 
it is constitutive of the very concepts at issue that bachelors are unmarried men. The truth of 
the claim that bachelors are unmarried men is secured by the very concepts themselves. In 
accordance with the distinction between ontologically dependent abstracta and pure 
abstracta (Dummett (1973, 509-510); Divers (1990, 253)) only the latter are abstracta as 
traditionally, i.e., platonistically, conceived, since the latter but not the former are not 
ontologically dependent upon concreta. Contra R.M. Martin (1987, 183-185), the 
postulation of sense does not involve us in subjectivism; the thesis of the objectivity of 
sense is no more problematic than the thesis of the public nature of meaning. 
50 For exegesis of the Fregean principle, see Dummett (1973, Chapter 5). The principle 
goes unheeded by Jubien (1993, 23 and passim), who identifies the notion of reference with 
that of (Russellian) propositional constituency, i.e., the idea—adopted by Fine (1995, 
276)—that the ordinary referents of terms are constituents of the propositions in which the 
terms occur. The latter view is of the kind which the Fregean sense/reference distinction is 
designed specifically to avoid. Thus, what Jubien christens ‘the Fallacy of Reference’ in 
fact designates two separate theses which, far from being identical, are not necessarily in 
harmony. 
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calculation), grasp of meaning and grasp of truth-value coincide.51 (Analyticity 
does not require non-informativeness. Once this is realized there is no need to 
claim, as does Hymers (1996, 604), that we do not know the truth value of 
Goldbach’s conjecture because we do not fully understand its meaning in the 
absence of proof. Rather, Goldbach’s conjecture is a case in which grasp of 
meaning is insufficient for knowledge of truth-value.52) 
 Since the notion of rigid designation is related to that of essence, it is 
explicable only in terms of constancy in de re modal contexts, not in terms of 
retention of reference in all modal contexts, since rigid designators (often, i.e. at 
least where their ordinary referents are concreta) lose their references in 
sentential modal contexts.53 The philosopher who thinks this outrageous or 
intuitively unappealing should consider the cost of its rejection, namely the 
acceptance of an unduly restrictive and philosophically inutile revision of the 
notion of logical possibility. (In addition, some of the philosophical views which 
motivate the rejection of the position I adopt are inherently unattractive: they 
contain excessively extensionalist elements which involve the seeming repudiation 
of the sense/reference distinction.) 
 Hacking (1975, 333) holds that ‘in the domain of the “logical”, Kripke’s 
scheme enables us to treat nonrigid designators as ranging over a set of 
“stipulated” individuals’. That is why, according to Hacking, it is true that it is 
logically possible for the present Queen of England to have had parents other than 
George VI and his wife Elizabeth.  My account, however, admits the truth of it is 
(logically) possible that Elizabeth II is not the daughter of George VI and his wife 
Elizabeth. It admits that truth even if we take it that Elizabeth II is the actual 
biological product we believe her to be, since logical possibility is not pertinent to 
concrete entities. 
 Hacking may have been misled into thinking that Kripke is offering a new 
notion of ‘de re logical possibility’ by some comments which Kripke actually 
makes. 54 The comments I have in mind include the following examples: 
                                                 
51 The view, rejected by Wiggins (1974, 339) that ‘if two words have each, by our own 
making, the same sense then we must know that they have the same sense’ does not follow 
from my view: rather, when we know what each of two such words means we will have a 
case of analytic knowledge. Analyticity concerns not words—any word might have had a 
different meaning—but meanings. (Given my general philosophical indebtedness to 
Wiggins I note, for the record, that I disagree with the anti-Fregean approach to genuine 
proper names he adopts at (1974, 338-339). His position is seemingly predicated upon the 
supposition that the retention of Fregean sense for proper names leads to anti-Kripkean 
descriptivism. I agree with Dummett (1973, 97-98) that descriptivism is unessential to a 
Fregean view.) 
52 I am indebted to Bob Hale for pointing out a previous deficiency in my discussion of the 
relationship between grasp of meaning and grasp of truth-value in the analytic case. 
53 Burge (1977, esp. 347) is suggestive of an exception to this principle, in that the presence 
of some—specifically indexical—elements in a construction which displays the de dicto 
syntactic form entails that it involves paradigmatic predication de re.  
54 Hacking (1975, 334) mentions ‘central de re Kripkean logical possibility’.  
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characteristic theoretical identifications like ‘Heat is the motion of 
molecules’, are not contingent truths but necessary truths, and here of 
course I don’t mean just physically necessary, but necessary in the 
highest degree—whatever that means. (Physical necessity, might turn 
out to be necessity in the highest degree. But that’s a question I don’t 
wish to prejudge. At least for this sort of example, it might be that when 
something’s physically necessary, it always is necessary tout court.) 
(1980, 99)  
 
The third lecture [of Naming and Necessity] suggests that a good deal of 
what contemporary philosophy regards as mere physical necessity is 
actually necessary tout court. (1980, 164) 
 
Necessity ‘in the highest degree’ is usually taken to be logical necessity, i.e., truth 
in all possible worlds. This may lead Kripke’s readers to suppose that he takes the 
logical modalities to concern concrete entities (and thus to be centrally de re). 
Kripke’s account is ambiguous on this point and the ambiguity allows 
interpretations like that of Hacking to get off the ground. However, Hacking’s 
interpretation can be refuted and Kripke’s account can be tidied up. Since Kripke 
comments that non-logical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree he may 
be read as implying that logical possibility is restricted by true statements of 
metaphysical necessity de re.55 My earlier suggestion that metaphysical and 
logical modalities can and should be distinguished is at odds with such a tenet. I 
will now try to show that a similar distinction is in fact employed by Kripke, but 
that it is not consistently—or at least not always clearly—applied by him, this 
latter fact enabling Hacking’s account to have some basis in what Kripke actually 
writes. It will be recalled that one of the considerations with which I attempted to 
justify my distinction between logical and metaphysical modalities was that 
logically necessary truths contrast with statements of metaphysical necessity de re 
in that the former are taken to hold independently of considerations as to what 
exists (or, at the very least, as to what exists contingently). Logical necessity can 
be explicated in terms of truth in all possible worlds. Where metaphysical 
necessity is concerned this need not be the case, because the relevant objects can 
be such that they need not exist. Kripke (1980, 102) claims that ‘“Hesperus” and 
“Phosphorous”, when used as names, are rigid designators. They refer in every 
possible world to the planet Venus’. One might suspect that Kripke is here in 
danger of identifying logical and metaphysical modalities, but he is more careful, 
stating that ‘when I say “Hesperus is Phosphorous” is necessarily true, I of course 
                                                 
55 My account has been permeated with the distinction, drawn by Wiggins (e.g., 1980, 110, 
214), between a necessarily true statement and a true statement of metaphysical necessity de 
re. If incorporated into Kripke’s account this important and neglected distinction banishes 
much confusion. 
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do not deny that situations might have obtained in which there was no Hesperus 
and no Phosphorous’ (1980, 109).56 
 The possibility is thus open that there are worlds in which ‘Hesperus is 
Phosphorus’ is not true, since there are worlds in which Venus does not exist.57 
This is consistent with the considerations regarding contingency and existence 
which I recruited in my drive for a distinction between logical and metaphysical 
modalities. Other important issues are outstanding, however, and they will be 
addressed after the following digression. 
 
Digression: Univocity and Strength 
 
An issue which has lingered covertly in my considerations of the differences 
between logical and metaphysical modality is that of whether ‘necessity’ and 
‘possibility’ are univocal (i.e. whether each has a single sense). A separate, 
although sometimes undiscriminated issue,58 is that of whether all necessity is of 
one strength, or whether objective non-logical necessity is somehow weaker or less 
binding than logical necessity. I regard the latter issue as more interesting than the 
former, as much for the rhetorical role it has played in the implicit debate between 
empiricists and Aristotelian realists as for its intrinsic philosophical merits. I 
suspect that much that has been written about it has largely missed the boat, resting 
on a failure by disputants on both sides to separate distinct issues regarding logical 
force on the one hand and metaphysics on the other. In this respect, the disputants 
have truly been talking at cross-purposes, the empiricists aiming to establish the 
superior strength of the notion of logical necessity over any (purported) notion of 
metaphysical necessity, the Aristotelians aiming to establish that, where a 
metaphysical necessity holds, its binding force, from a metaphysical point of view, 
is no less than is the case in respect of any other sort of necessity. One suspects 
that both sides have viewed themselves as challenging the other, but with neither 
fully realizing what the other is actually proposing. If we distinguish between the 
logical force of modal notions and the ontological force of the modalities, we can 
accept that there is a sense in which logical necessity is the strongest necessity and 
that this need not conflict with the essentialist claim that (there is another sense in 
which) metaphysical necessity is at least as strong as logical necessity. I will 
explain this in due course; first let us consider the univocity thesis. 
                                                 
56 He does not wish to involve himself in questions relating to the truth-value and modal 
status of the assertion in such situations. 
57 See 2.2 for a fuller account of the implications of this point, including an account of why 
the appeal to weak necessity is unsatisfactory. There, I contended that de re modal 
attributions are typically committed to the actual existence of their subjects. Thus, I am 
committed to the view that free logic—i.e, in the words of Hughes and Cresswell (1996), 
293), ‘logic “free” of existential assumptions’—cannot provide such attributions with the 
correct semantics. I am grateful to E.J. Lowe for comments on this. 
58 The two issues are conflated by Fisk (1973, 27-28). 
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 Modal notions come in species. The univocity thesis is not incompatible 
with this idea, because from the premise that ‘necessity’ has a single sense it does 
not follow that the notion of necessity comes in only one species.59 In this, matters 
are no different from the case of the word ‘mammal’. The possibility of qualifying 
a word in order to render and distinguish specific (derivative, technical or semi-
technical) senses of the word (e.g., as in the cases of ‘terrestrial mammal’, ‘aquatic 
mammal’, ‘logical necessity’ and ‘metaphysical necessity’) does not preclude that 
word from having a single overarching sense. So, even if the univocity thesis 
holds, it poses no threat to the distinction I make between logical and metaphysical 
necessity qua notions: each is a subject-specific qualification of the general notion 
of a restriction or compulsion which does not admit of deviation. There is no 
entailment relation (in either direction) between any decision regarding the 
univocity thesis and any position regarding the issue of strength. 
 Those who take it that non-logical modalities function (solely or 
primarily) as sentential operators distinguish between, for example, epistemic 
possibility (which relates to ignorance of the truth-value of a statement) and 
objective notions of possibility, such as logical, metaphysical and physical 
possibility, in the following manner.60 It is held (e.g. by McFetridge (1990, 136-
137) and Hale (1996, 93-95)) that the objective possibility that p, but not the 
epistemic possibility that p, entails the logical possibility that p. (For example, on a 
classical account, our ignorance of the truth or falsity of Goldbach’s conjecture 
does not entail that it is logically possible that it is false: that is what is at issue.) 
One way in which objective non-logical necessity is then understood to be weaker 
than logical necessity is as follows: whatever is logically necessary is non-logically 
necessary, whereas whatever is non-logically necessary need not be logically 
necessary.61 In relation to physical necessity Bacon (1981, 134) expresses this as: 
                                                 
59 Cf. Hacking (1967, 159-162, 164). According to Fisk (1973, 26): ‘Physical and logical 
necessity are distinguished not by distinguishing two species of necessity but by 
distinguishing the physical from the logical truths to which the necessity applies.’ However, 
his account rests upon his erroneous explication of physical necessity as of the form (I) —
i.e., ‘it is necessary that p’—despite his description, here and elsewhere, of physical 
necessity as de re. He fails adequately to distinguish necessarily true statements and true 
statements of physical necessity. 
60 I embrace the distinction, but I believe this cannot be the correct way to draw it, since 
this way distorts the logico-grammatical form of the non-logical modalities. 
61 Cf. McFetridge (1990, 136-137): ‘On certain traditional assumptions...if it is logically 
necessary that p, then it is necessary that p in any other use of the notion of necessity there 
may be (physically, practically etc.). But...the converse need not be the case.’ Also, cf. Hale 
(1996, 94-95). On such accounts, the notion of strength is explicated such that if the 
necessity1 of a proposition always entails that the proposition is necessary2 without the 
converse being the case, then necessity1 is stronger than necessity2. In accordance with his 
adoption of this explication of the notion of strength—i.e., in this context, logical force—
Hale (1996, 95) comments that friends of the notion of metaphysical necessity ‘are 
committed, at the very least’ to denying that logical necessity is the strongest necessity. It 
will be apparent, from my vehement denial of the appropriateness of the de dicto form to (at 
least) a large class of metaphysical necessities, that I am not that kind of friend and that I 
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‘physical necessity follows from logical necessity, but not vice versa’. Such a view 
has already been rejected on the grounds that physical necessity, qua species of 
metaphysical necessity de re, does not admit of explication in terms of the de dicto 
form (I). In a more recent account, which has affinities with Bacon’s view, the late 
Ian McFetridge sought to establish not only that there is no necessity stronger than 
logical necessity, but that logical necessity is the strongest necessity. It is clear that 
it is logical force which is his concern, rather than the strength of the ontological 
compulsions which might attend the objective modalities. McFetridge (1990, 136-
137) outlines the ‘traditional assumption’ that, where objective modal notions are 
concerned, ‘if it is logically necessary that p, then it is necessary that p in any other 
use of the notion of necessity there may be (physically, practically, etc.). 
But...something could be e.g. physically necessary without being logically 
necessary.’ 
 McFetridge seeks to defend this traditional assumption. However, we 
have already noted that it cannot do the job of showing that logical necessity is the 
strongest necessity, because not all notions of possibility and necessity can be 
portrayed via the use of sentential modal operators. If the account of metaphysical 
necessity de re that I have adopted is correct then at least a large class of such 
modality cannot function in the manner required by McFetridge’s account. 
 According to McFetridge (1990, 137), ‘if the person [who has made a 
claim of the form “Necessarily, p”] will accept no non-epistemic sense in which it 
is possible that not-p, his...claim did involve the strongest necessity i.e. (on the 
traditional assumption) “logical” necessity’. 
 In relation to this claim two points should be observed. Firstly, if the 
account of essentialist claims that I have adopted (after Wiggins) is correct, then 
(at least a large class of) claims employing the notion of metaphysical necessity 
are not of the form ‘Necessarily, p’. Here McFetridge displays an attitude similar 
to that of those obstinate empiricists who refuse to recognize any role for 
modalities except that of functioning as operators on dicta.62 Since the objective 
                                                                                                                 
take Hale’s claim to be incorrect. In light of my account of metaphysical necessity, I neither 
assert nor deny the claim attributed by Hale to the friend of metaphysical necessity, since 
both courses involve the distortion of the true form of de re modal claims (which I take to 
relate to typical instances of metaphysical necessities and possibilities). Hale’s claim is 
incorrect for the further reason that the defender of metaphysical necessity need not be 
committed to the denial of the thesis that the logical force of logical necessity is greater than 
that of metaphysical necessity if, as I will indicate below, that thesis can be explicated 
independently of the method adopted by McFetridge and Hale with its attendant distortion 
of the form of modal attributions involving objective non-logical modalities. 
62 Consider this remark (1990, 137-138, my emphasis), which overlooks the venerable idea 
that there is a kind of necessity that is not propositional at all: 
 
There might be views which held that there were at least two notions of 
necessity, only one of which was involved in ascriptions of validity, and 
which were incommensurable in strength: some propositions possess the 
‘logical’ notion of necessity but lack the other one, while others possess 
this latter notion of necessity but are not logically necessary.  
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modalities are not exhausted by those which admit of unproblematic de dicto 
expression, some of them drop out of (proper) consideration in McFetridge’s 
argument. Secondly, even granting that all objective necessity is de dicto, there is 
an obvious gap in McFetridge’s argument: the conclusion that there is a strongest 
notion of necessity does not follow from his premises. At best, as Hale (1996, 98) 
observes, the argument shows only that there is no notion of necessity stronger 
than logical necessity. 
 Even if there is an objective sense in which it is possible that a true 
statement of metaphysical necessity is false, it does not follow that metaphysical 
necessity is weaker, in point of ontological compulsion, than the necessity 
corresponding to the relevant possibility. Since the argument that McFetridge 
offers is concerned with the logical force of notions of necessity, rather than with 
their strength in point of ontological compulsion, this point may be regarded as of 
dubious merits. However, part of the import of the point is that it indicates the lack 
of observance, in McFetridge’s argument, of any distinction between a necessarily 
true statement and a true statement of metaphysical necessity. Also, in so far as 
that argument can be seen as an attempt to rebuff the essentialist, it is worth 
pointing out that, were an essentialist to claim that metaphysical necessity is 
absolute, the claim being made might be a metaphysical claim, rather than a claim 
about the logical force of modal notions. Kripke is a realist about metaphysical 
necessity, and where he claims that it is (perhaps) necessity in the highest degree 
he may be viewed as making a metaphysical claim about that real necessity (which 
may be seen as a rebuke to orthodox views of Humean descent), not a claim about 
the logical force of a notion of necessity. It is unfortunate, though, that Kripke 
describes ‘theoretical identifications like “Heat is the motion of molecules”’ as 
‘not contingent truths but necessary truths’ (1980, 99) since this conflates true 
statements of metaphysical necessity and necessarily true statements; a conflation 
which I take to be contrary to the spirit of Kripke’s essentialism and inconsistent 
with any cogent essentialism. 
 Wiggins claims that the constraints on conceiving de re (set out at 1980, 
106) embodied in his essentialism concern  
 
a necessity that is not in the narrow sense logical necessity. But its 
strength (contrast certainty) is equal to that of logical necessity. For 
once the theoretically fundamental sortal property f is fixed upon and its 
extension comes to light, it is not for thought to renege even 
hypothetically upon the determination of how a thing falling within that 
extension has to be in order to [be] an f ([to] belong to f). That would 
weaken thought’s grip of its object. If f determines an ultimate 
sort...then there is nothing else that a particular entity falling inside the 
sort could oblige the conventionalist by acquiescing to become instead. 
To be, for such a thing just is to comply with this ultimate or near 
ultimate concept f. (1980, 146) 
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This seems to me to be a clear case in which the strength in question concerns the 
ontological compulsion involved in real necessity de re, rather than the 
comparative logical force of logical and non-logical modalities. This is manifested 
by the deictic-nomological background of Wiggins’s claims, and by his emphasis 
on being and the extensional. Were the friend of metaphysical necessity to claim 
that such necessity is at least as strong, in this (ontological) sense, as any other 
necessity, then that claim would be very different from any claim about strength in 
the (logical force) sense which concerns McFetridge and Hale. Furthermore, no 
stance on the latter issue threatens the ontological claim. 
 Another way in which notions of objective non-logical necessity are 
understood to be weaker than the notion of logical necessity relates to the 
explication of modal notions via the possible worlds device. Since the class of 
logically possible worlds is held to be more inclusive than the class of 
metaphysically or physically possible worlds, it is held that logical possibility is 
weaker than these other modal notions, and accordingly that logical necessity is 
stronger than metaphysical or physical necessity since logical necessities, unlike 
non-logical necessities, pertain in (unrestrictedly) all possible worlds. Unlike the 
explication, adhered to by Bacon, McFetridge and Hale, of strength in terms of the 
‘traditional assumption’, I take this to constitute a convincing heuristic by which 
the notion of logical necessity can be shown to be stronger, in point of logical 
force, than all other objective notions of necessity. What does not follow, however, 
is that the ontological compulsion involved in real metaphysical necessities is any 
weaker than that involved in logical necessities; the former may even be stronger, 
in this sense, than the latter.63 
 Real metaphysical necessities de re hold in virtue of the natures of entities 
in the actual world. That such necessities do not hold in all logically possible 
worlds should cause the essentialist no chagrin. True statements of metaphysical 
modality de re, unlike true statements of logical modality, are typically relative to 
the natures of actual entities.64 It is indeed the case that (at least a large class of) 
metaphysical necessities are relative in the sense that there is an objective notion of 
possibility in light of which it is possible that statements of those necessities are 
false. The denial of a true statement of metaphysical necessity may constitute a 
logical possibility, as I will attempt to show later in this chapter. So, although there 
is an intelligible sense in which logical necessity is stronger than metaphysical or 
                                                 
63 The lack of entailment from the logical force point to the ontological point is all the more 
pertinent given that the possible worlds device is not genuinely explicative of the 
metaphysics of modality. 
64 This points to the well-worn distinction (mentioned at 3.2) between necessity and 
essentiality, since many necessities which hold of individuals, sometimes called ‘trivially 
essential’, are such that they are not aptly explained in terms of the individual’s nature. It is 
necessary for Socrates to be such that he is not both seated and unseated, but this, many 
essentialists take it, is not a truth deriving from the specific nature exemplified by Socrates. 
Rather, its truth derives from a priori logical principles. That is one reason why I hold that 
metaphysical modalities de re are typically, rather than always, relative to natures. 
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physical necessity, it does not follow that this conclusion carries with it any 
metaphysical weight: it does not show that the relevant non-logical necessity is in 
fact less ontologically binding than logical necessity. For the essentialist, other 
possible worlds need not always reflect real possibilities. The possible worlds 
device is intended to be expressive of metaphysical, physical, and especially 
logical modalities. But, as we have seen, logical possibilities are not substantive 
and only substantive possibilities are real in the sense of relating to concrete 
entities; which is not, of course, to dispute the objective status attributed to logical 
possibility. The essentialist, then, can suggest that logical necessity is no stronger 
(in the metaphysical sense) than metaphysical necessity de re, since logically 
possible worlds are not real in the sense that substantive metaphysical possibilities 
are real. (Most of those who employ the possible worlds device do so, in any case, 
because of its expressive power and heuristic utility, particularly in relation to 
logical modality, rather than through any metaphysical commitment.) 
 
Kripke, Metaphysical Necessity, Possible Worlds  
 
I distinguished, at 3.2, between metaphysical and logical modalities, the latter of 
which, but not the former, I take to be unrestricted. (The distinction was illustrated 
using the case of the modal status of Leibniz’s principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles within his system.) In accordance with the account I offer, not all 
possible worlds express real metaphysical possibility: possible worlds talk is wider 
in that it is expressive of merely logical possibility. The possible worlds device 
will fail to secure many of the benefits widely purported to accrue to its 
employment if it is precluded from handling logical modalities, since it is primarily 
intended to provide an extensional semantics for discourse involving sentential 
modal operators. 
 Kripke (1980, 35) classifies the notion of necessity as metaphysical and 
the notion of the a priori as epistemological. There is some obscurity as to whether 
Kripke intends to describe all necessity as metaphysical, or whether he is referring 
only to necessity de re. This is compounded by what Wiggins (1974, e.g, 328) has 
called the ‘metalinguistic’ trappings of Kripke’s account of necessity de re: for 
example, Kripke goes on to speak, apparently without heed to the de re/de dicto 
distinction, of this metaphysical notion of necessity as relating to the truth or 
falsity of statements.65 I hold that Kripke’s account is consistent with mine in that 
he regards metaphysical and logical modalities as distinct. I also contend, however, 
that although this commitment is central to the spirit of Kripke’s essentialism, it is 
something which he fails to honour: in this he is no different from many of his 
essentialist contemporaries and successors.66 There is additional ambiguity in 
                                                 
65 This is despite Kripke [1971](1977, 67). The tendency will be illustrated forthwith. The 
criticism applies whether or not the ‘metaphysical notion’ of necessity relates to all 
necessity or solely to necessity de re as pertinent to concreta. 
66 My claim concerning the spirit of Kripke’s essentialism is supported by comments he 
himself makes, e.g., [1971](1977, 69), where he recognizes that cases of modality de re 
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Kripke’s account relating to the role of possible worlds talk. This ambiguity is, in 
my view, contributory to the genesis of interpretations such as that offered by 
Hacking (1975, esp. 333-335). Having shown that Kripke does indeed endorse a 
distinction between logical and metaphysical modalities I will suggest that the 
ambiguity as to the function of possible worlds talk can and should be clarified. 
 I have already commented that Kripke regards not all necessary truths as 
logical necessities, on the basis that Kripke regards ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ as 
necessary but does not take it to be true in all possible worlds. Although Kripke 
writes of non-logical necessary truths, we can, following Wiggins, more aptly say 
that objective non-logical necessities are expressed by true statements of 
metaphysical necessity de re, rather than necessary truths. Although Kripke seems, 
in some sense, to favour the view that logical and metaphysical necessities are 
equally binding, he regards not all metaphysical necessities as logical 
necessities.67 He does not explicate a notion of de re logical possibility at all and 
he recognizes that logical modalities are typically de dicto. So, Hacking’s belief 
that Kripke proposes a de re revision of the standard notion of logical possibility is 
unjustified. Although Kripke recognizes a distinction between logical necessity 
and the necessity which features in modal attributions about contingent existents, 
he might have been more careful so as to fully preserve and respect the distinction. 
(One such respect—his depiction of metaphysical necessity de re in terms of 
‘necessary truth’—has already been observed.) 
 Possible worlds talk is held to be valuable in virtue of its expressive 
utility. (We need not hold that this is an advantage which possible worlds talk has 
over other modal talk. Like Kripke, we can view it as heuristically useful, without 
deeming possible worlds talk philosophically or expressively superior to modal 
discourse free of such talk. I will proceed to suggest that possible worlds talk has 
expressive capabilities which outstrip and, if we are not careful, undercut, 
essentialist theses.) For the modal primitivist, the value of possible worlds talk is 
primarily heuristic. Such talk is intended, among other things, to express logical 
modalities. It is here, however, where certain rather dangerous ambiguities arise in 
Kripke’s account. Kripke (1980, 15) writes: 
 
if one wishes to avoid the Weltangst and philosophical confusions that 
many philosophers have associated with the ‘worlds’ 
terminology...‘possible state (or history) of the world’, or 
‘counterfactual situation’ might be better. One should even remind 
oneself that the ‘worlds’ terminology can often be replaced by modal 
talk—‘It is possible that...’  
                                                                                                                 
concern objects, not statements, although, as I have commented at 2.2. above, the letter of 
his formulations in which de re necessity is held to feature misrepresents its form. 
67 As is evidenced by his admonition that the necessity which features in modal attributions 
concerning contingent existents be interpreted ‘weakly’ [1971](1977, 68). Nevertheless, the 
notion of weak necessity advanced therein is misbegotten, since it attaches to statements 
and cannot, therefore, properly be expressive of such attributions. 
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The alternative terminologies which Kripke suggests are of dubious merits. For, 
example, a statement of merely logical possibility can be such that it could not be, 
or even have been, true of the actual world at all. Logical possibility statements 
make no predications concerning concrete entities: rather, their content is purely 
conceptual. For this reason, ‘possible state (or history) of the world’ terminology 
will fail to equal the expressive (and semantic) power allegedly attaching to 
worldly terminology, since the former will fail to encompass (true) statements of 
merely logical possibility. There are logically possible statements which could not 
feature in true descriptions of possible states or histories of the actual world. This 
is a corollary of a point explained by Burgess (1996, 25): 
 
possibility in the ‘metaphysical’ sense of what (is or isn’t but) 
potentially could have been the case is not to be analyzed as or 
conflated with possibility in the ‘logical’ sense of what it is not logically 
or analytically self-contradictory to assert or assume actually is the 
case. 
 
Accordingly, Kripke’s suggestion (1980, 18; cf. 20, 48 n. 15) that possible worlds 
are total ‘“ways the world might have been”, or state histories of the entire world’ 
is unacceptable, since if it is taken up then possible worlds terminology cannot 
express merely logical modalities, i.e., the very modalities which motivate their 
introduction. Similarly, there are logical possibilities which are not translatable 
into ‘counterfactual situation’ terminology so long as the ‘counterfactual 
situations’ are taken to concern ways this entity and/or the world might have been. 
McFetridge (1990, 135-154) argues for the indispensability of the notion of logical 
necessity on the basis that it is integral to the whole project of reasoning from 
suppositions: it will already be clear, on the basis of previous comments, that these 
suppositions will be suppositions that p. I suggest that the value of logical 
possibility is very closely related. The notion of logical possibility allows us to 
make suppositions which are wildly contrary-to-fact. Thus we can reason from 
suppositions of the form (I) (‘It is possible that p’) which do not qualify as ways 
the world might have been at all (and which do not describe any concrete entities 
at all). In this sense, logical possibility is truly unrestricted. The next section 
illustrates how the permissiveness of the notion of logical possibility relates to its 
value. 
 
4.4 Logical Possibility: Its Nature and Value 
 
Strictly and Broadly Logical Possibility 
 
A distinction may be made between logical modalities narrowly and broadly 
conceived.68 Thereby, strict logical possibility involves the absence of formal 
                                                 
68 Cf. Haack (1978, 173) and Hale (1996, 94). 
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contradiction. Broadly logical possibility, in turn, arises from the meanings of non-
logical terms, rather than just the logical constants.69 Both conceptions involve 
meaning: the distinction arises from the locus of the meaning at issue in each 
case.70 There is no strict formal contradiction involved in a supposition to the 
effect that bachelors may be married. The meanings of noun phrases are irrelevant 
to strictly logical modalities. In accordance with the integral role of logical 
modalities in the practice of reasoning from suppositions, logical possibility is 
unrestricted in that even broadly logical impossibilities may be strictly logically 
possible. 
 Strictly logical possibility is more liberal than broadly logical possibility. 
I am motivated to attach some importance to the distinction partly by a desire to 
avoid the conflation of substantive and merely logical modalities. Such conflation 
might arise from extensionalist views of meaning, as embodied, for example, in 
Putnam (1975, 215-271).71 Given the recognition that the meanings of non-logical 
terms have a determining influence upon broadly logical modalities, the danger is 
that the extensionalist will be tempted to let extensional factors impinge upon the 
determination of those modalities. As we have seen, Putnam (1975, 233; contrast 
1983, 63-64) has succumbed to this temptation, as have other philosophers of 
essentialist persuasion.72 I do not retract my commitment that logical modalities, 
                                                 
69 On my account, this precludes neither broadly logical impossibilities not reducible to 
contradictions nor logical necessities not reducible to logical truths. 
70 Cf. Wiggins (1979, 156 nt. 27): 
 
logical truth is...forced upon us by the meanings of the logical constants. 
By this criterion not even ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ qualifies. 
Because logical necessity in the useful and strict sense is exigent, the 
species of possibility which is its dual is hopelessly permissive. 
 
The distinction is implicit in Quine (1980, 20-24); cf. Romanos (1983, 109). As should 
already be clear, Plantinga’s excessive conception (e.g., 1974, v, 1-2), mistakenly intended 
to include the necessity pertaining to essential attributions, of ‘broadly logical necessity’ is 
rejected on my account. 
71 Putnam (1975, 227) comments that ‘“meanings” just ain’t in the head’. As should be 
clear from my approach to logical modalities, the extensionalist has no monopoly on the 
thesis of the objectivity of meaning. 
72 According to Seddon (1972, 483): 
 
One move is to argue that although the statement that ‘A bar of iron 
floats on water’ is not explicitly self-contradictory, it is implicitly so, for 
we are saying that a mineral with a specific gravity of less than one (i.e. 
it floats), has a specific gravity in the range 7.3-7.8 (i.e. it is iron), and 
this is a contradiction, and is therefore logically impossible. 
 
This move is adopted by Rasmussen (1977; 1983). I take the contrary view, deeming 
matters concerning real definition entirely irrelevant to considerations regarding the logical 
modalities. 
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broadly or narrowly conceived, are non-substantive. I urge that the intensions of 
ordinary names for concrete objects, but not their extensions, bear upon the 
determination of broadly logical modalities.73 This is consistent with the 
conceptualist realist approach to essence and modality de re that I adopt. So far as 
concerns the logical modalities, facts about the natures of concrete entities and 
deictic-nomological restraints upon conceiving of such entities are irrelevant. So 
far as concerns the modalities, reference to concrete natures bears only upon the 
objective non-logical modalities. Allowing extensional factors to impinge upon 
logical possibility, I will suggest, undermines the utility of the notion. 
 Given that only intensional meaning is admissible as a determinant of 
broadly logical modalities, it may be suggested that there is no need to place much 
emphasis on the distinction between strictly and broadly logical modalities. The 
extensionalist has been warded off: the threatened conflation of substantive and 
merely logical modalities is no longer immanent. However, the distinction has 
additional value in that it accords well with the considerations relating to reasoning 
from suppositions to which I have alluded. It allows for situations in which a 
reasoner may lack the relevant epistemic background pertaining to broadly logical 
modalities (i.e. the reasoner may lack knowledge of the relevant intensions: this 
accords with the Fregean thesis of the objectivity of sense). Benardete (1962, 346 
n. 3) suggests that there ‘is no contradiction, in the strict formal logical sense, in 
asserting that some ideas are made of tin, yet that freedom from self-contradiction 
does not suffice to make the thing logically possible’.74 However, Benardete’s 
claim is at best arbitrary, if not question-begging. If a construction is 
grammatically well-formed and declarative, i.e., if we are really dealing with a 
statement, and if that statement embodies no formal contradiction, then it is 
logically possible in the strict sense. In view of the objective status of logical 
modality it is not surprising that logical impossibilities may escape detection and 
can even be believed.75 
 
Logical Possibility: Elimination, Revision, Conservation  
 
                                                 
73 Cf. Strawson (1966, 225). 
74 Interestingly, and in contrast, a similar example, ‘the sound of a trombone is blue’, was 
offered by Russell (1940, 170) as ‘perhaps’ a logical possibility. Such examples, called 
‘selection errors’ by syntactic theorists after Chomsky (e.g., 1965), are described by 
Wolfram (1989, 33) as occurring where ‘the wrong sort of property or activity is predicated 
of the subject’. That description is suggestive that substantive metaphysical considerations 
have some sway here. There is a marked difference between selection errors and 
unquestionably ill-formed constructions (such as Wolfram’s example, ‘Cats blows the wind’ 
(1989, 32)), in that the former, but not the latter, clearly admit of internal negation. I see no 
reason for deeming selection errors either logically impossible or meaningless: I admit them 
as logical possibilities. Cf. Hodges (1977, 154) who deems them false.  
75 Cf. Collins (1967, 53). 
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Entrenched abuses of the notion of logical possibility and purported difficulties 
concerning its definition or its discernment have led some philosophers to regard it 
with some suspicion. Various positions, including revision of the notion and denial 
that logical possibility is any kind of possibility at all, have been adopted. 
Occasionally philosophers have appeared to advocate the elimination of the notion. 
I believe that such positions have arisen through the tendencies to too closely 
associate the very notion with the aforementioned abuses and to view metaphysical 
considerations concerning substantive possibility as a threat to the notion of logical 
possibility without bearing in mind the question as to what that notion is actually 
for. The tendency to revise the notion in light of one’s metaphysics is also 
manifested in work which is not motivated by suspicion of the notion. We have 
already seen this is the case of Putnam, who (at one time) allowed (purported) facts 
about the natures of actual existents such as water to delimit logical possibility. 
Similarly, Plantinga (1974, v, 1-2 and passim) proposes a notion of ‘broadly 
logical necessity’, intended to be implicated in the expression of substantive modal 
attributions de re,76 without ever asking what the notion of logical possibility is 
actually for, and without addressing the legitimacy or otherwise of his own usage. 
I view Plantinga’s proposal as both revisionary and, like his attempt to explicate 
essence and modality de re in terms of modality de dicto, misguided. I will briefly 
survey and criticize the views I reject. This will serve to substantiate my own 
position, which I take to be conservative.77 (Philosophers whose interests are 
primarily metaphysical ought to bear in mind the question as to the value of the 
notion of logical possibility so as not to be misled into providing a distorted 
account of its nature or adopting an unduly hostile attitude towards the notion.) 
 Eliminativism about logical necessity is not viable so neither is 
eliminativism about logical possibility.  It is worth noting that many accounts 
critical of the notion of logical possibility make no mention of its correlative. I take 
this to substantiate my suggestion that such accounts have tended to allow their 
own metaphysical commitments with regard to real possibility, and their attendant 
anti-empiricism, to cloud their philosophical judgment: surely, one who seeks to 
revise or banish logical possibility has either to revise by the same lights, or to 
deny the centrality to the notion of deductive consequence and the whole practice 
of philosophy of, its correlative. Neither course is tenable. 
                                                 
76 Cf. Plantinga (1970, 475), ‘a possible world is a state of affairs that could have obtained 
if it does not. Here “could have” expresses, broadly speaking, logical or metaphysical 
possibility.’ It is not clear that Plantinga takes ‘logical’ and ‘metaphysical’ to mark any 
distinction here. On my account, many states of affairs which could not have obtained 
nonetheless constitute logical possibilities. 
77 I take it that the notions of logical necessity and logical possibility are not pre-
philosophical. It may be suggested that there is no historically continuous notion of logical 
possibility at play, but various shifts from one notion of logical possibility to another: cf. 
Hacking (1975, 334-335). In so far as a core notion of logical necessity has persisted since 
ancient times this suggestion can be regarded as harmless to the case I will present. That 
there is such a core notion is suggested by McFetridge (1990, 136) after Aristotle, Prior 
Analytics, 24b19-22. 
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 Antipathy to the reckless applications to which empiricists have attempted 
to put the notion of logical possibility has led anti-empiricists to reckless views on 
that notion. For example, Cook (1994, 155) depicts ‘the idea of “logical 
possibility”’ as something which ‘burdens us’ if we adopt ‘the Humean view of 
causation’. Given the indispensability of logical necessity we can hardly agree that 
its correlative is burdensome. The point is, rather, that the notion has been abused 
and that we must recapture clarity by rending the notion free of the legacy of that 
abuse. It is the abuse which is burdensome and which is up for elimination, not the 
notion.78 Cook charges that ‘the idea of “logical possibility”...leads...to a peculiar 
view of the way in which philosophy is to construct and deal with examples’, i.e., 
that the notion has a detrimental effect upon philosophical methodology. The 
distinction I have defended between conceiving of (de re) and conceiving that (de 
dicto), affords the view that the ‘leading’ about which Cook is concerned comes 
about through historical accident, and through confusion, rather than being internal 
to the very notion of logical possibility. By the lights of the distinction, merely 
logically possibilities have significant bearing on neither our epistemology where 
matters a posteriori are concerned nor our substantive metaphysics.  
 Some philosophers (Rinaldi (1967, esp. 97); Seddon (1972, esp. 481); cf. 
Toulmin (1958, 169-172); Mason (1988, 11)) have claimed that ‘logical 
possibility’ is a misnomer which fosters confusion. According to Seddon (1972, 
481), 
 
we all know that it is not possible for a bar of iron to float on water...if 
we insist that it is nonetheless logically possible, we invite the comment 
that we are using the word ‘possible’ in a very odd way, and that we 
will need good reasons for such a striking departure from ordinary 
usage. I doubt that good reasons are forthcoming. 
 
My account of logical possibility is already equipped to deal with Seddon’s 
remarks since it maintains that it is not the case that it is logically possible for a 
bar of iron to float on water since this conflates modality de re and de dicto. When 
logical possibility is used, as is appropriate, to qualify a dictum, the difficulties 
alluded to by Seddon are avoided. This involves no deviant use of the word 
‘possible’. In addition, the notion of logical possibility is technical. There is no 
reason why it should comply with ‘ordinary usage’. Once we have a clear view of 
how the notion of logical possibility should properly serve us the difficulties which 
Seddon purports to present are entirely avoided. As long as it is clear, as I have 
recommended, that logical possibility talk is not just about genuinely possible 
                                                 
78 Mason (1988, 11) writes that the notion of logical possibility ‘has some uses...but in 
most circumstances it is a notion which (as Hume would say) we should commit to the 
flames’. This is an injudicious comment, since a notion is either up for elimination or not. 
The point is to discriminate between the legitimate and illegitimate applications of the 
notion. It is the latter which must be expunged from our philosophical practice, not the 
notion itself. This is in line with the tenor of Mason’s discussion. 
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states of affairs (i.e. ways the world could be), there is no need to be so extreme. 
We need only bear in mind that logical possibility qualifies dicta rather than 
concrete entities. Logical possibility is a variety of possibility, it is just that it is 
distinct from concrete possibility: there is no misnomer involved. 
 On my account, both empiricists and essentialists have been guilty of 
failing properly to observe demarcations between logic and metaphysics where 
modalities are concerned.79 I have sought to maintain a clear distinction, certainly 
in practice, and I hope also in theory, between merely logical modalities and 
substantive metaphysical modalities. In the words of Rasmussen (1983, 537), I 
claim that ‘confusion results from using “it is logically possible that” in reference 
to beings in rerum natura’. Unlike Rasmussen, I take this to be a sufficient 
condition for confusion.80 Rasmussen’s actual, and in my view subversive, 
intention is to use the word ‘logical’ in reference to the natures (essences) of 
concrete objects. Thus, he seeks to restrict logical possibility in a manner akin to 
that displayed by Hacking’s Kripke. As we have seen, a similar view is entailed by 
some of Putnam’s work, and is implicit in Plantinga’s category, intended to 
encompass essentialist modalities for concreta, and taken up by Davies (1981, 187-
201), of ‘broadly logical possibility’. My account conserves logical possibility, 
abandoning the pretension that logical possibilities involve reference to concrete 
entities. Rasmussen, Putnam, and Plantinga seek to uphold the pretension and 
revise logical possibility.81 We can distinguish between the extensional/real-
                                                 
79 Compare the case of the attendant failures to afford due recognition to the de re/de dicto 
distinction and to the form of essentialist claims. 
80 Rasmussen’s weaker claim is that 
 
confusion results from using ‘it is logically possible that’ in reference to 
beings in rerum natura, solid iron bars, cats, etc., but retaining a sense 
to the term ‘logical’ that confines the object of analysis to the [nominal] 
definition of the entities in question and not their respective natures. 
(1983, 537) 
 
81 It is with good reason that I tar Plantinga and Putnam with the same brush as their less-
renowned contemporary: all three philosophers give accounts of logical modality and 
modality de re which allow extensional factors pertaining to real essences to impinge upon 
the logical modalities. In a remark reminiscent of Putnam’s extensionalism, Rasmussen 
(1983, 533) complains that ‘appeals to “meaning”...do not constitute some special access to 
what is and is not logically possible for beings in rerum natura’. What this indicates, 
however, is the inappropriateness of the idea that logical possibility does so relate to 
concrete entities, rather than the need to revise the notion of logical possibility, relativising 
it to substantive considerations concerning the natures of real existents in the concrete 
realm. I take Rasmussen’s view to be the most misguided of the three, e.g., since, unlike 
Putnam and Plantinga, his account of concepts and logical possibility at least fails to explain 
how we can reason using concepts which lack extension and perhaps fails to allow for this. 
Rasmussen’s remark (1983, 515) that ‘concepts...are inherently relational and are 
necessarily of or about something other than themselves’, conjoined with his thoroughgoing 
extensionalism, suggests that only that which is instantiated can feature in our reasoning. 
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essential and intensional/nominal-essential aspects of concepts, which leaves room 
for the claim that logical possibilities relate at best to the latter. An essentialist 
view of concepts need not restrict logical possibilities in so far as we distinguish 
between de re and de dicto conceiving. On the account I have offered, after 
Wiggins, it is inconceivable for a solid iron bar to float on water, since an entity 
which can float on water does not have the persistence principle of a solid iron bar. 
Any conceiving going on can therefore not be conceiving of an iron bar. 
Nonetheless the logical possibility of the statement that an iron bar floats on water 
is in no way undercut. The restriction on conceiving de re is in virtue of 
metaphysical necessity de re: there is no such restriction on conceiving de dicto. 
Claims about the natures of concreta are not founded upon de dicto, or logical, 
necessities.82 The accounts of Rasmussen, Putnam and Plantinga show no 
awareness that there is logical room for the position I adopt according to which, 
for example, it is impossible for iron bars to float on water but logically possible 
that iron bars float on water.83 My account, unlike those I brand revisionary, 
respects the utility and the formal and a priori nature of the logical modalities. 
 
 
4.5 Closing Remark: Empiricism and Essentialism 
 
Despite their desire to eliminate metaphysics, the logical positivists did not banish 
substantive modal talk from their philosophy. Like empiricists before and since, 
they conflated the notions of logical possibility and substantive possibility, thus 
neither successfully banishing objective non-logical modalities nor properly 
respecting the useful notion of logical possibility. Some of those who responded to 
the empiricist abuse of logical possibility proposed their own revisions of the 
notion, others adopted eliminativist views. Such views are untenable and the 
motivation behind their adoption is undermined by clarifying the nature and utility 
of the notion of logical possibility. This, in turn, promotes the restriction of the 
notion to its proper role. 
 Despite the rejection of positivism and the vogue for broadly Aristotelian 
realism which took place, the conflation of logical modalities and metaphysical 
                                                 
82 Rasmussen (e.g., 1977, 117, 120, 122) is yet another example of a philosopher who takes 
true essentialist attributions about concreta to involve necessary truths. 
83 Machan, (1969, 40-42) complains about Hospers’s claim (1967, 173), that it is logically 
possible for a solid iron bar to float on water. Contrary to Machan’s apparent supposition, 
however, it does not follow from the rejection of Hospers’s claim that the proposition that 
an iron bar can float on water is not logically possible. Machan (1969; 1970) provides a 
disastrously revisionary account which relativizes logical possibility to epistemic 
considerations—although I am in sympathy with the implication (1970, 246) that the 
incorporation of certain indexical elements in logical possibility claims is illegitimate. His 
key arguments are unsound: e.g., he fails (1969, 41; 1970, 248-249) to respect the 
distinction (e.g., A.R. White (1975, 84)) between necessitas consequentiae and necessitas 
consequentis. To his discredit, Rasmussen (1977, 119-120; 1983, 537-538) uncritically 
accepts some of Machan’s misguided suggestions. 
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modalities de re was very apparent in the writings of many of those, including 
some of the most prominent, who adopted essentialist views. This was due to a 
lack of rigour concerning the observance of the de re/de dicto distinction and 
attendant matters. 
 The cogent essentialist, however, observes the de re/de dicto distinction, 
and the distinction between logical modalities and metaphysical modalities de re. 
The cogent essentialist, in addition, is well-placed to preserve and respect the core 
notions of logical possibility and necessity. This is a great advantage if the logical 
modalities are, as McFetridge has suggested, and I have agreed, crucial to the 
whole practice of reasoning from suppositions. 
 Opponents of classical empiricism, such as Kant84 and Hegel,85 
distinguished between merely logical possibility and real possibility, observing 
that logical possibility is, in Hegelian terms, an abstraction from the ontological 
process, rather than a feature thereof.86 So grand, and so derided, a metaphysician 
                                                 
84 Critique of Pure Reason [1781/1787](1933), A223/B270, A244/B302, A596/B624 n., cf. 
A220/B268. Kant, perhaps as an implicit rejoinder to Hume, repeatedly emphasizes that 
logical possibility is necessary but not sufficient for possibility in existence. As Körner 
(1955, 89-90) and Walsh (1975, 148) indicate, Kant’s ‘Postulates of Empirical Thought’ 
(A218/B265-266) employ objective non-logical modalities. Kant (A227/B279) writes that 
‘the third postulate...concerns material necessity in existence, and not merely formal and 
logical necessity in the connection of concepts’. 
85 The Science of Logic, Bk II, Pt 3, Ch. 2, ‘Actuality’ [1812-16](1969, 541-553). Useful 
comment occurs in Burbidge (1992, 39-51), Harris (1983, 189-212), Houlgate (1995), 
Johnson (1988, 142-145) and Mure (1950, 132-143). Hegel provides a threefold 
classification of modality: formal, real and absolute. Both real and (Hegelian) absolute 
necessity are, by my lights, notions of metaphysical modality de re. Real necessity is an 
aspect of the contingently actual: what contingently is renders many formal possibilities 
merely formal, i.e., it precludes their actualization. All possibility exists for Hegel, but some 
as ‘only possibility’ [1812-16](1969, 544), i.e., only as ‘present to thought’ (Burbidge 
(1992, 41)). Absolute necessity, ‘the determination of the parts by the principle of 
organization of the whole’ (Harris (1983, 207)), is the teleological dynamic of actuality the 
end of which, for Hegel, is freedom. (This unity of necessity and freedom compares with 
the Aristotelian conception of the human ergon as proairesis, an account of which is 
provided by Clark (1975, esp. 21-29).) 
86 Harris (1983, 193) comments: 
 
The logically possible...is an extremely thin and rather futile conception. 
Everything, as Hegel points out, is logically possible so long as one 
abstracts from all conditions of actuality....a hippogryph is logically 
possible only if we abstract from physiology. Physiologically a horse 
with the torso of a man in place of its neck and with a human head is 
altogether impossible and is actually self-contradictory. 
 
The point is, however, that Hegel’s notion of formal possibility intrinsically involves 
abstraction from actuality: ‘In the sense of this formal possibility everything is possible that 
is not self-contradictory’ (Hegel [1812-16](1969, 543)). The very notion introduces the 
abstraction, without need for any further act of abstraction. Cf. Burbidge’s comment (1992, 
43) that the formal modalities are ‘independent of content’. 
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as Hegel was opposed to the conflation of logical possibility and real possibility; 
yet those who sought to eliminate metaphysics were blinded to a distinction which, 
in comparison with many aspects of the apparatus of modern philosophy, is far 
from being sophisticated or obscure. It is ironic, given their insistence that there 
are no modalities in nature, that it is empiricists who have been guilty of obscuring 
the distinction. Real possibility cannot easily be forsaken, as is evidenced by the 
inappropriate role in which empiricists have sought to cast logical possibility, as a 
surrogate for the former notion. The irony is all the more pronounced in the case of 
a philosophy which called itself ‘logical’. It is unfortunate that the conflation has 
been perpetuated by neo-essentialists still under the spell of empiricism, since it is 
detrimental to metaphysics and the philosophy of logic and it obstructs the path to 
a sound modal epistemology, especially for modality de re. 
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